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About the Good Governance Learning
Network
The Good Governance Learning Network (GGLN) was founded in 2003 as an initiative to bring together civil
society organisations working in the field of local governance in South Africa to network and share information
and lessons towards the goal of strengthening participatory democratic local governance. Now in its second
phase (2007 – 2009), the network has taken on a more active focus on positively impacting on the local govern-
ance context in South Africa through collective learning, research, information dissemination and advocacy.
Vision
The vision of the GGLN is to create a strong civil society network that harnesses and builds the collective
expertise and energy of its members to contribute meaningfully to creating a system of participatory and
developmental local government in South Africa.
Objectives
The objectives of the network are to:
Share information and learning about local governance by creating an interface for organisations working in
this arena;
Document and disseminate best practices as well as produce information and research outputs that are of
benefit to various stakeholders involved in local governance processes, including communities and munici-
palities;
Advocate for changes in policy and practice to promote participatory local governance;
Promote the development and replication of innovative models for participatory local governance and pro-
poor development at the local level; and
Generate partnerships between civil society organisations, and between civil society and government at
various levels, to strengthen local governance processes.
Values
The GGLN is underpinned by the following values, which all members of the network commit themselves to:
Participatory and pro-poor governance;
Non-partisanship;
Constructive engagement with government and other stakeholders;
Working together in the interests of achieving the network’s objectives;
Sharing the benefits of membership amongst active members; and
Building the capacity of member organisations.
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Membership
Full membership of the GGLN is open to all South African registered non-profit organisations that have at least
one core programme that focuses specifically on issues of good governance at the local level.
The full members of the GGLN are:
Afesis-corplan
Built Environment Support Group (BESG)
Centre for Policy Studies (CPS)
Centre for Public Participation (CPP)
Community Law Centre, University of the Western Cape
Democracy Development Programme (DDP)
Electoral Institute of South Africa (EISA)
Fair Share
Foundation for Contemporary Research (FCR)
Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA)
Isandla Institute
Planact
Project for Conflict Resolution and Development (PCRD)
Trust for Community Outreach and Education (TCOE)
Contact:
Tel: 021 418 4173
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2008 marks the tenth anniversary
of the 1998 White Paper on Local
Government. As a result of the
White Paper, the form and
substance of local government
and governance in South Africa has
been fundamentally reshaped.
Through a suite of local government legislation
promulgated since 1998, South Africa now has a
system of “wall-to-wall” local government, responsi-
ble for basic service delivery and facilitating social
and economic development at local level. Statistics
show that more citizens than ever before now have
access to basic services such as water, sanitation
and electricity. Municipalities can take part of the
credit for this accomplishment. Local government
legislation has consolidated and opened up new
spaces for citizens to directly participate in their own
governance. Two local government elections have
passed, marking the consolidation of formal political
democracy at local level. In short, all the ingredients
have been assembled for effective, responsive and
participatory local government.
Yet, for all the achievements, in 2008 many
would argue that local government is in a state of
crisis. Observers point to the continued countrywide
community protests as an expression of a deep
malaise within this realm of governance in the
country. While there can be no disputing the impres-
sive scale of service delivery improvements, it would
seem that the patience of many marginalised
9hope that our report will contribute meaningfully to
generating a better understanding of the local
governance environment, of what has been achieved,
and the priorities and challenges that lie ahead. While
we also hope that the report will impact on improved
local government policy in the near future, our longer-
term objective is to participate in an ongoing process
of assessment and engagement in years to come.
Towards a review of
the state of local
governance
When we embarked on what we soon realised was
the very ambitious undertaking of compiling a review
of the state of local governance in South Africa, we
had a great deal of enthusiasm but little in the way of
method. What we wanted to achieve was fairly clear:
a critical but constructive review of the full spectrum
of local governance issues in South Africa. Besides
being the first review of this nature, the undertaking
was unique in that it was firmly rooted in civil
society. We were motivated by the awareness that
civil society had previously engaged local govern-
ance, but had seldom offered a vocal and coherent
assessment of the core issues. While we recognise
that civil society can be considered the “significant
other” in local governance, equally responsible to
play its part in ensuring good governance, for the
purpose of this review our particular interest was in
providing an independent review of the role and
responsibilities of local government.
The obvious challenge was to offer a frank and
independent critique of local government without
ignoring the very real social and economic con-
straints that confront municipalities. Most impor-
tantly, the purpose of this review is not to malign but
to support government in its efforts to bring about
more effective, democratic and pro-poor local
governance for the citizens of the country.
citizens, who have waited quietly on the sidelines for
their turn, has finally run out.
In many cases perceptions of service failure are
compounded by perceptions of unresponsive
councillors and officials and mismanagement and
corruption. Too many municipalities appear to be
significantly dysfunctional, unable to manage their
finances and incapable of carrying out their most
basic service delivery mandates. In many cases,
municipalities have not complied with even the most
basic legislated prescriptions to ensure that govern-
ance is transparent and participatory. Indeed,
national government itself has recognised many of
these shortcomings, with programmes such as
Project Consolidate being initiated to try and bring
about some measure of functionality amongst the
country’s most troubled municipalities.
As a network of civil society organisations active
in the field of local governance, we have witnessed
the development of South Africa’s new system of
local government over the past decade, and have
observed its successes and shortcomings. In
addition, a number of our member organisations
have been active public commentators on a variety of
local governance issues. In June 2006 the network
reached a decisive phase in its own development,
with the realisation that it was time to collectively
document and share our experience and understand-
ing of the local governance environment. In the
following eighteen months our collective energies
were thus dedicated to producing this report.
The publication of the report comes while
government is in the midst of its own review of local
(and provincial) governance structures, processes
and outcomes. For this purpose, it has circulated a
comprehensive set of questions pertaining to the
operations of democracy at local level, the structures
of local governance, public-private partnerships,
service delivery, the environment and funding.1 We
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This report draws on background research conducted
by Dr Stephen Rule for the GGLN. Four workshops
with GGLN members helped to refine the approach
and to identify the substantive issues to be ad-
dressed.2 A first draft of the report was subjected to
further review and revision by different members of
the network.
This first 2008 report established the framework
which the GGLN will use to review the state of local
governance in the future. It also provides an impor-
tant baseline analysis against which future reviews
will assess key local government issues and trends.
The GGLN has also committed itself to a methodol-
ogy that involves intensive interaction with a broad
cross-section of civil society organisations and
formations. Through this method and the ongoing
projects that GGLN members share with local
communities, this review can claim with confidence
that the views expressed in the report, if not fully
representative, are at least indicative of organised
civil society in South Africa.
Background and
context
Since the advent of democracy in South Africa,
enormous strides have been made in the implemen-
tation of a comprehensive system of government at
the local level. The basis of local government is the
current demarcation of the entire country into 283
municipalities3. Every part of the country thus falls
within a municipal area and is subject to the
governance of an elected municipal council which
employs officials to provide a range of services to
the local population.
Legislation facilitates the active participation of
members of the local community in the affairs of the
municipality, including the formulation of Integrated
Development Plans (IDPs) and municipal budgets.
The Municipal Systems Act (32 of 2000) requires
municipalities to promote public participation and to
build the capacity of residents, councillors and
municipal officials to engage in participatory
processes. As a means of tracking progress in this
area the executive of a municipality is obliged to
report annually on the level of public participation in
municipal matters.
In terms of the Municipal Demarcation Act of 1998, the
country currently comprises 283 municipalities. Six of
these are Metropolitan Municipalities (Category A), 231
are Local Municipalities (Category B) and 46 are District
Municipalities (category C).
Judgements by the Constitutional Court in 2006 on
Matatiele and Doctors for Life served to strengthen the
obligation of Local Government to encourage, capacitate
and support processes of public participation (De Visser
& Baatjies, 2007).
Among the services which South African municipali-
ties are required to provide to residents within their
demarcated areas are water, electricity, sanitation,
street lighting, solid waste disposal, and the con-
struction and maintenance of roads.
Additionally, local governments are required to
promote and encourage the development of local
economies and facilitate the reduction of poverty.
While successes in the provision of these services
are quantifiable, a more important issue in the long
term is the extent to which these service levels and
prevailing standards of local democracy and
accountability contribute to good local governance.
Such an assessment requires a firm grasp of the
meaning of good governance.
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Several definitions influence South African discourse
on good local governance. The official concept of local
good governance is suggested in chapter 7 of the
Constitution, the Local Government White Paper, the
Municipal Structures Act (117 of 1998) and the
Municipal Systems Act. Equally influential understand-
ings emerge from the private sector where good
corporate governance emphasises transparency,
accountability, efficiency, productivity and profit
maximisation. The World Bank and International
Monetary Fund usage of governance discourse is
closely related to the concept of good corporate
governance. From the perspective of development
agencies and NGOs, good governance attempts “to
capture the multitude of interactions that occur be-
tween citizens and the local state”. A further approach
to good governance has its roots in the United Nation’s
(UN) concept of human rights (Hollands, 2003).
such as accountability, participation and the enjoyment
of human rights, UN resolution 2000/64 rejects prescrip-
tive approaches to development assistance. Resolution
2001/72, contained in the Millennium Development
Report, reiterates the view that better governance means
greater participation coupled with accountability.
Furthermore, in the Millennium Declaration, members
of the UN observed that the creation of an environment
conducive to development and the elimination of poverty
is dependent on good governance within each country.
In this view, local good governance is a vital building
block to eventual nationwide good governance practice.
In spite of the merits of the broader concept
suggested by civil society and the international definition,
a narrow corporate governance approach is most
influential in practice. This is attributable to the greater
ease with which the mere existence of procedures and
policies can be assessed and measured (using the
conventions of institutional accounting and auditing),
in comparison with their actual outcomes. Importantly,
the fundamental intention of corporate governance was
never to create a state that is friendly and responsive to
its citizens. Instead it is geared to creating an environ-
ment that is attractive to investors. Within this paradigm
citizens are seen as clients who must get services and
products commensurate with what they can afford.
Corporate governance finds value in the public
sector because it holds the potential to enhance and
maintain confidence in public institutions. By implication,
public relations and good impressions may feature more
prominently in the corporate governance approach than
frank and honest communication (Hollands, 2003).
This thinking has been evident during Good Governance
Surveys conducted by Afesis-corplan where there was
often a mismatch between the overwhelmingly positive
portrayal of municipal affairs by council officials and
the realities reported by citizens.
The NGO sector in South Africa has generally
tended to borrow from all of the governance models.
Viewed within the UN human rights prism, good
governance is a process by which public institutions
conduct public affairs, manage public resources and
guarantee the realisation of human rights4. According
to this approach, these endeavours should be accom-
plished in a manner that is free of abuse and corrup-
tion and within the confines of the rule of law. Accord-
ingly, a true manifestation of good governance is
delivery of basic human rights including the right to
health, adequate housing, sufficient food, quality
education, social justice and personal security. While
acknowledging the link between good governance and
sustainable development and emphasising principles
 good governance is a process by which public institutions
conduct public affairs, manage public resources and
guarantee the realisation of human rights.
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The Good Governance Survey developed by Afesis-
corplan, for example, set out to establish a balance
between the efficiency prerogatives of governance
and the participation and accountability concerns of
the NGO movement. Senior municipal officials and
consultants steeped in the corporate governance
tradition have mastered the rhetoric of “participation
and engagement” but are often reluctant – or
possibly lack the capability – to include indicators of
these principles in monitoring instruments. This
narrow approach to good governance inhibits the
development of a more meaningful form of civil
society engagement with local government that
would entail greater participation and consultation
with a wide range of stakeholders in decision-making
processes.
Towards a definition of good governance
A useful starting point towards defining good governance is provided by the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD)5, which sets out eight major characteristics of good governance:
Participation: A key cornerstone of good governance is participation by both men and women. Participation
can be either direct or through legitimate intermediate institutions or representatives. It is important to
point out that representative democracy does not necessarily mean that the concerns of the most vulnerable
in society are taken into consideration in decision-making. Participation needs to be informed and organ-
ised. This means freedom of association and expression on the one hand and an organised civil society on
the other hand.
Transparency: When decisions are taken and enforced, this must be done in keeping with rules and regula-
tions. Transparency also means that information is freely available and directly accessible to those who will
be affected by such decisions and their enforcement. It also means that enough information is provided and
that it is provided in accessible forms and media.
Effectiveness and efficiency: Good governance means that processes and institutions produce results that
meet the needs of society while making the best use of resources at their disposal. The concept of efficiency
in the context of good governance also covers the sustainable use of natural resources and the protection of
the environment.
Responsiveness: Good governance requires that institutions and processes try to serve all stakeholders
within a reasonable timeframe.
Accountability: This is a key requirement of good governance. Not only governmental institutions but also
the private sector and civil society organisations must be accountable to the public and to their institutional
stakeholders. Who is accountable to whom varies depending on whether decisions or actions taken are
internal or external to an organisation or institution. In general an organisation or an institution is account-
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Governance is complex and comprises multiple
dimensions. After deliberation the GGLN has
concluded that although there are many aspects that
can be evaluated when reviewing good governance,
for practical purposes and replicability it is necessary
to limit the scope of the review to a number of
dimensions and to delineate key issues within these.
The starting point of such an exercise lies in the
objects of local government as set out in the
Constitution.
able to those who will be affected by its decisions or actions. Accountability cannot be enforced without
transparency and the rule of law.
Consensus oriented: There are many actors and as many viewpoints in a given society. Good governance
requires mediation of the different interests in society to reach a broad consensus on what is in the best
interest of the whole community and how this can be achieved. It also requires a broad and long-term
perspective on what is needed for sustainable human development and how to achieve the goals of such
development. This can only result from an understanding of the historical, cultural and social contexts of a
given society or community.
Equity and inclusiveness: A society’s well-being depends on ensuring that all its members feel that they
have a stake in it and do not feel excluded from the mainstream of society. This requires that all groups, but
particularly the most vulnerable, have opportunities to improve or maintain their well-being.
Rule of law: Good governance requires fair legal frameworks that are enforced impartially. It also requires
full protection of human rights, particularly those of minorities. Impartial enforcement of laws requires an
independent judiciary and an impartial and incorruptible police force.
Objects of local government
Section 152 of the South African Constitution states that the objects of local government are:
To provide democratic and accountable government for local communities;
To ensure the provision of services to communities in a sustainable way;
To promote social and economic development;
To promote a safe and healthy environment; and
To encourage the involvement of communities and community organisations in the matters of local
government.
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After consideration of both government and civil
society conventions for understanding and reviewing
good governance, the GGLN has adopted a frame-
work that focuses on three key and inter-related
aspects of local governance against which local




Democracy goes beyond representative democracy to
include the existence and general well-being of
democratic systems, procedures, practices and
democratic culture at municipal level. As the OECD
definition suggests, responsiveness means that
municipalities seek to be sensitive to, and serve, the
needs of all stakeholders within a reasonable
timeframe. Accountability implies that municipalities
are accountable to those who will be affected by their
plans, decisions or actions.
2. Planning and budgeting
Whilst often perceived as responsibilities that fall
within the realm of technocratic professionalism,
planning and budgeting have clear political dimen-
sions, as they privilege particular outcomes,
prioritise some actions or outcomes over others, and
determine how resources are allocated to achieve the
intended outcomes. It is recognised internationally
that interactive grassroots participation is not only a
means to achieve better planning and budgeting
processes and results, but there is also an intrinsic
value in these processes.
3. Equitable service delivery
and poverty reduction
This focuses on the implementation of municipal
plans and the allocation of resources in a manner
that enhances human, social and economic develop-
ment in local communities. It implies that all
residents and groups have opportunities to enhance
or maintain their well-being, with particular priority
given to those who are most marginalised.
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Figure 1 illustrates the framework for reviewing local
governance, as adopted by the GGLN. It shows the
three aspects of good governance as interconnected,
each aspect influencing the other two. It also
illustrates that the efficient functioning of each of the
three aspects requires, on the one hand, integrity and
perceptiveness at the level of council and adequate
professional and technical skills within the adminis-
tration. On the other hand, this institutional capabil-
ity must be matched by, informed by and augmented




This review expands on the framework summarised
in figure 1, making preliminary assessments of the
extent to which good local governance is in
evidence, especially from a public participation
perspective. The sections that follow commence
with a set of questions that unpack the particular
aspect of local governance under review and guide
the analysis of that particular aspect. It is envis-
aged that future reviews may elaborate further on
both the questions posed and the analysis
presented.
No new empirical research was undertaken in
the compilation of this report. The review draws on
secondary sources of research conducted and
documentation produced by the member organisa-
tions of the GGLN and other analysts.
It is envisaged that similar reviews will be
conducted regularly on the basis of the ongoing work
and analysis of GGLN members. The insight from
project work of GGLN members will be supplemented
by innovative research methodologies aimed at
collecting data on aspects of local governance about
which there is currently inadequate information.
It is important to view this review report as a
work in progress. We are well aware of the dynamic
nature of the local governance environment in South
Africa, and we expect that in time our framework and
guiding questions will be adjusted and further
refined. The GGLN will consider responses and








To what extent do members of the public have trust in their
municipalities?
What is the role of protest as a vehicle for the public to
express their attitudes towards local government?
To what extent have municipalities developed local policies
regulating the functioning of ward committees?
How well are ward committees functioning?
Are the nomination and election procedures for ward
committee members equitable and credible?
Are ward committees representative of local communities?
To what extent do ward committees influence council
decision-making?
What alternatives to ward committees exist to enable public
participation in local government?
In evaluating emerging local level democracy in
South Africa, it is important to bear in mind that
well-established liberal democracies largely fail to
develop effective links between their citizens and the
institutions and processes of government. This
reduces the quality and vibrancy of the democracy
and the level of accountability in the system (Hicks,
2006)6. Thus South Africa’s on-going development of
municipal democracy occurs in a context where the
so-called historical “models” of democracy have a
crisis of their own. The quality of democracy in
South African local governance can be assessed in
terms of the opportunities that exist for public
participation; transparency of municipal processes;
systems and accountability; the extent of corruption;
and the nature of the relationships between elected
representatives and officials.
Several measures can be used to assess these
indicators. What follows is a synthesis of GGLN and
other contributions to the quantification of each of
these five indicators.
However, before embarking on a discussion of
indicators largely in terms of their instrumental use,
it is useful to consider the issues of democracy,
responsiveness and accountability in relation to
impact and how that impact might be measured.
Various research tools may be used to register the
existence of democracy, responsiveness and ac-
countability but the ultimate evidence of such
qualities probably lies in the extent to which the
public trust government and comply with it. Obvi-
ously this does not preclude the possibility that trust
could be based on the fictitious rendition of such
qualities by government and that compliance can be
won through subtle combinations of manipulation
and coercion.
Indeed public trust may be regarded as a proxy
indicator of the existence of these qualities. Public
attitudes towards a range of issues, including local
government, have been measured in successive
nationally representative surveys by the Human
Sciences Research Council (HSRC), Idasa’s
Afrobarometer and other organisations over the last
decade.
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The reality is that the level of trust in local government has repeatedly
emerged as low across the country and its different social and
demographic categories.
1999 2000 2001 2003 2004 2005
48,0 36,5 37,9 42,8 54,6 48,1
Source: HSRC survey databases
Asked in 2005 to indicate the extent to which they
trust or distrust local government in South Africa,
less than half (48,1%) said that ‘I trust’ or ‘I strongly
trust’ my local government. More than one third
(35,5%) distrust or strongly distrust their local
government.
Table 1: % Strongly trust or trust local government, 1999-2005
Table 2: To what extent do you trust/distrust your local government?
Source: South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS), HSRC, 2005
Strongly trust 12,6
Trust 35,5
Neither trust nor distrust 13,8
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Levels of trust of local government in 2005 (48,1%)
are substantially lower than those of provincial
government (59,5%) or national government
(64,3%).
The level of trust varies geographically by province
and type of settlement. Two-thirds of people in the
Eastern Cape trust or strongly trust their local
government, as do about half of those in
Mpumalanga, Free State, North West, KwaZulu-Natal
and Limpopo (table 3). The fact that there is no
correlation between trust in local government and
regional trends in maladministration and corruption,
Figure 2: Levels of trust in different spheres of government





















needs to be examined carefully. Good Governance
Surveys conducted in small Eastern Cape municipali-
ties in the period 1999 to 2001 suggest a degree of
empathy between poorly serviced communities and
their largely dysfunctional municipalities seemingly
based on the sentiment that ‘we are all in it together’
(Afesis-corplan, 2004).
  Trust 66,6 53,2 52,5 50,6 49,1 47,4 41,0 37,9 37,0 48,1
  Neutral 14,8 9,8 16,1 11,4 14,0 12,1 23,0 25,1 21,2 16,4
  Distrust 18,7 37,1 31,5 37,9 36,9 40,6 36,0 37,2 41,8 35,5
  Total 100,1 100,1 100,1 99,0 100,0 100,1 100,0 100,2 100,0 100,0
Table 3: Trust in local government by province
EC MP FS NW KZN LP NC TotalWC GP
Source: SASAS, 2005, HSRC
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In contrast, only just over one-third of those in
Gauteng and the Western Cape trust or strongly trust
their local government. At the same time these
provinces generally have the most highly developed
municipal infrastructures and better records of
uninterrupted service. Service users who are better
educated and have higher expectations of service
delivery tend to be more critical of government.
 People living in the tribal areas of the country
have a much higher (58,6%) level of trust in their
local government than do their counterparts in
formal rural or urban environments (table 4). There
is little evidence to suggest however that tribal
areas are relatively free of corruption or
maladministration. Consequently, this trust could
be misplaced.
Tribal Rural formal Urban informal Urban formal Total
Trust 58,6 46,7 43,8 43,6 48,1
Neutral 10,8 22,9 12,7 19,2 16,4
Distrust 30,7 15,4 43,6 37,3 35,5
Total 100,1 100,0 100,1 100,0 100,0
Table 4: Trust in local government by type of settlement
Source: SASAS, 2005, HSRC
What underlies these excessively low levels of trust
in local government? It is critical for municipalities
to understand that grassroots social movements
frequently lack the capacity and resources to engage
in public participation through the formal channels
provided by municipalities. This results in high levels
of frustration and in behaviour ranging from
cynicism and disengagement in some communities
to overtly aggressive protest in others.
Un-regulated civil
engagement with the state
Non-regulated forms of participation, often the
strategies of the poor and marginalised are often
cast, especially by the state, as the work of “anar-
chists”, “counter revolutionaries” or even as “siding
with the bourgeoisie and its supporters” (McKinley,
2004). The most extreme form of public participation
is violent public protest. During 2005 there were
protests in 90 of the 136 weak municipalities
targeted for central government assistance and there
were 881 illegal and 5 085 legal protests in
municipalities through 2004/05 (Johnston, 2007).
Fakir suggests that the motivations for this protest
activity can be split into two broad categories (Fakir,
2006). One is social movement or civic activity with
a strategy and alternative policy. This activity is
characterised by a distinct ideological position,
namely opposition to what is seen as the neo-liberal
trajectory of government policy. Such activity tends
to have a political identity and includes organised
structures and regular meetings. The other category
of social protest comprises spontaneous
expressions of frustration against the failure of local
government to meet basic needs. However it also
focuses on the perceived lack of transparency in
municipal decision-making, and the lack of
responsiveness by local politicians (Fakir, 2006).
While its focus may ostensibly be poor service, it
is alert to the link between poor services and a lack
of accountability and transparency in local
government.
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In response to these developments, government
invariably claims that it carries no responsibility for
unrealistic service expectations and the operation of
social forces that seek to usurp the authority of the
state. A study of popular violence in Phumelela (Free
State) and Khutsong, which was controversially
incorporated into North West province rather than
Gauteng (Johnston, 2007) suggests that government
policy may itself be the source of this breakdown in
civility. The study contends that Local economic
development (LED) and IDP policies simply function
as “wish lists” that raise expectations because they
are difficult to implement and have little or no impact
on local investment, jobs or growth.
Johnston suggests that local politicians and officials
need to significantly re-formulate their understanding
of policies such as the IDP or LED and the likely
strategies for economic growth that would succeed
outside of the metropolitan areas and those few
successful, mainly tourist-based, urban nodes. It is
contended that local and regional investors are
unlikely to take the risks required or be convinced by
the economic orthodoxy of politicians or officials
(Johnston, 2007).
In other instances the actions of municipal
authorities have directly weakened citizen-state
relations in local governance. A study by Pithouse
(2006) reports the confrontation between officials
and dissatisfied residents of informal settlements in
eThekwini Municipality’s Clare Estate and Reservoir
Hills. Longstanding ANC supporters were unhappy
with their councillors, the worsening material
conditions in the settlements, threats of forced
removal and the failure of a decade of engagement in
official public participation processes. Organised
together as Abahlali baseMjondolo they decided to
boycott the March 2006 local government elections,
using the slogan “No Land, No House, No Vote”.
Abahlali were effectively banned from undertaking
any meaningful political activity outside of the
settlements in the run-up to the election. The City
Mob hacks councillor to death
An ANC councillor in Deneysville (Free State), Mr Ntai Mokoena, was hacked to death in a service delivery
riot on 2 July 2007. A crowd of about 500 went on the rampage in Metsimaholo township, stoning
Mokoena’s and another councillor’s home in the area before setting a municipal building alight. The mob
had gathered early on Monday to protest over the apparent lack of service delivery in the area. Their anger
turned to violence when they confronted Mokoena near his home. Eleven people were arrested for public
violence. The chairperson of the Free State ANC, Mr Ace Magashule, condemned the killing as the work of
“anarchist elements within opposition parties”.
Lee Rondganger http://www.iol.co.za (3 July 2007)
Good governance is weakened when engagement between
citizens and the state moves outside the bounds of constitu-
tional principles and the provisions of a democratically estab-
lished legislative framework.
The gap between the technical promise of plans drawn up by
experts and the reality experienced by citizens may lead to a
fracturing of the already tenuous legitimacy that local people
accord to municipal authority.
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Manager first banned an Abahlali march in November
2005 and while he continued to ban marches Abahlali
were reported to be subject to various incidents of
illegal police assault and detention. There were more
than a hundred arrests. Pithouse further suggests
that the police were used to prevent the Abahlali
from taking up an invitation to appear on the SABC
talk show Asikhulume. The Abahlali took the City
Manager to the High Court in February 2006, where
the judge issued an interdict against the City and the
police, preventing them from interfering with the
shack dwellers’ right to march. After the court
victory, thousands of shack dwellers marched into
the city and presented a memorandum to the office
of the KwaZulu-Natal provincial MEC for housing.
Such direct suppression is fairly unusual – local
politicians generally respond in different ways which
may include a mixture of co-option, empathy and
coercion. In the area known as E-section of Umlazi,
ANC and SACP activists who were unhappy with their
councillor, fielded an independent in the elections
(Pithouse, 2006). Supporters of the independent
candidate claimed that there was widespread
intimidation in the lead up to the election, including
death threats and assaults. They also alleged that
there had been blatant fraud during the election. On
the day after the election they staged a protest in the
course of which the Public Order Policing Unit shot
dead a young woman near the protest and seriously
wounded the independent candidate in his home. An
organisation called Women of Umlazi was formed in
response and organised a large march on 31 March
2006. Two former SACP activists who had worked
closely with the independent campaign and the
march organisers, were later assassinated, while
others survived assassination attempts. The MEC
denied that the violence was politically motivated.
Thereafter, Women of Umlazi organised weekly mass
meetings. Two of the council’s employees were
arrested for one of the murders. Pithouse (2006)
concluded that the Abahlali experience showed that
the existence of real and severe grievances does not
necessarily result in popular protest if communities
are run democratically and autonomously. Party
loyalists, slum lords and various alliances thereof
may act to suppress popular action through eco-
nomic power, violence and intimidation. Pithouse
however notes that the influence of such forces can
be overcome through legitimate popular democratic
opposition.
In further comparisons with Heller’s account of
the experience of Kerala, a state in India and Brazil’s
Porto Alegre, where the authorities are proponents of
“people’s planning”, Pithouse (2006) argues that the
route to more effective opportunities for public
participation in South Africa will come from popular
struggles for democratisation waged outside of the
direct control of the party and state.
Legislated participation
The right of citizens to participate in governance and
government process is enshrined in the Constitution
and further protected through legislation and various
policy frameworks.
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Legislative and policy provisions for citizen participation in local governance in South
Africa
I. Constitution
Section 152(1)(e): obliges municipalities to encourage the involvement of communities and community
organisations in local government
Section 195(e): in terms of the basic values and principles governing public administration- people’s
needs must be responded to, and the public must be encouraged to participate in policy-making
II. White Paper on Local Government (1998)
The objects of community participation are embedded in the following principles:
To ensure political leaders remain accountable and work within their mandate
To allow citizens to have continuous input into local politics
To allow consumers of services to have input on the way services are delivered
To afford organised civil society the opportunity to enter into partnerships with local government
III. The Municipal Structures Act (1998)
Municipal executives must annually report on the involvement of communities in the affairs of the
municipality
Section 72 and 74 state that the object of a ward committee is to enhance participatory democracy in
local government
IV.The Municipal Systems Act (2000)
Section 16(1) requires the municipality to develop a culture of municipal governance that complements
formal representative government with a system of participatory governance
Section 4 (2):
1. Municipal Councils must encourage the involvement of the local community
2. Municipal Councils must consult the community about the level, quality, range and impact of
services
Section 5 and Chapter 5: members of the community have the right to contribute to the decision
making process of the municipality, including the IDP
V. Municipal Finance Management Act
Section 23 obliges municipalities to consult the local community on its draft budget.
The ward committee
system
Since 2001 ward committees have emerged as the
principal structure through which citizen participa-
tion in local governance is expected to take place.
What follows is an analysis of the effectiveness of
these committees as vehicles for meaningful public
participation.
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Municipal policies for ward
committees
Municipalities have broad discretion in framing the
local operating policies for their ward committees.
Many municipalities have chosen to simply codify the
provisions that already exist in national legislation
(primarily the Municipal Structures Act). For exam-
ple, the Newcastle Municipality (2007), has adopted
such an approach. The ward committees are ex-
pected to discharge their responsibilities by making
inputs on any matter affecting the ward, in the form
of recommendations to council via the ward council-
lor. The ward committees function as advisory
committees to the ward councillors and as “a
resource to the Council.” The ward committees may
not incur expenditure on behalf of council. The policy
clarifies that the functions and powers of ward
committees do not permit interference with the
Council’s right to govern and to exercise its executive
and legislative authority. Council reserves the right
whenever it deems necessary, to amend or revoke
any power or function delegated to a ward
committee.
Public awareness of ward
committees
Municipal Structures
The Municipal Structures Act (1998) requires that municipalities in South Africa be managed as one of three
broad categories:
Mayoral Executive: Council elects Executive Mayor, who in turn appoints Executive Mayoral Committee
Executive Committee: Council elects Executive Committee, which in turn elects Mayor from its
membership
Plenary Executive: Municipal Council takes all decisions about the municipality; Council elects the
Chairperson, who is called the Mayor
In order to operate, municipalities require a Council, Speaker (Council Chairperson), Executive Committee
(if applicable to the type) and Committees of Council (Section 79 or 80).
Should a Council decide to have ward committees, these should be established in each ward. Council is
required to make administrative arrangements to enable ward committees to perform their functions and
exercise their powers efficiently. The role of a ward committee is to make recommendations on matters
affecting its ward to the councillor or through the ward councillor to the Council (IDASA, 2006).
In 2005 less than half (43%) of South African adults had some
knowledge of ward committees
In 2005 less than half (43%) of South African adults
had some knowledge of ward committees in their
areas, some do not know (23%) and the remainder
were not sure (34%) (Hemson, undated). Signifi-
cantly, SASAS respondents reporting “no income”
have the highest knowledge of ward committees
(51%) while those in the highest personal income
category have the lowest level of knowledge (32%).
Knowledge of ward committees declines steadily with rising
income categories.
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Knowledge of ward committees declines steadily with
rising income categories. Knowledge of ward
committees emerged as highest in the poorest
provinces (Eastern Cape 66% and Limpopo 63%), in
contrast to lows of 19% in the Western Cape and
36% in Gauteng (table 5). In the Western Cape and
KwaZulu-Natal, delayed introduction of the new ward
committee system owing to political opposition in
these two provinces might also account for lower
levels of knowledge.
Table 5: Knowledge of ward committee in area of residence, by province
Source: SASAS, 2005, HSRC
66%
EC LP FS KZN NW MP GP NC WC
63% 54% 43% 41% 37% 36% 34% 19%
By settlement type, ward committees were far better
known in informal settlements (61%) than in urban
formal areas (35%).
Urban informal Tribal  Hostels Urban formal Smallholdings Farms
61% 59% 57% 35% 22% 10%
Table 6: Knowledge of ward committee in area of residence, by settlement type
Source: SASAS, 2005, HSRC
Despite the generally higher level of knowledge of
ward committees among the poor and thus the
possibility of greater levels of participation, knowl-
edge of ward committees does not appear to lead to
greater confidence in local government.
were aware of ward committees as forums for
community participation. They reported to know
about the existence of these committees in their
localities. It is however, notable that only 17% of
respondents in Delmas Local Municipality could
confirm that ward committees exist in their munici-
pality. Conversely, 95% of those surveyed in Steve
Tshwete Local Municipality reported that they do
exist. By contrast, knowledge of the existence of
development forums was scanty. Only 22% of
respondents in the district knew about the existence
of development forums, the degree of awareness
again being highest in Steve Tshwete Local Munici-
pality. The degree to which the various forums are
publicised has a clear influence on community
participation, making it essential for local municipali-
ties to publicise sufficiently all the forums for
knowledge of ward committees does not appear to lead to
greater confidence in local government.
There was a decline of trust in local government from
61% to 50% in the period 2004 to 2005 where ward
committees are known.
In a Good Governance Survey conducted in the
six local municipalities of the Nkangala District
Municipality (Mpumalanga province) in 2006/07, an
average of 61% of members of the public and CBOs
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community participation. It was found that 64% of
the members of the public and CBOs in Delmas Local
Municipality and 49% of those in Emalahleni Local
Municipality believe that there are no forums for
community participation in their municipality. An
average of 42% of the members of the public and
CBOs in the Nkangala District reported that they




Issues of public knowledge and functionality
notwithstanding, ward committees appear to exist
across the country. For example, of the 365 wards in
Mpumalanga, 363 had serving ward committees by
January 2007. Similarly, only two out of 365 wards
in North West had not established committees by
this date. The process was not as rapid as
government would have liked. A South African Local
Government Association (SALGA) national
conference in September 2004 found that of a
potential 3200 ward committees, only 2700 had been
established (Idasa and Afesis-corplan, 2004).
Operation of ward committees
A study in the City of Johannesburg (Himlin, 2005)
found that, with a few exceptions, ward committees
were in operation, meetings were scheduled monthly
and attendance was regular. Most ward committees
had established systems for replacing members,
although these did not always follow council policy.
Minutes of meetings were mostly taken by Council
staff, but these were not usually available to anyone
outside of the committee.
A simultaneous survey of Johannesburg ward
councillors (Himlin, 2005) identified a number of
problems preventing successful operation of the
ward committees. As with previous surveys by
Afesis-corplan, Idasa and others the most common
reasons cited were a lack of clarity around the roles
of the ward committee and a lack of resources
available to conduct their activities. Lack of skills and
ineffective communication with the community were
also identified as important limitations. Ward
committee communication with the public generally
took the form of community meetings. Newspapers,
pamphlets or e-mail were more occasionally used.
Community focus groups conducted during the
research revealed a general lack of awareness of
nomination and election procedures.
the most common reasons cited were a lack of clarity around the
roles of the ward committee and a lack of resources available to
conduct their activities.
The majority of ward committees seemed to operate
without a direct connection to any specific sectoral
interests. Most ward committee members saw their
councillor as primarily responsible for monitoring
progress in the ward. Most were unaware of how
council monitors its progress and respondents
complained of a lack of clear accounting of what was
planned for the ward against what was actually
achieved. While the principle of non-partisan
representation was known, conflict had occurred in
relation party political issues (Himlin, 2005).
In common with other ward committee research
Himlin found that ward committee members who did
The majority of ward committees seemed to operate without a
direct connection to any specific sectoral interests.
ward committee members who did not enjoy livelihood security
found the structured demands of the ward committee system
hard to bear.
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not enjoy livelihood security found the structured
demands of the ward committee system hard to bear.
Under these circumstances, ward committee mem-
bers tend to cast themselves as overworked volun-
teers in service of government and community. While
understandable, this perception is at odds with the
notion of ward committees as forums that provide an
opportunity for civil society to engage local govern-
ment.
Research amongst local government policy-
makers in KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) reveals that the
potential contribution of ward committees to
municipal planning and development is restricted on
several fronts. There is a lack of expertise and
technical capacity amongst many members of ward
committees and no allocation of municipal resources
to enable them to contribute effectively to municipal
processes. It should be noted however that the
notion that government is obliged to capacitate civil
society for engagement around technical functions is
not one that is universally accepted and the notion of
accredited training for ward committee members for
example, sponsored by the state, could be viewed as
both onerous on the state and potentially undermin-
ing of true civil society engagement within the non-
state sector. However the real problems that confront
ward committees in KZN may be quite basic;
municipal officials appear to be unprepared to
engage with the public and therefore unreceptive to
active public participation (Hicks, 2006).
Election of ward committees
In Idasa/Afesis-corplan research, Tzaneen was cited
as exemplifying a fairly common practice where
different electoral procedures are instituted for urban
and rural wards. In urban areas, existing structures
send their nominations to a meeting to be confirmed
by residents of the ward. In rural areas, villages and
farming communities constituting a ward send their
nominated representatives to serve directly as
members of the ward committee. Idasa/Afesis-
corplan found various permutations of this system
operating across different municipalities in 2004. An
interesting trend that emerged was that traditionally
voiceless and disadvantaged people tended to be
over-represented on ward committees – possibly
because the powerful economic interests and middle
class did not take the ward committee system
seriously.
Party political influence played a significant role
in the nomination process in some municipalities.
Buffalo City for example, held multi-party caucuses
to get inter-party consensus on the nomination
process. Ward councillors generally had a direct role
in deciding which interests would be recognised
within their ward. Few councillors or ward committee
members agreed with the principle of alignment
between the dominant party in the ward and the
affiliation of those serving on the ward committee,
however in reality this was usually the case. A strong
view prevailed that party dominance on the commit-
tee did not necessarily translate into a partisan
orientation for the committee. Given the effort and
expense of holding ward committee elections and the
fact that the principles of equitable and diverse
representation are invariably subverted by logistics
and local politics, IDASA and Afesis-corplan posed
the question: should elections be scrapped in favour
of nominations from interest groups and geographi-
cally defined constituencies? (Idasa & Afesis-
corplan, 2004).
traditionally voiceless and disadvantaged people tended
to be over-represented on ward committees – possibly
because the powerful economic interests and middle
class did not take the ward committee system seriously.
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In a comparative international analysis, it emerges
that not all countries see the elected nature of ward
committees as critical nor do they insist on the
representation question being handled entirely as a
matter of public choice. In New Zealand and India for
example, some consideration is given to competen-
cies that might be required to function as a ward
committee member. In other words they apply the
“best person for the job” principle. These principles
seldom figure in South African discourse on ward
committee composition. The issue of how closed or
open ward committees should be also requires
consideration.
rooted in civil society and not a decentralised unit of
the municipality. Ward committees should therefore
avoid direct project management or implementation
responsibility and always reserve their status as
neutral facilitators that support CBO programmes
rather than offering competition or authority with




Himlin found that there tend to be more men than
women on ward committees despite the efforts to
ensure gender balance. As found in other studies,
ward committees reported that they were
underutilised in communicating with the community
and were overly controlled by ward councillors.
Given the generally weak record of ward committee
elections and the low polls, ward committees would
be unwise to regard their mandate as strong or to
suppose that they have an exclusive claim to
represent community interests.
ward committees would be unwise to regard their mandate
as strong or to suppose that they have an exclusive claim
to represent community interests.
The possibility of ‘open’ ward committees or
provision for significant ‘ex-officio’ representation
needs to be seriously considered. This is particularly
important where the potential for conflict exists
between existing community-based organisations
and ward committees. Thembelihle, Msunduzi and
Emalahleni Municipalities have experienced this
problem to varying degrees. Ward committees
needed to conceptualise their role in terms of a body
The possibility of “open” ward committees or provision
for significant “ex-officio” representation needs to be
seriously considered.
Ward committees needed to conceptualise their role in terms of a
body rooted in civil society and not a decentralised unit of the
municipality.
Less than one-fifth of ward committee members
were involved in report back meetings to the sectors8
which they represent. Most interaction with the
community occurred at the general meetings that the
ward councillor organises.
The Idasa/Afesis-corplan report (2004) revealed
a great variation in the interpretation of how ward
committees should be constituted. In some wards, a
two-phased electoral process occurs (interest groups
nominate and community elects). Interests based on
sectors, geography (especially in large rural wards),
and the traditionally voiceless (youth, women and the
ward committees reported that they were underutilised in
communicating with the community and were overly controlled
by ward councillors
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elderly) are accommodated and a community meet-
ing elects a committee from the list of nominees.
The Good Governance Survey conducted in the
Nkangala District indicates that more than half (53%)
of individual and CBOs respondents were of the view
that representation on ward committees was fair in
terms of gender parity. Other criteria of representivity
such as disability, race, diversity of stakeholders and
geographical location fared less well.
Ward committee influence on
council
In the study of ward committees in Johannesburg by
Himlin (2005), most ward committee members
reported that their committee had submitted a
number of proposals to council (an average of 3,4
per ward over the previous six months). About one in
five (20%) perceived that they had a strong impact
and a further one third reported some impact. Himlin
concluded that the challenge is to extend the impact
of the ward committees in the community and within
the council.
the challenge is to extend the impact of the ward
committees in the community and within the council
Source: Himlin, 2005
Figure 3: Ward Committee members’ perceived impact of proposals on Johannesburg
Council
Perceptions of ward committee
effectiveness
No countrywide data is available on the overall public
perception of ward committee effectiveness. However
the topic has been the subject of Good Governance
Surveys conducted by Afesis-corplan and other
GGLN members. In a survey of Nkangala District
Municipality, it was found that 55% of the 356
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surveyed members of the public and CBOs believe
that ward committees are either effective or very
effective forums for community participation. The
outlook was most positive in Emakhazeni Local




A problem with the developing and valid critique of
ward committees is that more spontaneous forms of
participation, like local development forums and
street committees, appear to have run their course
and few alternatives suggest themselves. Area
Coordinating Teams (ACTs) were established in Cape
Town as a mode of interaction between the munici-
pality and its residents (Williams, 2006). The
intention was to encourage community participation
in development planning in the low-income areas of
Hanover Park, Heideveld, Manenberg, Langa and
Gugulethu. In principle ACTs created institutional
space and opportunity for discussion between
individuals, community organisations, council and
the administration. The basis for such interaction
was the key issues of infrastructure, housing, health
or any other service provided by local government.
Research by Williams however suggests that the
ACTs were a structural failure. Council was not obliged
to follow through on any issue raised through ACTs
and officials and councillors were not obliged to
attend the scheduled ACT meetings. Williams con-
cluded that that ACTs had been implemented mostly
for their symbolic value rather than to empower
communities and to transform the unequal relations of
socio-economic power in the City of Cape Town. In
practice, community participation processes were
arranged by the Mayor’s office with little civil society
involvement. The City seemed to expect communities
to support pre-designed IDP programmes without any
explanation of the processes underlying the plans.
Izimbizo, or large-scale community meetings,
have also been used as vehicles for government to
communicate directly with communities on the
ground, and for community members to voice their
aspirations and grievances. Izimbizo are generally
convened to discuss the IDP and budget at both
district and local municipality level. There are also
premiers’ and presidential izimbizo which are
organised at provincial and national levels.
In general, it would appear that izimbizo generate a
relatively superficial level of engagement between
government and communities, rather than genuine
participation. The top-down organisation of izimbizo
has come in for some criticism and in the case of the
presidential/premiers’ izimbizo officials from national
and the provincial government tend to liaise only
with top officials from municipalities (such as
mayors) and decide unilaterally which areas the
president or premier will visit (Buccus, 2007). There
is a perception that izimbizo are stage managed
public relations exercises: with the choice of location
izimbizo generate a relatively superficial level of engagement between
government and communities, rather than genuine participation.
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being motivated by strategic political objectives, and
access to the events by the broader community at
times being controlled.
up which occurred on issues raised at the event. A
study by the Centre for Public Participation (CPP)
shows that some communities felt that the izimbizo
were important forums for interaction with govern-
ment, whereas in other communities, such as in the
Sisonke and Umgungundlovu districts, they were
seen as ineffective road shows.
The research by CPP shows that while the
provision of food, t-shirts and entertainment might
attract larger numbers of people to izimbizo (hence
increasing popular access to local government) this
does not translate into meaningful input or out-
comes. However izimbizo are still seen as a rare
opportunity for communities to engage directly with
high-ranking political leaders such as the president.
A question has also been raised about the ability and the extent
to which issues raised by the communities in izimbizo are
actually followed up after the event.
A question has also been raised about the ability and
the extent to which issues raised by the communities
in izimbizo are actually followed up after the event.
Public evaluations of izimbizo vary according to
how well-organised the imbizo was, and the follow-
Key points:
South Africa’s on-going development of
municipal democracy occurs in a context where
the so-called historical “models” of democracy
have a crisis of their own. At the same time a
number of different surveys have shown that
trust in local government by South Africans is
currently very low.
The right of citizens to participate in govern-
ance and government processes is well enshrined
in the Constitution, law and policy. And while
there is a strong commitment on paper to the
development of a culture of participation this
has not been able to prevent a surge of service
delivery protests from taking place across the
country. Two broad kinds of protest have been
identified: one is social movement or civic
activity promoting a strategy and alternative
policy. The other category of social protest
comprises spontaneous expressions of frustra-
tion against the failure of local government to
meet basic needs.
In an effort by the state to channel participation,
ward committees have emerged as the principal
structures through which citizen participation in
local governance is expected to take place.
Ward committees are still in their infancy and
the experience of them remains mixed. Munici-
palities have broad discretion in framing the
local operating policies for their ward commit-
tees but many have chosen to codify the
provisions that already exist in national
legislation. Public surveys highlight a number
of problems with the ward committee model
including a lack of clarity around the roles of
the ward committee and a lack of resources
available to conduct their activities. Other
weaknesses include poor links with sectoral
interests, difficulties for poor members to
participate in ward committee activities, poor
representivity and weak election procedures.
While there is a valid critique of ward commit-
tees as a mechanism for grassroots participa-
tion, there are few viable alternatives, with
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street committees and development forums
seen to have run their course.
Izimbizo, or large-scale community meet-
ings, have also emerged as vehicles for
government to communicate directly with
communities. Although these may generate
a relatively superficial level of engagement
they are also seen as important opportuni-
ties for national leaders to engage with





How effective are municipal communication
strategies in ensuring that municipalities
interact effectively with their residents on
issues of critical importance?:
Are IDP documents, municipal budgets and
municipal salary scales easily available to
the public?
Are izimbizo or report-back meetings
convened regularly?
Do the public provide adequate input on IDP
and LED plans?
What is the level of compliance by municipali-
ties with legislation and regulations pertaining
to transparency, access to municipal informa-
tion and communication. For example:
Are municipal tender processes free and
fair?
Are the business interests of councillors
declared publicly?
Is there a confidential system for reporting
or whistle-blowing on corruption and
maladministration?
Is the independent functioning of the audit
committee respected?
Is the Auditor-General’s report presented in
an open council meeting?
How effectively are municipalities using
information technology to improve access to
municipal information amongst their residents
and to ensure the highest levels of
transparency, for example:
What systems are in place for the public to
register complaints (i.e. is there a com
plaints telephone line) and how effectively
do these systems operate?
Are annual reports produced and circulated
as required by law?
South Africa has an exceptionally well-developed
body of legislation, policy and regulations that
governs how citizens can access information from all
levels of state. At a local level municipalities must,
for example, table an annual report and the Auditors-
General’s report for public scrutiny (Afesis-corplan,
undated).
However despite extensive legal and policy provi-
sions geared towards ensuring good local govern-
ance in South African municipalities, the reality of
local governance practice often falls well short of the
policy ideal. A growing gap between the rhetoric of
policy intentions and citizen’s day-to-day experience
of municipal governance runs the risk of alienating
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civil society. In the case of many semi-rural munici-
palities the danger is that municipal governance is
increasingly regarded as a superfluous, wasteful
institution whose operations depend on extensive
support from other spheres of government. Further-
more there is a growing (and largely valid) perception
within civil society that financial reporting and
accounting conventions are either ignored or manipu-
lated to withhold key information from public scrutiny.






The Constitution both enshrines the principle of access
to information and provides the basis for legislation
expanding on citizen’s right to access information and
communication at the local government level. In the
Bill of Rights, sections 32 and 33 state:
32. Access to information
1. Everyone has the right of access to
a. any information held by the state; and
b. any information that is held by another
person and that is required for the exercise or
protection of any rights.
33. Just administrative action
1. Everyone has the right to administrative action
that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair.
2. Everyone whose rights have been adversely
affected by administrative action has the right to
be given written reasons.
Chapter seven of the Constitution deals with local
government and the following sections are relevant as
regards transparency, access to municipal informa-
tion and communication:
152. Objects of local government
1. The objects of local government are -
a. to provide democratic and accountable
government for local communities;
e. to encourage the involvement of communities
and community organisations in the matters
of local government.
160. Internal procedures
4. No by-law may be passed by a Municipal Council
unless:
b. the proposed by-law has been published for
public comment.
7. A Municipal Council must conduct its business in
an open manner, and may close its sittings, or
those of its committees, only when it is reason-
able to do so having regard to the nature of the
business being transacted.
162. Publication of municipal by-laws
Municipal by-laws must be accessible to the public.
The Promotion of Access to Information Act (2 of
2000) and the Promotion of Administrative Justice
Act (3 of 2000) give effect to these rights, and are
applicable to all organs of state including local
government.
The Local Government: Municipal Structures Act
(117 of 1998) Schedule five provides a code of
conduct for local councillors. The preamble also
states that “councillors must be accountable to local
communities and report back at least quarterly to
constituencies on council matters, including the
performance of the municipality in terms of
established indicators”.
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The Local Government: Municipal Systems Act
(32 of 2000) devotes an entire chapter (chapter four)
to public participation and how council must engage
with the community on issues such as the municipal
budget, its IDP and the performance management
system of the municipality.
The Municipal Finance Management Act (56 of
2003) provides further mechanisms to promote
transparency and for the general public to access
information at the local government level. For the
tabling of the annual and audited financial reports the
municipality must comply with section 27 (2) which
states that: “The mayor of a municipality must,
within seven months after the end of a financial year,
table in the municipal council the annual report of
the municipality and of any municipal entity under
the municipality’s sole or shared control.” Section 27
(4) states: “The Auditor-General may submit the
financial statements and audit report—(a) of a
municipality directly to the municipal council, the
National Treasury, the relevant provincial treasury,
the MEC responsible for local government in the
province and any prescribed organ of state, if the
mayor fails to comply with subsection (2)”. Section
130 states, “The meetings of a municipal council at
which an annual report is to be discussed or at which
decisions concerning an annual report are to be
taken, must be open to the public and any organs of
state, and a reasonable time must be allowed—
(a) for the discussion of any written submissions
received from the local community or organs of
state on the annual report; and
(b) for members of the local community or any
organs of state to address the council.
(c) Representatives of the Auditor-General are
entitled to attend, and to speak at, any council
meeting referred to in subsection (1).”
Regarding the disclosure of salaries and benefits the
annual financial statements must, according to
section 124 (1) “include particulars of —
a) the salaries, allowances and benefits of political
office-bearers and councillors of the municipality,
whether financial or in kind, including a state-
ment by the accounting officer whether or not
those salaries, allowances and benefits are within
the upper limits of the framework envisaged in
section 219 of the Constitution.”
It is also important for citizens to be aware of
sections 117 and 118 of the Municipal Finance
Management Act (MFMA). Section 117 says, “no
councillor of any municipality may be a member of a
municipal bid committee or any other committee
evaluating or approving tenders, quotations, con-
tracts or other bids, nor attend any such meeting as
an observer.”
Section 118 says, “No person may—
(a) interfere with the supply chain management
system of a municipality or municipal entity; or
(b) amend or tamper with any tenders, quotations,
contracts or bids after their submission.”
The importance of such legislation is illustrated in
the following examples of irregularity:
Matjhabeng and Mangaung Municipalities were
singled out by the Auditor-General for improper
handling of tenders, and employees and council-
lors’ having interests in companies dealing with
municipalities. “Evidence heard (from
Matjhabeng) could not satisfy the committee that
the transaction relating to a tender for mechani-
cal equipment was valid, as an amount of
R3,151,347 was paid to the contractor three days
before he was awarded the tender” (The Citizen,
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16 September 2005). The report was due to be
completed in January 2005, and was apparently
handed over to the MEC and to the Premier, but
never made public despite the fact that some
officials have already been disciplined.
In Mangaung Municipality Mojalefa Matlole, the
Municipal Manager, and Mzwandile Silwana, the
chief of operations, were formally dismissed in
May 2006 after an internal investigation into their
conduct. The two officials were arrested by the
Scorpions in July 2005 along with Papi Mokoena,
the Executive Mayor, his wife Granny, as well as
Zongezile Zumane, the previous Speaker of the
Mangaung local council. They were allegedly
involved in fraud and theft involving municipal
tenders worth R150 million (SABC news, 22 May
2006).
Disclosure of interests by council members and em-
ployed officials is required by the Municipal Systems
Act to ensure that there is no conflict of interest.
Public representatives and employed government
officials are required to sign the register of disclo-
sure on an annual basis and to lodge any changes in
the course of the year (Afesis-corplan, 2005).
Key issues, limitations and




Good Governance Surveys undertaken in 2006 and
2007 in nine local municipalities in the Cacadu
District in the Eastern Cape by Afesis-corplan provide
a useful snapshot of the challenges and issues facing
local government in its attempt to communicate with
its citizens. They also suggests how citizens perceive
their ability to access information.
A critical issue is the low level of awareness and
knowledge amongst ordinary citizens about the
A critical issue is the low level of awareness and
knowledge amongst ordinary citizens about the legisla-
tive and policy tools available to them to access
information from their municipality.
legislative and policy tools available to them to
access information from their municipality.
Very few citizens appear to be aware of the statutory
requirements, for example, in the Promotion of
Access to Information Act that enable them to
request information from any government institution.
Citizens and the public are also generally unaware
that the MFMA can be used to ensure that tender
procedures are above board or that all financial
reports are tabled in open meetings. Given the
complexity of audited financial statements the skills
and resources required to enforce these rights
suggest that only wealthy citizens and well-resourced
civil society structures would in practical terms be
able to use these mechanisms.
Municipalities themselves do not always have a
comprehensive communication strategy (including
the use of information technology) to effectively
communicate what the municipality is doing to
provide free basic services, promote economic
development, and take forward the IDP.
the skills and resources required to enforce these rights
suggest that only wealthy citizens and well-resourced
civil society structures would in practical terms be able
to use these mechanisms
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They also do not always have the capacity, skills and
resources to implement an effective communication
strategy. Municipal communication strategies will
achieve little however unless there is a minimum
level of public trust and interest in the substance of
such communication. In a rural setting, under-
resourced civil society structures generally lack the
capacity to effectively engage with and hold local
government to account. Community newspapers and
radio stations can play a critical role in ensuring
greater transparency and accountability.
Possible interventions
The GGLN has identified a number of possible
interventions, including:
Improved training for municipal officials in the
relevant legislation pertaining to access to
information. This should also re-emphasise the
principles of Batho Pele and the need to be
responsive to the needs of the citizens they
serve.
Improved systems in municipalities to ensure
that information that is requested, and can be
legally distributed, is provided within an accept-
able time period.
Development of a comprehensive communication
strategy that takes into account each municipali-
ty’s needs and capacity while advancing access to
information.
Building the capacity of civil society structures to
allow them to undertake closer oversight of
municipal procedures and ensure that all the
correct procedures are followed, such as the
publication of annual reports and tabling of the
Auditor-General’s report. This is important as
informed and active citizen’s groups offer at least
three potential benefits:
They act as a deterrence to corruption by
councillors and officials by raising the
likelihood of exposure;
The early detection of irregular practices and
pressure from civil society organisations
might persuade council to change tack,
avoiding problems from escalating into
full-scale public protests.
Local community groups would be able to
distinguish between outright corruption and
administrative shortfalls resulting from weak
capacity – they could then prioritise and
design their responses accordingly (Afesis-
corplan, undated).
Equipping local newspapers and community
radio stations with the skills necessary to explain
the procedures required to access information to
their listeners and readers, or to report effectively
on the council’s annual report or Auditor-
General’s report.
Key points:
South Africa has well-developed legislation,
policy and regulations that govern how citizens
can access information from all levels of state.
Municipalities themselves do not always have a
comprehensive communication strategy (including
the use of information technology) to effectively
communicate what the municipality is doing to
provide free basic services, promote economic
development, and take forward the IDP.
A wide range of laws facilitate access to
information and require that local government
proactively provide information to its people in
accessible ways. Laws include the Promotion of
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Access to Information Act, the Municipal
Structures Act, the Municipal Systems Act and
the Municipal Finance Management Act.
There is though a growing gap between policy
intentions and citizens’ day-to-day experience
of municipal governance with a low level of
awareness and knowledge amongst ordinary
citizens about the legislative and policy tools
available to them to access information from
their municipality.
Municipalities rarely have a comprehensive
communication strategy to effectively commu-
nicate what the municipality it is doing to
provide free basic services, promote economic




Are democratic municipal elections held on a
regular basis?
communication by municipalities is aimed at
self-promotion rather than empowering citizens
with useful information to enhance participation
in municipal processes.
Possible interventions by municipalities should
include better training of municipal officials in
the legislative requirements and improved
municipal systems, designed to give effect to
new legislation. Municipalities should also build
the capacity of civil society to engage in
municipal processes and provide information to
the local media on an ongoing basis, equipping
journalists to engage with the range of issues
that flow from municipalities and should be in
the public domain.
What is the level of interest and participation in
local government elections?
What factors influence citizens’ participation in
local government elections?
As this review has already pointed out, local democ-
racy comprises at least three components, namely
municipal elections (sometimes called procedural
democracy), structured and sanctioned participation,
through, for example, izimbizo and ward committees,
and finally community initiated-interactions that
range from marches and memoranda to outright
confrontation.
Representative democracy requires the holding
of regular elections. Since the advent of democracy
in South Africa, in 1994, municipal elections have
taken place in 1995/6, 2000 and 2006. The 2000
elections were the first subsequent to the re-
demarcation of district, local and metropolitan
municipalities and the enactment of key provisions of
the Municipal Systems Act. The resulting transition
resulted in six metropolitan municipalities, namely
Johannesburg, Cape Town, eThekwini, Ekurhuleni,
Tshwane and Nelson Mandela Bay; 231 local munici-
palities, and 47 district municipalities.
Results of the first five democratic elections
(two local and three national and provincial) indicate
a trend of overwhelming support for the African
National Congress (ANC) and relatively low and
dispersed support for other parties, primarily the
Democratic Alliance (DA) and Inkatha Freedom Party
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(IFP). This does not in and of itself pose a major
problem for democracy. Established democracies
such as the United States, United Kingdom, Germany
and India have all experienced extended periods of
one-party dominance in executive and legislative
elections (Afrobarometer, 2003). What is of concern
is when dominant governing parties see less and less
need to respond to public opinion because they are
assured of re-election in the face of weak opposition.
At the same time far more people claim to have voted
in local government elections than actually do vote.
In a 2006 survey (Kivilu et al, 2006) 72% of respond-
ents indicated that they had voted in the 2004
elections and 60% that they had voted in the 2000
municipal elections. The actual voter turnouts at the
two polls were 76% and 49%, slightly higher and
much lower than expected, respectively. Similarly,
when asked if they would vote in municipal elections
were they to be held “tomorrow”, 81% said that they
would.
Of those in the same study that said they would
not vote, the main reasons for this were lack of
interest (46%), not being in possession of the
necessary documents to register (14%), not regis-
tered (13%), and disillusioned with politics (11%).
When asked what might encourage voters to vote,
about a third indicated that they would be encour-
aged to vote if they felt that their vote would make a
difference. Just under a quarter (24%) indicated that
shorter queues would encourage them to vote,
followed by if there were a political party that they
believed in (20%), they were more convinced that it
was important to vote (15%), the polling station was
closer and parties tried harder to get their votes
(10%). These trends point to significant negative
sentiment and withdrawal from political participation.
What is of concern is when dominant governing parties
see less and less need to respond to public opinion
because they are assured of re-election in the face of
weak opposition
The danger exists that governing parties with large
majorities might become less accountable to the
electorate, especially in countries with a proportional
representation system such as South Africa (Kivilu et
al, 2006).
Voter turnout is extremely high for national and
provincial elections but much lower for the municipal
elections. Voter turnout in municipal elections was
49% in 1995/6, 49% in 2000 and 48,4% in 2006
(EISA, 2006)9. In contrast, voter turnout for national
and provincial elections was 76% in 2004, 88% in
1999 and 86% in 1994. This is consistent with
trends in many democratic countries where elector-
ates are far more likely to vote in national elections
than in local government elections, perceiving the
latter to be of lesser importance.
far more people claim to have voted in local government
elections than actually do vote
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L o c a l  D e m o c r a c y  i n  A c t i o n
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Only three political parties hold control or coalition
joint control of municipalities, approximately 230 of
the 283 municipalities have ANC majorities in their
councils. The DA and IFP obtained majorities in
relatively few municipalities, mainly in the Western
Cape and KwaZulu-Natal respectively.
identified in relation to political involvement in the
HSRC’s South African Social Attitudes Survey
(Hemson, undated). The larger group (representing
23,5 million people) is committed to voting in
municipal elections. The smaller group (7,2 million)
are “disengaged” from voting in municipal elections,
in the sense that they either do not vote, do not know
if they would vote, or declined to answer the survey
question. The high participation group is mainly
black Africans and the lower participation group is a
mixture of all races (only 52% black African). The
former group is poorer (89% have personal monthly
incomes of less than R5000) than the latter (77% with
incomes of less than R5000). The “high participation”
group has a higher level of trust in local government
in South Africa and considerably greater knowledge
of a ward committee (49% as opposed to 26%) and
of a councillor in the areas where they live.
Party
Table 7: Distribution of votes in local government elections, 2006
Valid votes % votes Seats won % seats won
African National Congress (ANC) 17,467,104 66,34 5730 61,50
Democratic Alliance (DA) 3,862,357 14,67 1107 11,88
Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) 2,100,609 7,98 738 7,92
Independent Democrats (ID) 473,564 1,80 157 1,69
Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) 233,667 0,89 98 1,05
United Democratic Movement (UDM) 285,441 1,08 97 1,04
African Christian Democratic Party
(ACDP) 241,488 0,92 91 0,98
Vryheidsfront 189,921 0,72 78 0,84
Other 1,473,619 5,6 298 13,1
Total 26,327,770 100,0 8394 100
Source: Independent Electoral Commission
Key points:
Free and fair local government elections took
place in South Africa in 1995/6, 2000 and 2006.
While voter turnout in the democratic era has
been consistently high for national and
provincial elections, it is cause for concern
no amount of innovation in participation can compensate for a
weak electoral democracy.
Any discussion of participatory democracy
cannot overlook the fact that no amount of innova-
tion in participation can compensate for a weak
electoral democracy. It is important therefore to track
trends in this most fundamental aspect of municipal
governance. Two categories of respondent have been
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that the polls are consistently much lower for
South Africa’s municipal elections. Polls
suggest a level of disengagement from local
politics and this needs to be borne in mind
when it comes to the design of public participa-
tion processes, as no amount participation can
compensate for weak electoral democracy.
Another factor that emerges is the overwhelming
support for the African National Congress (ANC)
with low and dispersed support for other parties. ).
What is of concern is when dominant governing
parties see less and less need to respond to public
opinion because they are assured of re-election in




Do party officials intervene in senior
appointments, e.g. “Section 57” senior
managers and other key posts?
To what extent are such interventions
irregular?
Are such interventions the basis of further
networks of patronage and to what extent is
the problem of the “old boys club” thus
further propagated?
To what extent do hierarchies of power
within the party subsume formal lines of
accountability and authority within the
municipality?
Does the influence of senior politicians
unreasonably constrain the administrative and
strategic discretion of senior managers?
What impact has the advent of full-time
councillors and mayoral committees had on
this issue?
Has this resulted in a blurring of the
distinction between executive authority and
administrative authority?
Is the quality of decision-making
compromised where independent technical
and professional opinion is not clearly
presented to decision-makers or is
significantly adjusted, for fear of political
consequences?
Do skilled municipal bureaucrats manipulate
expert advice and information to constrain local
political choices?
Where such manipulation does occur, is it
primarily politically motivated or driven by
bureaucratic concerns?
In liberal Western theories of democracy, i.e. the
model on which the South African system is prima-
rily based, the separation of power between adminis-
trators and politicians is fundamental. The basic
premise is that elected representatives provide
leadership and strategic direction while the non-
elected managers and administrators serve the
leadership and provide expert advice and a neutral
knowledge base for the leadership’s decisions. The
administration is of course also responsible for the
non-partisan implementation of the leadership’s
The basic premise is that elected representatives
provide leadership and strategic direction while the non-
elected managers and administrators serve the leader-
ship and provide expert advice and a neutral knowledge
base for the leadership’s decisions.
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decisions. Western and European local government
discourse has become increasingly critical of this
formulation, “It is…misguided to claim that politi-
cians ‘lead’ and officers ‘manage’. Both have roles in
leadership and management but the received models
of political administrative relations fail to recognise
this” (Hambleton, 2005:195). Before applying these
sentiments to South Africa it must be noted that they
arise from contexts in which local government
systems have evolved over many decades and both
councillors and officials are generally highly qualified
for their respective tasks.
In its “Delivery Guide for Councillors”, the
Consolidation of Municipal Transformation Pro-
gramme (CMTP) acknowledges the strained relations
that often exist between councillors and officials.
This may arise from the perception by officials that
councillors encroach on their terrain and interfere in
the day-to-day management of the municipality.
Conversely there is also the view from councillors
that officials are not able to grasp and act on the
development challenges, without being micro-
managed. The fact that some officials retained their
posts since the apartheid era obviously adds further
complexity to this relationship.
Policy and legislative
framework
The provisions of the Municipal Structures Act and
the Municipal Systems Act are extensive in defining
political decision-making systems and the powers of
elected office holders and mayors within those
systems. For example, section 4 of the Municipal
Systems Act sets out the rights and duties of
municipal councils and makes it clear that these are
exercised through executive and legislative authority
which is bestowed on council alone and may not be
interfered with. Section 6 of the same act sets out
the duties of municipal administrations and mainly
addresses the accountability of the administration to
the local community. Interestingly, this provision
addresses the relationship between the administra-
tion and the local community but is silent on
relations between the council and the administration.
In general the rights and duties of municipal
councils, members of the local community, and the
administrations of municipalities, are set out in
sections 4, 5 and 6 of the Municipal Systems Act.
There is little by way of policy and legislation
that specifically governs, or indeed harmonises, the
working relationship between councillors and
officials. Section 53(1) of the Municipal Systems Act
prescribes that the responsibilities of political
structures and office holders be set out in writing
and be related to the role of the administration. It
also provides that matters of accountability and
working relations between political structures and
the administration should be defined. However, to the
extent that any responsibilities are clearly set out in
legislation, the intention is mainly to prevent corrupt
or rent-seeking behaviour. For example, the MFMA
provides that councillors may not participate in any
committee evaluating or approving tenders, quota-
tions, contracts, or bids.
Equally important is the prohibition on interference
with the supply chain management system. Similarly
the Code of Conduct in the Municipal Systems Act
regulates the conduct of all councillors. Like the
MFMA, the code mainly seeks to prevent councillors
from using their influence on council for personal
profit. In this regard it requires a declaration of
interests by councillors which covers the disclosure
of shares and securities in any companies, member-
councillors may not participate in any committee evaluat-
ing or approving tenders, quotations, contracts, or bids.
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ship of any closed corporation, directorships and
partnerships held. Councillors are also required to
declare any remuneration, subsidies, grants or
pensions and interests in property.
The one key provision in so far as the political-
administrative interface is concerned, is the stipula-
tion that councillors may not intervene in the
administration of the municipality and may not give
any instruction to an employee of the council or
obstruct an employee’s implementation of a council
decision. Clearly where councillor involvement in the
affairs of the administration arises from the deci-
sions of council itself and where municipal systems
make provision for such involvement, the code could
not be successfully invoked by an employee who feels
aggrieved by such intervention. It might be useful
however to establish if municipal officials have made
use of this clause and under what circumstances.
The most common representation of the
tensions between councillors and officials is one of a
conservative municipal bureaucracy where white
male managers are over-represented. In this formula-
tion, white administrators whose careers began
under apartheid, use their superior experience and
bureaucratic guile to frustrate the developmental
ambitions of largely black councils. This scenario,
undoubtedly valid in the middle to late nineties, is of
questionable validity today but tends to retain
currency nonetheless. Gotz and Wooldridge (2003)
for example argue that this perspective has persisted
albeit in slightly adapted form and that tensions have
indeed deepened throughout the transition process
with its growing disjuncture between service needs
and administrative output.
Gotz and Wooldridge also draw attention to the
fact that councillors have different relations with
their administration depending on whether they are
from the majority party or opposition, part-time or
full-time, members of the executive committee,
mayoral committee or back-benchers. Different levels
of involvement in the administration was related to
this with councillors at the core tending to be
extensively involved with officials while those on the
periphery, especially opposition councillors, tended
to feel excluded from mainstream governance
processes. Some officials resented the involvement
of councillors in what they perceived as core
administrative functions , such as disciplinary
matters, appointments and hiring consultants. While
Gotz and Wooldridge made little comment on the
executive mayor system, subsequent research by
NGOs10 has shown that the aspect of insider and
outsider councillors is much accentuated through
this system with both ruling party back-benchers and
opposition councillors alleging that mayoral commit-
tees centralise decision-making and leave council as
a whole with a rubber-stamp function. Since the
advent of full-time councillors is closely associated
with mayoral committees and thus the Executive
Mayor system, and full-time councillors are per-
ceived to be more likely to adopt a hands-on ap-
proach to administrative matters, there is at the
least, circumstantial evidence that tensions between
heads of department and full-time councillors are
more likely under the Executive Mayor system.
In traditional theories of local government, the
rationale for the distinction between policy formula-
tion as the ambit of elected representatives, and
administration as the ambit of managers seems self-
evident. Gotz and Wooldridge however found that the
mere fact that managers encountered issues of
administration which required policy solutions and
councillors have different relations with their administration
depending on whether they are from the majority party or
opposition, part-time or full-time, members of the executive
committee, mayoral committee or back-benchers.
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brought these issues to the attention of council, was
perceived in some municipalities as the officialdom
“overstepping their roles.” This suggests very basic
incapacity or miscommunication between adminis-
trators and councillors. The distinction between the
administrative duty to highlight matters of policy
relevance and the political obligation to design such
policy (with relevant managerial input) is ostensibly
not that hard to define. Hambleton (2005:200)
however, argues that policy-making and policy
implementation are of necessity an interactive
process and that the idea of separating these
functions is a “useful myth.” In this view the “useful-
ness” of the myth arises because both administrators
and politicians are able to shirk responsibility for
poor local governance; politicians blame the adminis-
trators for poor implementation of sound policy and
the administrators blame the politicians for making
policy that cannot be practically implemented.
politics. Gotz and Wooldridge found a manifestation
of a similar problem where administrators were
alleged to have sided not with a particular party but
with one faction within a party. Throughout 2005 and
2006 there were various instances where the
functioning of councils was disrupted not by conflict
between parties but conflict within the ruling party.
Hambleton suggests that policy development
should thus be a shared responsibility, calling for
development and leadership from both groups. This
managerial theory of leadership does not however
address the more fundamental dilemma of fudging
the balance between electoral mandate and sound
technical and managerial input into decision-making.
Non-partisan administration is a basic principle
of government in liberal-democratic theory. Adminis-
trators are thus constantly susceptible to the
allegation that they are acting in a partisan manner
when their activities and strategies displease a
particular political party on council – a conundrum
which is very familiar in South African municipal
politicians blame the administrators for poor implementation of
sound policy and the administrators blame the politicians for
making policy that cannot be practically implemented.
In the research by Gotz and Wooldridge, both
administrators and non-executive councillors also
complained that party caucuses made the real
decisions and that council debates where orches-
trated and unlikely to have any real impact on final
decisions. Research by a number of GGLN affiliated
organisations suggests an increase in the influence
of political parties over municipal decision-making
and even a propensity for the parties to pre-deter-
mine the outcome of debate within council. An
observation exercise conducted by Afesis-corplan in
Buffalo City Municipality from 2004 to 2005 ob-
served a council procedure that appeared to be
rehearsed. The main feature was an absence of
debate and the confirmation of pre-determined
decisions through verbal indications of assent by a
majority of councillors. Lines of accountability are
also blurred when the hierarchy of political authority
within the party is not reflected in the hierarchy of
councillors – councillors and even officials who hold
high political office within the party often wield more
political influence than their supposed superiors
within the municipality (Gotz and Wooldridge, 2003).
Current public management theory stresses the
empowerment of managers through delegated
administrators and non-executive councillors also
complained that party caucuses made the real decisions
and that council debates where orchestrated and unlikely
to have any real impact on final decisions.
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authority. Clearly such delegations should not strip
council of any real decision-making power, but neither
should the absence of delegations create unnecessary
work for council and its sub-committees. In 2003
Gotz and Wooldridge found very uneven levels of
delegation across municipalities. Powers delegated to
officials were alternately “very loose” or “very
detailed.” Working relations between councillors and
officials have been further complicated by the
provisions in the Municipal Systems Act for
outsourced service provision via various entities
including service utilities. The procedures for decid-
ing and approving such arrangements are now very
onerous and have been further strengthened with the
Municipal Systems Amendment Act (44 of 2003).
Prior to this however, Gotz and Wooldridge found that
service utilities and corporatised units tended to
redefine working relations between councillors and
officials. Experiences of improved focus and council-
lor oversight of utilities with greater discretion for
management was contrasted with another perception
that outsourcing to utilities tended to weaken
accountability to council. Similarly Gotz and
Wooldridge found that the establishment of “regional
administrations” had raised additional complexity in
relations between ward councillors and regional
managers. As it stands the effect of decentralised
municipal functions, via regional administrations or
municipal sub-structures, is an under-researched
area, particularly in terms of its impact on the
political-administrative interface.
In their concluding comments on the
political-administrative interface Gotz and Wooldridge
argue for flexibility in the analysis of emerging
municipal trends related to political-administrative
working relations. A settling in period for local
government should allow for experimentation and the
comparison of different approaches without drawing
final conclu-sions about the propensity for conflict or
consensus.
Key points:
In the South African polity there is a separation
of power between public administrators and
politicians, however the nature of the separation
is a source of debate and a significant body of
best practice has not yet developed in this area.
These relationships thus remain a challenge for
the local sphere.
A number of issues arise about the roles of
each party. The traditional public administration
approach suggests that politicians should lead
and administrators manage, but there is a
growing recognition that each role requires
both traits to be performed effectively. Another
approach is to see politicians as developers of
policy and the public servants as implementers,
but this fails to take into account the iterative
nature of policy development and the need to
take into account the experience of administra-
tors in its implementation.
The South African literature suggests that there
is not yet a settled model for the smooth
functioning of the political-administrative
interface and that there is still a need for
experimentation, the use of different
approaches and greater discussion.
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The end of apartheid signalled the beginning of a
society shaped by equality where the rights of all
races, cultures and ethnic groups were to be realised
under a single framework of governance. Post-
apartheid governance in South Africa, based on a
Western model of liberal democracy, promotes
representative government via elections. Given the
nature of South Africa’s racially and culturally
segregated past, there are a number of critical issues
which emerge and to some extent remain unresolved
by this shift to a liberal-democratic system. One of
the more prominent issues is the question of
traditional leadership.
seem to contradict those of liberal democracy. One of
the fundamental concerns with regard to incorporat-
ing traditional leadership into the South African
system of government is that a system of democracy
cannot accommodate traditional councils that are not
subject to any form of popular ballot. Indeed the
entire notion is seen by some as antithetical to an
accountable, transparent and efficient form of
democratic governance. Authority with respect to
issues of service delivery and land administration is
either democratically derived or it is not – there is
little room for compromise. It has been argued that
traditional leadership cannot be mixed into a demo-
cratic system without threatening the stability and
coherence of the system as a whole.
Legislative framework
Prior to the finalisation of the 1996 Constitution, the
1994 Council of Traditional Leaders Act was passed
setting out the composition of the Council of
Traditional Leaders, the process of election of its
representatives and its specific powers and func-
tions. In 1997, however, a new Council of Traditional
Leaders Act was passed and the 1994 legislation
repealed. Much confusion surrounded the scope and
degree of traditional authority, with traditional law
1.5 Traditional
leadership
To what extent can traditional leadership be
incorporated into the contemporary model of
democratic local governance in South Africa?
Although new legislation regulates issues
regarding the role and responsibilities of
traditional leaders, is this sufficient to ensure
sound democratic practice is followed at the
local level of government?
Does current legislation regarding traditional
leadership ensure an atmosphere of
transparency and accountability at local
government level and what changes may be
necessary?
Land administration is one of the more
controversial issues regarding traditional
leadership - what are these issues and how can
they be resolved?
Many existing traditional councils are founded
on undemocratic, hierarchical systems of govern-
ance, where positions of leadership are generally
hereditary, a system that was institutionalised and
consolidated by the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951,
becoming an integral part of the apartheid system.
Traditional authority is based on principles which
Many existing traditional councils are founded on undemocratic,
hierarchical systems of governance, where positions of
leadership are generally hereditary,
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and practices often coming into conflict with those of
the new democracy. The Traditional Leadership and
Governance Framework Act (41 of 2003) therefore set
out to remodel the institutions of traditional leader-
ship and make them compatible with democratic
government whilst ensuring social development
within the country. This aimed to eliminate the
tensions and inconsistencies between the Constitu-
tion of 1996 and the role of traditional authorities
within South African society. However it has also been
argued that the Communal Land Rights Bill of 2003
made further concessions to traditional authorities,
giving them significant power over land administra-
tion that effectively resuscitates the powers that
traditional leaders enjoyed under the notorious Bantu
Authorities Act (Ntsebeza, 2004). The success of the
Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework
Act of 2003 therefore remains questionable insofar as
it still leaves some rural communities as the subjects
of traditional authorities. The new legislation has
gone a long way in aligning traditional authority with
local government, but it has not overcome the
fundamental contradiction between the constitutional
quest for representative democracy and the practical





An important objective of the 2003 legislation was the
establishment and recognition of traditional councils
at a local level. The intention was to align traditional
rule and traditional councils more strongly with the
principles of democracy and to overcome the negative
sentiment associated with traditional rule and
traditional councils. A traditional council, according
to section 3(1) will be established in an area which
has been recognized by the Premier as a traditional
community. Furthermore, the Act acknowledges a
position for traditional leadership, not only within
local government, but at the provincial and national
level. Although some observers have seen this Act as
“remarkable and inspiring,” in that it is a first
genuine attempt to “fuse democratic principles and
traditional practices” (Nthai, 2005:8), there have
been a number of concerns raised, especially with
regard to the nature of the establishment and
recognition of traditional councils. The Legal
Resources Centre points out, for example, that the
transitional arrangements of the act negate the
commitment towards democratic traditional leader-
ship by “exempting existing tribal authorities (i.e.
those established at the time the draft Bill was
passed) from the requirement of democratic elec-
tions and the compulsory representation of women”
(Legal Resources Centre, 2003:6-8).
This is a significant point in terms of the future
stability of the relationship between traditional
leadership and formal representative processes at a
local level, as well as the obligation to democratic
transparency as a whole.
Commitment to democratic transition involves an
ethic which should filter into all areas of local
government, including conservative traditional
communities. By allowing some communities to
maintain undemocratic structures there is a great
risk that these will entrench themselves and tran-
scend the boundaries of local government into the
actual functioning of society itself.
The Land Administration Act (2 of 1995), for
example, gives traditional leaders substantial and
Commitment to democratic transition involves an ethic which
should filter into all areas of local government, including
conservative traditional communities.
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unprecedented powers with regard to control over
land allocation and administration in communal areas
and therefore creates the opportunity for abuse of
power and mismanagement. The reality of urbanisa-
tion and the movement of labour towards large cities
casts doubt on the notion of permanent residents of
rural communities (Ntsebeza, 2004). While it may be
true that up to 80% of rural citizens still acknowledge
the position of the chief (Oomen, 2002), this form of
acknowledgement may relate to social status rather
than actual support for their authority.
The need for a hybrid system of democracy, which
incorporates all voices of our multi-faceted and
multi-cultural society, is essential for political
stability in post-apartheid South Africa. Traditional
leadership undoubtedly has a role within this
“hybrid” system, especially in rural areas. Crucially
there must be coherence between the Constitution
and the legal framework which determines the role of
traditional authorities. Definitive legislation is needed
to clearly circumscribe the roles and responsibilities
of traditional leaders at a local government level,
whilst working within the boundaries of the constitu-
tional framework.
Key points:
The institution of traditional leadership presents
challenges for the democratic South Africa,
associated as it is with undemocratic, hierarchi-
cal and patriarchal systems of governance.
There have been a number of legislative
developments since 1994, which illustrate the
contested nature of the role of traditional
leadership in the South African democracy. The
Land Administration Act of 1995 gave tradi-
tional leaders substantial and unprecedented
powers with regard to control over land
allocation and administration in communal
areas. In 2003 the Traditional Leadership and
Governance Framework Act set out to remodel
the institutions of traditional leadership and
make them compatible with democratic govern-
ment. The Act also made provision for the esta-
blishment and recognition of traditional
councils at a local level. At the same time the
new laws have not provided a definitive system
and it is suggested that additional legislation
should be developed clearly setting out the role
of traditional authorities at local level.
1.6 Corruption and
maladministration
To what extent is corruption a significant
problem in local government?
How do levels of corruption in local government
compare with other spheres of government?
What are the most significant forms of
corruption in local government and what is their
respective impact?
How significant is the evidence of nepotism
in the staffing of the municipality?
To what extent does corruption consume
resources meant for infrastructure and
service delivery?
How are services meant for the poor
impacted by corruption?
To what extent does corruption impact on
public cooperation with local government?
What policies and systems are in place to
prevent corruption?
What conventions are beginning to emerge in
municipal responses to corruption?
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What for example are councils’ attitudes
towards whistle-blowing?
What percentage of municipal corruption
cases are decisively resolved?
How is corruption understood?
What is the impact, for example, of media
profiles of particular municipalities in terms
of corruption?
How can municipal corruption be monitored
and tracked through special investigations
or interventions in terms of the Constitution
(i.e.  suspension of its executive powers in
terms  of the oversight responsibilities of
another  sphere of government)?
Policy and legislative
framework
The South African Constitution creates a framework
of social and governmental accountability by
providing that all executive organs of state must
account to the National Assembly and by setting out
mechanisms for this to be enforced. The Standing
Committee on Public Accounts (Scopa) for example,
functions to oversee government spending. Further-
more chapter 9 of the Constitution establishes a
number of oversight bodies including the Auditor-
General, the Public Protector and the Human Rights
Commission – the special status of these bodies and
their ability to investigate organs of state is crucial in
combating corruption. The Auditor-General for
example, empowered through the Public Audit Act
(25 of 2004), is authorised as the external auditor of
all national and provincial state departments and
municipalities. The act prescribes the independence
of the Auditor-General, subject only to the Constitu-
tion and the law and requires the Auditor-General to
be impartial and to per form his or her powers and
functions without fear, favour or prejudice. In its
preamble it further prohibits any person or organ of
state from inter fering with the functioning of the
Auditor-General and requires the submission of audit
reports to any legislature that has a direct interest in
the audit and also to the public.
It is largely through the Auditor-General that the
South African public has been made aware that
unauthorised and irregular expenditure by state
bodies affects all spheres of government.
Corruption in South Africa is prosecuted
through the Corruption Act (94 of 1992). The Act
makes corruption a criminal offence but there is a
host of legislation and policy that deals with account-
ability and transparent governance – rather than the
criminal aspect of corruption. The following sum-
mary of policy and legislation that addresses
corruption is drawn largely from Sam Sole (2005):
The Public Finance Management Act (1 of
1999): Sets out the fiduciary responsibilities of
finance officers and managers in government and
allows them to be held personally responsible for
financial misconduct or other governance failures.
At local government level the Act is mirrored by
the Municipal Finance Management Act whose
functioning is discussed in more detail later.
The Finance Intelligence Act (38 of 2001):
Obliges banks to keep improved records regard-
ing the banking activities of clients and to report
suspicious transactions in order to trace money
laundering.
The Prevention of Organised Crime Act (121 of
1998): Together with and other legislation related
to the seizure of assets and the recovery of
government funds this allows the Special
Investigating Unit (SIU) and the Asset Forfeiture
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Unit to investigate fraud and theft and for the
proceeds of crime and irregularly acquired assets
to be seized.
The Promotion of Access to Information Act (2
of 2000): Allows the public broad access to
information held by government and the private
sector.
The Protected Disclosures Act (26 of 2000):
Provides special protection for whistle-blowers
through a series of procedures that must be
complied with.
The Prevention and Combating of Corrupt
Activities Act (No. 12 of 2004): Applies to both
private and public sector and outlaws the offer or
receipt of “gratification” that has not been earned
and requires persons in authority to report
corrupt activity. More severe sentences are
introduced for offences against the Act.
South Africa has consistently been a participant in
key regional strategies to improve governance and
reduce corruption. The African Peer Review
Mechanism (APRM) for example is a voluntary
exercise entered into by member states of the African
Union as a form of self-monitoring. The blueprint for
this exercise is the Declaration on Democracy,
Political, Economic and Corporate Governance that
sets out values, codes and standards in these sectors
(NEPAD, 2003). Internally South Africa has launched a
number of programmes that address corruption. In
September 2004 the Public Service Commission
launched the National Anti-corruption Hotline that
allows government employees, the public and
concerned third parties to report corruption.11
Corruption experts are cautious about drawing
simple conclusions from this extensive framework of
anti-corruption legislation and policy. Lala Camerer
(1999:1) of the Institute of Security Studies, warns for
example that as South African politicians and civil
servants are increasingly exposed to public scrutiny
and media attention, “it should come as no surprise
that anti-corruption rhetoric forms part of the political
agenda.”12 The essence of this concern, now thrown
into sharp relief by allegations against former Deputy
President Jacob Zuma and Commissioner of Police
Jackie Selebi, is the risk that the symbolism and the
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message that the state is “getting tough on corrup-
tion” often seems more important than effective and
decisive action where corruption involves senior
politicians and civil servants. A 2006 study of
corruption in South African local government that
included the activities of the Directorate of Special
Operations (Scorpions) and the SIU and other anti-
corruption agencies warned that:
In South Africa the matter of independence is
critical given a history where there has been
persistent political pressure to bring certain
agencies under the authority of the South African
Police Service (SAPS), an agency that is widely
perceived to have serious problems of corruption
and to be subject to political influence (University
of Loughborough, 2006:17).
In October 2006 the DPLG launched a strategy
entitled “Government and Communities in Partnership
To Prevent Corruption.” This is an outcome of Project
Consolidate and was publicised “to promote a culture
of good and ethical governance.” The strategy is to be
piloted in 17 municipalities in five provinces during
the first year and a further 15 municipalities in the
second year. It involves the development of anti-
corruption models for wider application. The strategy
will focus on developing key per formance indicators,
corruption monitoring systems and the identification
and analysis of existing trends and patterns of
corruption. The plan is to mobilise ward committees
and communities as a whole to participate in local





Markinor surveys since 2000 suggest that corruption
in local government is perceived to be on a par with
corruption in some of the government line functions
that are particularly prone to perceptions of corrupt
practice.
The Markinor results suggest that requests for bribes
occur most commonly in job seeking, in obtaining
municipal services (electricity and water) and in
obtaining services from the Department of Home
Affairs which issues identity documents. Particular
corruption problems seem to attach to the police, the
Department of Home Affairs and local government.14
Instances of financial maladministration are also
commonplace. The September 2003 report by the
Auditor-General cited a 57% failure of municipalities
to submit financial statements 20 months after the
due date. Thus the Auditor-General was obliged in
many instances to provide the public with an
incomplete “compliance” report on the state of
municipal finances (Auditor-General, 2003).
The principal policy instrument in addressing
this problem is the Municipal Finance Management
Act, effective from 2004. The Act aims to create more
direct accountability within council, specifically with
regard to the decisions and controls exercised by
mayors, mayoral committees and finance officers. It
establishes stringent financial accounting and
reporting systems. Provincial governments are tasked
with overseeing municipal finances and, if need be,
can intervene in the financial management of a
municipality. Should a province fail to do so, national
government can intervene in its stead.
SIU investigations into local government corrup-
tion indicate that an important component of corrup-
tion is that which relates to the defrauding of tender
corruption in local government is perceived to be on a par with
corruption in some of the government line functions that are
particularly prone to perceptions of corrupt practice.
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and contracting procedures by councillors and staff
who receive kickbacks from the successful tendering
organisation, or through other means, hold a financial
interest in the outcome of the process.15 The 2006 case
study by Mbumba Development Services for the
University of Loughborough (2006:43) notes that:
Despite increasingly stringent measures to prevent
councillors and senior officials from benefiting
from tender awards, the irregular award of large
infrastructure and service tenders seem to persist.
Mbumba went on to cite seven examples of municipal
corruption (some involving multiple municipalities) in
various provinces ranging in value from R100m to
less than R100 000 where large-scale infrastructure
fraud had occurred. It was suggested that cases like
these had led to the issuing of new regulations by the
National Treasury in June 2005. These regulations
mirror provisions within the MFMA and aim to curb
corruption in the tendering and procurement function
and improve accountability and transparency for the
award of municipal bids (Cape Times, 7 June 2005).
Case study evidence gathered by Afesis-corplan
and other NGOs suggests that measures to prevent
procurement irregularity have mixed credibility by the
public. For example in the 2006 Nkangala District
Good Governance Survey 44% of public respondents
did not believe that their municipalities have effective
systems for disclosure of business interests by their
councillors and officials. Confidence was lowest in Dr
JS Moroka Municipality where only 12% of the
members of the public and CBOs thought that the
system is effective while the most optimistic outlook
was recorded in Emakhazeni Municipality where 54%
of the respondents said that the system of disclosure
in the municipality is effective. In contrast, most
councillors and officials are of the view that their
systems of disclosure are effective. However, 58%
indicated that the disclosed information is not made
available to the public. Their view tallied with that of
members of the public and CBOs, 68% of whom
reported that the information is not accessible.
Seemingly, there is confusion over the purpose of
collecting the information.
Given the severity of these problems and their
implications for expanding infrastructure and serv-
ices, Mbumba suggested that a set of indicators be
developed to understand the full implications of large-
scale corruption in municipal programmes.
The indicators would set out to record:
The number of infrastructure projects where
construction or maintenance has been disrupted
by irregular financial management procedure or
where such irregularity is alleged
The monetary value of the misappropriated
finance
The service deficit for the intended beneficiaries:
service deficit = intended service level and scale
(as framed by the Integrated Development Plan or
other planning instrument) minus the actual service
level and scale experienced by the intended
beneficiaries (may require on-site inspection)
The “severity” of the corruption (rather than
incapacity or incompetence) as indicated by
Auditor-General reports or the reports of anti-
corruption agencies, internal disciplinary actions
by the municipality / other sphere of government,
criminal or civil actions arising from the case
Public perceptions of
corruption
GGLN affiliated organisations have conducted good
governance surveys since 2000 which include
questions about public perceptions of corruption. In
the most recent round of these surveys, almost three-
44% of public respondents did not believe that their
municipalities have effective systems for disclosure of
business interests by their councillors and officials.
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Key points:
South Africa has put in place an extensive
framework of anti-corruption legislation and
policy yet surveys show that the public perceive
local government to be a hotbed of corruption.
Related to corruption is the issue of
maladministration, manifest in poor manage-
ment and governance, particularly over financial
and reporting matters, such as the inability of
the majority of municipalities to submit their
financial statements on time.
The principal policy instrument in addressing
corruption and maladministration is the
Municipal Finance Management Act, which aims
to create more direct accountability within
council, specifically with regard to the decisions
and controls exercised by mayors, mayoral
committees and finance officers. In spite of this,
investigations show that the major sources of
corruption are tenders and procurement
procedures.
Given the severity of these problems and their
implications for expanding infrastructure and
services, it is suggested that a set of indicators
be developed to understand the full implications
of large-scale corruption in municipal programmes.
quarters (73%) of the members of the public and
CBOs surveyed in Nkangala District Municipality
reported that nepotism is the most common form of
corruption in their municipalities. Other forms of
corruption that were cited by the majority of the
respondents were tender irregularities.
Maladministration and the signing of cheques without
appropriate controls were also mentioned as common
forms of corruption.
of the public and CBOs cited fear of reprisals as the
key reason for not reporting corruption and most
councillors and officials (65%) concurred with this
view. Another worrying finding was that the biggest
proportion (48%) of members of the public and
CBOs believe that there are no consequences for
those convicted of corruption.
Almost two-thirds (63%) of the councillors and
officials surveyed acknowledged having either heard
or read about cases of corruption in their municipali-
ties. In some instances there were vast differences of
perception between councillors and officials and
members of the public and CBOs. There were also
strong indications that cases of corruption go
unreported because of a lack of faith in the munici-
pality’s ability and willingness to act on reports of
corruption. More than two-fifths (44%) of members
Almost two-thirds (63%) of the councillors and officials
surveyed acknowledged having either heard or read
about cases of corruption in their municipalities.
the biggest proportion (48%) of members of the public and
CBOs believe that there are no consequences for those convicted
of corruption.
Almost half (47%) of the respondents hold the view
that councillors put party interests before the
interests of the community. More seriously, 54% of
members of the public and CBOs hold the view that
councillors abuse their positions for personal gain.
While surveys of public perception are open
to obvious criticism in terms of the limited
possibility for verification, the value of these
methodologies in providing detailed insight into the
form and motive for municipal corruption is virtually
unmatched.
2. Planning and Budgeting
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Democratic representation establishes
the voice of the people in local
decision-making. Democratically
elected councils must also
demonstrate that they approach the
prioritisation of needs, planning and
budgeting in a manner that combines
technical competence with respect for
the public views and aspirations, of
both current and future generations.
This section of the report focuses on planning,
particularly the Integrated Development Plan (IDP) as
the leading instrument of local planning, with its link
to finance, budgeting and performance management.
Intergovernmental relations is also discussed as this
is key to municipalities securing resources for
development and achieving harmony or disjuncture




To what extent is Integrated Development
Planning (IDP) achieving its desired outcomes?
Which policy and legislative frameworks govern
and inform IDPs?
What support has been given to municipalities to
undertake IDP?
To what extent are municipalities able to devise
credible IDPs?
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To what extent is there meaningful public
participation in IDP processes?
What are the key issues, limitations and
challenges related to the IDP process?
The dominant model for
local government
planning
Integral to the new approach to governance in South
Africa is a profound shift in the approach to plan-
ning. A further and often controversial feature of this
shift is expanded local government powers and
responsibilities that now encompass social and
economic development, sustainable service delivery,
and the attainment of an environment that is both
safe and healthy.
The IDP in policy and
legislative context
Of the many policies and legal provisions that govern
the IDP the Municipal Systems Act of 2000 is key
and may supersede other legal planning imperatives.
The Municipal Systems Act makes the IDP the official
five-year strategic management plan for South
African municipalities and stipulates the key compo-
nents of the IDP as well as the criteria and values
that must be applied to planning. The Act defines the
IDP as a “single inclusive and strategic plan” that
“links, integrates and coordinates a municipality’s
sector specific plans;
aligns the resources and capacity of the munici-
pality to the overall development objectives of the
municipality;
forms the policy framework on which annual
budgets rest; and
informs and is informed by similar development
plans at national and provincial development
plans” (Carter 2004:1-2).
In accordance with the Systems Act, district munici-
palities are responsible for the district IDP as well as
the framework for local municipal IDPs. District
municipalities are therefore responsible for “inter-
local co-ordination” as well as integration with other
levels of government planning (Todes, 2002:14). It is
well known that the first set of IDPs in particular
reflected significant weaknesses and were often
drawn up by external consultants, because newly
formed municipalities often lacked the local planning
capabilities to prepare an IDP. In an effort to address
this, and in accordance with the Municipal Structures
Act, the DPLG introduced Guide Packs on IDP. These
IDP is a cornerstone of developmental local govern-
ment in South Africa. It is a tool to align budgeting
and project implementation with strategic priorities,
and “to link across and co-ordinate the growing
number of sectoral plans, programmes and projects
that impact on the activity of municipal government”
(Harrison 2008:321). More recent perspectives
present the IDP more ambitiously as a central
component of an emerging system of intergovern-
mental planning and coordination (Patel and Powell,
2008). In essence, the developmental intention of the
IDP is to bring about “…more strategic decision
making, deeper levels of local democracy, more goal-
oriented budgeting, more developmental and
transformative outcomes, changes in spatial configu-
rations, and better coordinated and prioritised on-
the-ground delivery” (Harrison 2008:322). The big
question is whether it is able to live up to this
undoubtedly far-reaching expectation.
IDP is a cornerstone of developmental local
government in South Africa.
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offer a series of recommendations pertaining to all
IDP components, including methodology, institu-
tional organisation, types of public participation, as
well as the manner in which cross-cutting issues are
included and addressed within the planning process.
Other national government support initiatives to
strengthen IDPs include a training programme and
the establishment of Planning, Implementation and
Management Support System (PIMMS) centres at
district level. These support initiatives have been
instrumental in terms of shaping the way in which
IDPs are designed and conducted and are largely
responsible for the uniformity in many IDPs (Todes,
2002:14).
The IDP document itself, which is reviewed on
an annual basis, is developed through an initial five-
phase preparation process, namely: analysis,
strategy design, projects development, integration
and, lastly, approval. The broad IDP process includes
annual monitoring, evaluation and review of the
actual implementation of the plan. The IDP monitor-
ing and review process must detail the attainment of
organisational objectives and follows the typical
project planning cycle. Public participation is viewed
as a central component of the IDP process.
Challenges confronting
IDPs
key components of the municipalities’ business
processes and are thus deemed to be effective (Patel,
2004:4). The CSIR found that 35% of municipalities
(99) possess the most basic institutional require-
ments and capacity but rely on expert support and
assistance when it comes to developing and imple-
menting IDPs effectively and therefore do not have a
complete sense of ownership of the IDP. The
remaining 28% (80) of municipalities lack the
necessary basic institutional capacity for planning
and face huge challenges when it comes to develop-
ing an effective IDP. Identified constraints to the IDP
process include lack of meaningful participation,
insufficient economic, institutional and human
capacity, lack of knowledge and poor intergovern-
mental relations. Collectively these limitations have
dogged the successful implementation of IDPs.
While some of these issues may be considered to be
“teething problems”, there are others that appear to
be of a more structural nature (Carter, 2004:2).
Participation
In an effort to meet the legal requirement for
meaningful stakeholder participation in planning, the
DPLG Guide has proposed the establishment of IDP
representative forums. These and other participatory
strategies have generally not achieved the quality and
depth of public engagement envisaged. Research on
the Ugu District Municipality’s IDP, for example,
found that the establishment of representative
forums as a space for stakeholder participation has
not proved to be a particularly effective or successful
method of communication and discussion.
just over one in three (37%, or 105 municipalities) demonstrated the
ability to develop IDPs that have come to form the key components of the
municipalities’ business processes and are thus deemed to be effective
In 2004 Council of Scientific and Industrial Research
(CSIR) research revealed that of the then 284
municipalities in South Africa, just over one in three
(37%, or 105 municipalities) demonstrated the
ability to develop IDPs that have come to form the
the establishment of representative forums as a space for
stakeholder participation has not proved to be a particu-
larly effective or successful method of communication and
discussion.
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The forums apparently overestimated the capacity
and availability of stakeholders (Todes, 2002:38).
Local government policy and legislation requires
municipalities to give particular attention to the
involvement of marginalised groups. Recent studies
of the Msinga, Hibiscus Coast and eThekwini
municipalities show that while IDP support docu-
ments produced at a national level do address gender
issues, when it comes to the local level, gender is
neglected. (Todes et al, 2007). Gender advocacy
groups also report that the IDP process is inaccessible
(Todes et al, 2007). Broad participatory processes
tend to be “divorced” from the IDP resource allocation
and implementation processes (Todes et al, 2007:2).
(Carter, 2004:2). It is alleged that councillors alter
IDPs after they have been approved and adopted by
the council. During the course of 2002 it also
became apparent that intergovernmental transfers to
municipalities were “gazetted” after the IDP planning
processes had been concluded and as a consequence
could not be factored into the IDP document (Carter,
2004:2). This issue is further taken up below.
Moreover, as a result of the municipal
redemarcation in 2000 further disruption and
capacity shortages occurred within some municipal
administrations.
Researchers maintain that in instances where wom-
en’s specific needs and issues have been registered in
the participatory processes or through advocacy,
municipalities have generally neglected to address
these needs (Todes et al, 2007).
Arguably, the highly complex nature of integrated
development planning also militates against meaning-
ful participation. While this is no excuse for munici-
palities to ignore the requirement to facilitate public
participation in planning processes, the reality is that
many municipalities have opted for a more techno-
cratically driven approach to the IDP, which leaves
little scope (or patience) for potentially prolonged and
wide ranging processes of community engagement.
Institutional, human and
financial capacity
The tendency for the IDP to become a “wish list” has
long been acknowledged but never fully resolved
where women’s specific needs and issues have been
registered in the participatory processes or through
advocacy, municipalities have generally neglected to
address these needs Municipal staff do not have the financial, project
management and business planning skills required to
develop appropriate project proposals and business
strategies, particularly given the complex sets of
issues that somehow need to be coordinated and
assembled in the IDP. National and provincial
departments have therefore been unable to increase
the allocation of resources to the municipalities
(Carter, 2004:2). Furthermore, due to the complex
nature of the IDP methodology set out in various
guides, the core role of strategic planning within an
institutional context has not been made clear to the
majority of role players (Rauch, 2002:27). It is also
worth noting that the nature and scope of IDPs has
shifted over time and they now have to incorporate
spatial development frameworks, medium term
financial plans, disaster plans, integrated transport
plans, water services plans and performance
management systems (Harrison, 2008). This clearly
puts significant pressure on the political and
technical capacity of municipalities to produce
Municipal staff do not have the financial, project management
and business planning skills required to develop appropriate
project proposals and business strategies
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coherent and integrated plans. When it comes to
municipal finance, as a result of economic, structural
and even political factors, municipalities often fail to
collect the full revenue owed to them. In such
instances, revenue forecasts set out in IDPs lack any
credible basis.
Information and knowledge
Other challenges concern a lack of reliable informa-
tion for planning. Confronted by insufficient informa-
tion about communities, existing infrastructure and
estimated costs and expenditure involved in service
delivery, municipalities are not able to model or
forecast the impact and effects of different tariffs and
rates. This is further compounded by the fact that
they are unable to adequately calculate the operating
costs associated with large capital projects once they
have been developed (Carter, 2004:3).
Intergovernmental relations
reflected in the IDP. One of the key problems is that
the planning and delivery cycles of national and
provincial sector departments and other stakeholders
are not aligned. This, in turn, makes it more difficult
for the horizontal alignment of plans and projects
between departments in a municipality, as it in-
creases the pressure on municipal department to
report upwards, instead of encouraging horizontal
integration (Pieterse and van Donk, 2008).
In recognition of the fact that intergovernmental
co-operation and alignment is wanting, national
government, particularly the Presidency and DPLG,
has proposed that the IDP becomes “a local expres-
sion of a government-wide plan with clearly defined
accountabilities and responsibilities” (Patel and
Powell, 2008:353). This recognises the need for
greater alignment of national, provincial and local
plans and development imperatives, as reflected in
the National Spatial Development Perspective
(NSDP), the Provincial Growth and Development
Strategies (PGDS) and IDPs. While this may seem
commonsensical, especially from the perspective of
national (and provincial) government, it will require
changes both in law and in organisational culture and
attitudes to make this possible. More importantly, it
is likely to make the IDP process even more complex
and technocratically driven, thereby downplaying and
undermining the potentially empowering and
mobilizing role of local planning processes
(Harrison, 2008; Pieterse and van Donk, 2008).
The way forward for IDPs
The challenge is for IDPs to become “effective
instruments in meeting community needs through
better decision-making and management, and
realistic strategies and programmes that deliver
small and growing, yet tangible change to people’s
lives” (Patel, 2004:10). Recent IDPs show a signifi-
cant improvement compared to earlier versions and
are potentially en route to becoming more credible.
A significant challenge for municipalities in formulat-
ing an IDP is that national sector departments and
agencies are not legally obliged to relate to the IDP
process, yet many of their actions and projects are
located within municipal boundaries. The Intergov-
ernmental Relations Framework Act (13 of 2005)
sought to help rectify this, by proposing the estab-
lishment of structures and mechanisms for improved
intergovernmental cooperation and coordination.
While these forums may have proved beneficial in
some respects, it is by no means a foregone conclu-
sion that these have improved the integration and
alignment of government plans and ambitions as
A significant challenge for municipalities in formulating an IDP is that
national sector departments and agencies are not legally obliged to relate
to the IDP process, yet many of their actions and projects are located
within municipal boundaries.
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Yet, a fundamental challenge relates to the IDP’s
ability to bring about deeper levels of democracy,
through meaningful participation and engagement
with community groups, particularly those who are
most marginalised. Most municipalities seem to lack
the ability, if not the commitment, to embed the
notion of participatory local democracy in their day-
to-day practice. Current trends to make the IDP the
centrepiece of intergovernmental planning and
coordination, while appealing in some respects, will
only serve to make it more difficult for the IDP to
become a local development plan, one that truly re-
flects the needs and aspirations of local communities.
things, resulting in an on-going trade-off between
different imperatives which ultimately can mean that
none of the imperatives is satisfied. Thus the IDP
process is seen as the primary mechanism for at
least the following:
The comprehensive service delivery plan for
municipalities with targets and indicators for
implementation
Aligning budget with strategy and priorities
Engaging citizens on their needs and how they
would prioritise
Aligning the plans and activities of different
departments within the municipality
Aligning the plans and strategies of all three
spheres of government for the particular munici-
pal area
Providing long-term strategic direction for the
economy of the municipality
Forcing all these elements into the IDP process can
be unproductive and results in IDP documents that
are often too complex to be useful. There may also
be a misplaced belief that alignment can somehow be
achieved through the technical process of producing
an IDP. Alignment rather flows from strong inter-
departmental and inter-organisational relationships,
excellent communication flows and a strong common
sense of purpose and direction.
a fundamental challenge relates to the IDP’s ability to bring
about deeper levels of democracy, through meaningful
participation and engagement with community groups,
particularly those who are most marginalised.
There is also a view that the national approach to
IDPs incorporates old and outdated approaches to
strategic planning that assume that the future is
stable and predictable and that seek to be too
comprehensive, consequently driving overly bureau-
cratic approaches. It follows that more dynamic,
networked planning tools and processes must
respond to the fact that strategy is both planned and
must respond to the unexpected dynamics of making
decisions in real time.
Within this the major problem of the IDP is that
it is supposed to be the tool for achieving too many
Current trends to make the IDP the centrepiece of intergov-
ernmental planning and coordination, while appealing in
some respects, will only serve to make it more difficult for
the IDP to become a local development plan, one that truly
reflects the needs and aspirations of local communities.
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Key points:
IDP has developed as a cornerstone of develop-
mental local government in South Africa, although
it is yet to satisfactorily attain the high ideals
which this approach was developed to achieve.
Increasingly more and more is being required of
the IDP, which must meet the requirements of
more and more laws and policies. This has led
to the development of different approaches. One
views the IDP as the place where the plans of all
three spheres of government should coalesce,
while another sees the IDP as an overburdened
instrument which loses its focus when it tries to
meet too many requirements.
A number of other challenges have emerged in
the development of IDPs and the need for
meaningful public participation stands out. For
the most part, municipalities have been unable
to ensure that public participation around the
IDP elicits quality participation while incorpo-




To what extent are there measures in place to
ensure that municipalities adhere to sound
financial practice?
What do annual audits indicate about the
financial health of municipalities in South
Africa?
How do members of the public perceive the
financial performance of their municipalities?
To what extent are municipalities engaging
communities in the formulation and monitoring
of their annual budgets?
One way of addressing this would be to unpack the
IDP into a number of different planning
instruments that are simpler and better designed to
accomplish a narrower purpose. These could include
a five-year service delivery plan involving extensive
consultation and participation as well as an annual
report evaluating municipal performance against the
service delivery plan. This should include an
independent assessment of performance by an
appropriate independent institution or auditor to
ensure transparency and integrity. In the larger urban
areas municipalities in partnership with other
spheres of government, organised business, labour
and other relevant economic stakeholders could
produce a long-term development strategy for the
area focused on the economy as a tool for aligning
common action and strategic infrastructure.
In a democratic society, citizens give the government
a mandate by means of their votes. Elected politi-
cians are therefore obliged to translate the objectives
and aspirations of their constituencies into policies
and plans that are reflected in the budget (Fölscher,
2004). Owing to the lack of infinite resources and the
boundless array of public needs, it is inevitable that a
municipal budget will comprise trade-offs between
different spending priorities.
Local government budgets are calculated on the
basis of desired targets of service delivery, that is the
budgets are performance-based. The MFMA is
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intended to ensure that sound financial governance
takes place within municipalities and that the roles
of mayor, councillors and officials are specified.
Section 21 of the MFMA requires that the Mayor
should co-ordinate processes that are needed for
the preparation of the annual municipal budget as
well as for reviewing the municipal IDP in order to
ensure that the tabled budget and any revisions that
have been made to the IDP and any other budget-
related policies are “mutually consistent and
credible”. The Municipal Manager is also the
accounting officer and is tasked with all aspects of
revenue and expenditure management. The Munici-
pal Manager must thus ensure that once the budget
has been approved, it is implemented.
Budgets are calculated in detail for the financial
year, which runs from July to the following June, as
well as in less detail for the Medium Term Expendi-
ture Framework for the following three-year period
(Idasa, undated 2).
Section 23 of the MFMA specifies that once an
annual budget has been tabled in a municipal
council, the accounting officer must publicise the
budget and related documents and invite comment
from the local community. Any views or representa-
tions received by the council must be considered. If
these community inputs cannot be factored into the
budget, the community is entitled to a response and
explanation from the Mayor.
On average, South African municipalities raise
85% of their revenue from property rates, tariffs for
services and levies. However, municipalities with
fewer resources and sources of revenue receive as
much as 92% of their income from other sources.
In terms of the Division of Revenue Act, approxi-
mately 5% of the national budget is allocated to
municipalities to ensure that their revenue matches
the expenditure required to create and maintain
infrastructure and to deliver the services for which
they are responsible (Idasa, undated 2). Thus,
municipalities with large numbers of households
that are not able to afford to pay for basic services
are funded from nationally collected income tax,
company tax and value-added tax (VAT). The share
of the national budget comes in the form of an
“equitable share” allocation for service delivery and
from “conditional grants” to fund infrastructure or
current expenditure on capacity building.
The MFMA requires an annual audit of munici-
pal finances. The quality of these audits has,
however, been poor. It was reported in April 2007
(Business News, 2007) that although audit dead-
lines were generally being met, the number of
qualified audits doubled between 2003/04 and 2005/
06. The Minister of Finance reported at the SALGA
National Conference that many municipal Chief
Financial Officers lacked appropriate qualifications
in finance and that some had been rotated from
other management posts, such as traffic control or
human resources, into finance. Between 30% and
70% of senior management posts at municipalities,
including Chief Financial Officers and Municipal
Managers, were vacant.
As table 8 shows, nearly half of respondents (47%)
in a 2006 study by Bratton and Sibanyoni are of the
view that municipalities are doing very well or fairly
well in terms of local revenue collection. However, a
lower number of people holds the same view in
respect of decisions on expenditure.
Significantly, more than a quarter (26%) does not
know or has not heard enough about expenditure
incurred by their municipalities to be able to assess
their per formance. A similar proportion (27%) is
insufficiently informed about the collection of local
revenues (Bratton & Sibanyoni, 2006). Even in
instances where ward committees are functioning
well, details of the municipal budget are rarely
tabled for discussion between members.
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held one or two consultative meetings. Almost
two-thirds (64%) of the councillors and officials
reported that four or more consultative meetings
had been held to discuss the most recent municipal
budget. However, one of the main challenges is to
strengthen systems of citizen accountability and public
oversight on municipal financial performance. This
should include mechanisms to enhance the scope of
information disclosure to citizens, particularly focus-
ing on outputs, outcomes and impacts of municipal
decisions (Savage, 2008).
A more positive picture emerges from the six local
municipalities of the Mpumalanga District
Municipality of Nkangala, where 61% the members
of the public and CBOs interviewed reported that
public meetings are held on the municipal budget.
The survey also shows that both civil society and
government respondents confirmed that the
municipalities held a number of consultative
meetings to discuss the most recent municipal
budget. More than half (56%) of the members of the
public and CBOs reported that their municipalities
Key points:
As a middle income country the budgets of
South African municipalities reflect a series of
trade-offs between developmental needs and
limited resources.
Good financial management by municipalities is
constrained by the availability of skilled person-
nel across municipalities. This is evident in the
increase in qualified audits and the large
number of vacancies in Municipal Manager and
Chief Financial Officer posts.
With municipalities themselves not always able
to deliver professional financial management it
is unsurprising that public oversight of munici-
pal financial performance is still weak. An
important challenge therefore is to strengthen
systems of citizen accountability.
Table 8: Public views on municipalities’ financial performance
Source: Bratton & Sibanyoni (2006).
Local revenue
collection 15% 32% 27% 14% 12%
Decisions on
expenditure 10% 26% 26% 19% 19%




How does legislation encourage the public to be
involved in municipal per formance management?
What has the experience been in cases where
attempts have been made to engage communi-
ties in municipal per formance management?
How have municipal politicians and officials
reacted to attempts to involve communities
more directly in performance monitoring?
How is performance management linked to
integrated development planning in practice?
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Despite extensive legal and policy provisions geared
towards ensuring the practice of good local
governance in South African municipalities, the
reality of local governance practice often falls well
short of the policy ideal. Consequently, a growing
gap between the rhetoric of policy intentions and
citizens’ day-to-day experiences of municipal
governance runs the risk of alienating civil society
and the citizenry in general from their local
authorities. The year 2007 saw an increase in service
delivery related protests and there has been a
growing acceptance within civil society that more
needs to be done in terms of service delivery in order
to stem the tide of conflicts. Recent trends have
shown that there is a relationship between service
delivery, municipal administration/mal-administration
and broader community participation. For example, it
has emerged that despite regular Auditor-General
reports, details of impropriety are either ignored or
withheld from public scrutiny and this creates a
growing alienation and local level conflict between
citizens/civil society and local government.
In an effort to narrow this rift, efforts have been
made, ostensibly, to involve citizens in municipal
performance management systems (PMS) through
which a fruitful dialogue and engagement between
politicians, administrators and the communities is
fostered. The system requires a concerted approach
by all stakeholders in the setting of targets, by both
the evaluators and those being evaluated. Such
consensual arrangements, it was initially hoped,
would ensure greater municipal accountability by
municipalities to local communities.
  An effective municipal PMS is supposed to not
only deal with current misdemeanours such as the
irregular awarding of contracts or procurement of
services, but it is also supposed to help diffuse any
potential service delivery related protests and block
potential loopholes for corruption. Over the past
seven years there have been allegations, especially in
smaller municipalities that the performance of
councillors and officials is not on par with their
salaries and allowances. In more recent years the
country has been rocked by protests from the public
as a result of poor service delivery brought about by





It is required by law that municipalities not only have
a PMS, but must also involve local communities in
the municipal PMS. Section 42 of the Municipal
Systems Act states that a municipality, through
appropriate mechanisms, processes and procedures
established in terms of Chapter 4, must involve the
local community in the development, implementation
and review of the municipality’s PMS, and, in
particular, allow the community to participate in the
setting of appropriate key performance indicators
and performance targets for the municipality.
Chapter 4 of the Systems Act is dedicated to commu-
nity participation. Section 16(1) stipulates that a
municipality must develop “a culture of municipal
governance that complements formal representative
government with a system of participatory govern-
ance.” It emphasises that the municipality must
foster participation in the evaluation of its perform-
ance through a performance management system
alongside strategic decisions about service delivery.
According to the Act the municipality is supposed to
set targets and indicators that will enable it to
monitor and review its per formance based on those
indicators.
According to section 17(1) of the Systems Act,
community participation, including in the PMS must
take place through ward committees, councillors,
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mechanisms, processes and procedures defined in
the Act or established by the council. In essence,
where ward committees exist as the principal form of
community participation, the municipality is obliged
to involve them in the setting of key performance
indicators, targets and the monitoring thereof. The
Systems Act also stipulates that the municipality is
supposed to publish an annual report on the per-
formance of its councillors and staff. It has become
apparent that ill-advised spending priorities, as a
result of limited community participation and
consultation by municipalities, has been impacting
negatively on service delivery.
tured and well-regulated relationship with the
municipality can also use it. In 2004 Afesis-corplan
rolled out the KPI pilot projects to other parts of the
country with the help of well-established partner
organisations including the Foundation for Contem-
porary Research (FCR) in the Western Cape, Planact
in Gauteng, the Built Environment Support Group
(BESG) in KwaZulu-Natal and Idasa in Limpopo.
Relationship between the
PMS and IDP
Municipal performance management systems should
be based on the IDPs of municipalities. Because the
municipal IDP is reviewed on an annual basis, a
twice a year ward level performance management
system could feed into the annual review. In devel-
oping the ward KPI approach, Afesis-corplan took
into consideration that ward-level KPIs must also
relate to KPIs in the municipal IDP, since the
municipality is unlikely to feel compelled to adhere
to ward-level targets particularly around service
levels that deviate from those specified in the IDP. In
Nyandeni Municipality in the Eastern Cape,
R343 000 was allegedly intended for housing
subsidies as per the IDP. However, the money was
used to pay salaries. This suggests that inputs from
public participation in municipal performance
management were ignored when it came to actual
implementation of decisions.
In an effort to contain the litany of financial
impropriety within local government, two GGLN
members have devised a project dubbed “closing the
gap” or the community-based financial accountabil-
ity project (CBFA). This is being implemented by
Afesis-corplan in partnership with the Project for
Conflict Resolution and Development (PCRD),
another GGLN member based in the Eastern Cape.
The project seeks to promote community-based
financial accountability in compliance with section
In response to these legislative provisions, various
civil society organisations have developed instru-
ments to empower communities to play a role in
assessing municipal performance. These are not
meant to be punitive but are supposed to help foster
engagement and dialogue between a municipality and
the communities that it serves. One such organisa-
tion, Afesis-corplan, came up with a Key Perform-
ance Indicators (KPIs) matrix that is intended to
assess the relationship between local civil society
and its respective municipality. It was first piloted in
the Buffalo City Municipal area in the Eastern Cape.
The KPIs are focused on various governance
elements, such as the municipality’s interface with
the public, service delivery and performance man-
agement and the implementation of IDPs.
The instrument can be used by civil society
organisations that have an unstructured or partially
structured relationship with the municipality. Ward
committees or similar bodies that exist in a struc-
ill-advised spending priorities, as a result of limited community
participation and consultation  by municipalities, has been
impacting negatively on service delivery.
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21 (3) of the Public Audit Act which stipulates that
audit reports must be tabled in the relevant legislature
in accordance with any applicable legislation or
otherwise within a reasonable time. The CBFA aims at
empowering communities to monitor how municipali-
ties use their funds in line with the provisions of the
White Paper on Local Government. In Ndlambe and
Kouga local municipalities in the Eastern Cape the
newly formed monitoring groups consist of members
of the general public, ratepayers’ associations,
community-based organisations and individuals that
feel passionate about financial accountability.
the effectiveness of the PMS in ensuring better service
delivery. As a result, they have tended to frustrate the
activities of the ward committees in an effort to wear
them out and discourage them from fulfilling that
aspect of their mandate. Civil society organisations
have not faired better.
The internal workings of the PMS is thus flawed.
In many cases, violations have outweighed compli-
ance. Where there has been a semblance of compli-
ance, a closer look reveals serious attempts at
concealing poor per formance. There have also been
genuine concerns over whether society should not be
demanding an excellent collective management
performance rather than the current system that only
rewards senior managers and therefore generates
resentment among the rest of the staff. Tied to this
concern is the amount of time spent on the mere
“make-believe” compliance that really has nothing to
do with improved management performance.
Generally, although the details of the PMS are
clearly spelt out, it is obvious that the good intentions
contained in the policy and legal frameworks are not
reflected in actions on the ground. The implementa-
tion of the PMS is badly flawed while the structures
that are supposed to aggressively actualise the
Unless public participation in the municipal PMS
is substantially improved, there is little hope that
service delivery performance will equally improve.
Ward committees being the key forums for public
participation are charged with the role of spearhead-
ing the involvement of the general public in the PMS
of their municipalities. However, most of them
remain dysfunctional and insufficiently capacitated to
engage with municipal officials on technical issues
around performance management. Even those that
have been trained on how to use the civil society-
crafted ward KPI matrix complain about lack of
financial resources to enable them to undertake the
requisite performance monitoring tasks.
Moreover, councillors have not taken kindly to
being assessed by ward committee members, whom
they generally view as their underlings. This is the
same attitude that has been exhibited by council
officials as well. Both the elected representatives and
municipal officials have generally been hostile to the
monitoring process which is supposed to enhance
Unless public participation in the municipal PMS is
substantially improved, there is little hope that service
delivery performance will equally improve.
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What are the policy and legislative frameworks
governing intergovernmental relations in South
Africa?
Have the Intergovernmental Relations Frame-
work Act and its forums (where established)
improved district-local relations and
communication between district and local
municipalities?
Is there vertical alignment with provincial and
national government policies and programmes
as envisaged in the Act?
What are the key challenges and shortcomings
which need to be addressed to ensure
effective intergovernmental relations in South
Africa?
Key points:
The Municipal Systems Act requires that all
municipalities develop and implement a PMS.
The legislation also requires that local
communities  participate in the development of
the PMS through appropriate mechanisms and
processes. In particular the legislation
encourages the participation of the community
in the setting of appropriate key per formance
indicators and performance targets.
Performance management systems should be
based on the IDP and the development of key
performance indicators and areas should tally
with the core priorities identified in the IDP.
To date public participation and oversight of the
performance management systems has been
poor. Ward committees in particular are not yet
playing a meaningful role in performance
management.
On the whole the development of a strong culture
of performance management has not taken hold in
municipalities and there remains a disjuncture bet-
ween the vision set out in legislation and the reality
of the majority of the country’s municipalities.
policies - the ward committees - are largely dysfunc-
tional because of the numerous challenges they face.
Municipal officials and councillors remain equally
resistant to being assessed and there does not
appear to be meaningful recourse for aggrieved
communities. Under the circumstances, there may be
a need to re-think the PMS by strengthening ward
committees and the role of civil society and also
increase disincentives for non-compliant councillors
and officials.
Local government in South Africa is a unique
experiment in intergovernmental relations. Guided by
the constitutional principle of co-operative govern-
ment, district and local municipalities must work
together to achieve their (often overlapping) goals.
These government actors must coordinate common
policies, programmes and delivery with each other.
At its most basic level, intergovernmental relations is
about the relationships between the three spheres of
government – national, provincial and local govern-
ment – and how these can be made to work together
for the good of the country as a whole. In terms of
the White Paper on Local Government, intergovern-
mental relations is a set of multiple formal and
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informal processes, channels, structures and
institutional arrangements for bilateral and multilat-
eral interaction within and between spheres of
government. Since the final demarcation of munici-
palities in 2000, a myriad informal channels and
forums have been developed to align and inform
each actor of the others’ desires and needs.
In practice, relations between district and local
municipalities are often characterised by a lack of
co-operation, if not conflict. The presence of two
councils sharing jurisdiction of the same territory
has set the stage for political contestation. The lack
of clarity in the division of powers and functions
between district and local municipalities further
exacerbates the conflict. District-local intergovern-
mental relations tend to be forged on an ad hoc
basis, often influenced by party-political dynamics
and personalities (Atkinson et al, 2003). In sum,
intergovernmental relations has often failed to
facilitate the cooperation of district and local
municipalities to coordinate their constitutional
mandates and achieve efficient service delivery. The
state of intergovernmental relations is thus fraught
with confusion and misunderstanding.
the aim of formalising and institutionalising the
relationship between district and local municipalities
through the District Intergovernmental Forum. At the
local level, the IRFA promotes better coordination to
improve the effective provision of services that
require combined action to ensure that its legislated
intention translates into tangible, measurable results.
Ultimately, however, the success of the IRFA depends
on its ability to improve intergovernmental relations
in the local government sphere.
District intergovernmental relations have seen a
definite improvement since the implementation of the
IRFA. Initial signs are that the act has had a visible and
encouraging impact. However, teething problems,
particularly the elections and conceptual misunder-
standings of the Act and its requirements, have
hampered the effective functioning of some DIFs.
Some variables have interfered with the assessment of
correlating the promulgation of the Act with improved
district-local cooperation and relations. The impact of
the March 2006 local elections was particularly
influential in this regard, in that, for the most part, it
had a de-stabilising effect on DIFs which were
functioning well before the elections. Conversely, but
to a lesser extent, it heralded the establishment of
DIFs in districts where there previously were none,
and the revival of DIFs which were dysfunctional.
However, many district and local municipalities
continue to struggle with cooperative government.
Lessons from five years of unlegislated intergovern-
mental relations should temper any great expectations
for the new forums. Unhappy intergovernmental
relations are not easily remedied by a legislated forum
alone. In some districts, one or more strong local
municipalities (the so-called ‘secondary cities’) are
wealthier and have more capacity than their
districts. The strong local is then in the paradoxical
position of helping the district to fulfil its duties,
particularly in relation to other, less capable local
intergovernmental relations has often failed to
facilitate the cooperation of district and local
municipalities to coordinate their constitutional
mandates and achieve efficient service delivery.
Against this backdrop, the Intergovernmental
Relations Framework Act (IRFA) came into effect on
15 August 2005. The IRFA’s ultimate goal is to
enhance intergovernmental co-operation, which is a
necessary precondition of realising the goals of the
Constitution. In the district-local relations arena, the
IRFA mandated the establishment of district inter-
governmental forums (DIFs) by 31 August 2006, with
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municipalities. In this case, intergovernmental forums
should recognise the actual capacity of municipalities
and let the most capable municipalities have a bigger
role to benefit all municipalities in the district. In
cases where a district insists on taking a leadership
role it is unequipped to play, more competent local
municipalities have simply ignored the intergovern-
mental forums. This may explain the dysfunctional or
ineffective nature of some DIFs, particularly those with
more than one strong local municipality in its district.
The IRFA only seeks to provide a legislative
platform to guide district-local relations through the
principle mechanism of the DIF. The IRFA strikes a
balance between inter-district innovation necessary to
develop best practices and the need to establish
formal district-local intergovernmental forums across
South Africa. The Act is a framework, implying that it
sets parameters for the establishment of DIFs, but that
it is up to each district to find its way and to tailor the
forum to suit its capacity and dynamic make-up. The
framework allows wide scope for growth of the
divergent forums. DIFs must simply find their way
within that framework.
The IRFA is also important in tying the many,
disparate district-local forums to the new Premier’s
intergovernmental forums (PIFs) and indirectly, the
President’s Coordinating Council. This creates a
legislative system of inter-sphere communication
necessary to implement national and provincial
objectives that require the cooperation of all spheres
of government. However, the level of vertical align-
ment with the PIFs, as envisaged by the Act, did not
materialise in most of the DIFs. This is due, in part, to
the teething problems experienced in the first two
years of the act’s implementation.
In conclusion, a number of observations are
presented here. Firstly, with regard to the
establishment of the DIF, those districts that have not
established the DIF are now in breach of an executive
obligation as more than one year has passed since the
Act’s promulgation. Where no DIF has yet been
established, it is the responsibility, first of the district,
to ensure compliance and then, failing that, of the
provincial government to exercise its supervisory
function and compel, by directive, those districts to
establish the DIF where they have not done so. The
provincial government should further support these
districts to establish the DIF by assisting them with
draft protocols, meetings and the like.
Secondly, the membership of the DIFs is still too
broad and all inclusive, with the distinction between
members and invitees not always clear. Again,
provincial government should play a supportive role in
facilitating training workshops among the official
members (Mayors) to improve the understanding of
the Act’s requirements and, more importantly, the
rationale behind those requirements.
Thirdly, the most practical way to deal with most
of these issues appears to be through training and
workshops with the members of the DIFs to improve
their understanding of the Act and its rationale, with the
view to effecting better coordination and cooperation.
However, provincial governments should be careful not
to overstep their supervisory and supportive role in
assisting district municipalities to fulfil their mandate.
Fourthly, the role of “secondary cities” or “aspirant
metros” in districts is becoming an issue of increasing
district-local tension, and must be addressed to ensure
that cooperation, coordination, and ultimately service
delivery within those districts is not compromised. This
issue is currently being addressed in the DPLG’s review
process.
Lastly, institutionalised intergovernmental relations
involve a certain type of organisational embedding. It
primarily moves intergovernmental relations from the
informal domain of interaction through telephones,
letters and informal meetings into a more formal arena
of communication and interaction. It involves the
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
67
creation of a particular structure with certain organisa-
tional features. It introduces regularity of meetings
and a procedure for adopting resolutions and ensuring
their implementation. South Africa, by adopting the
IRFA, has taken further the institutionalisation of
intergovernmental relations.
In the end, however, forums are only as useful as
the outcomes they achieve. Despite the generally
progressive impact of the IRFA in the formal intergov-
ernmental relations arena, it is clear that the mere
existence of intergovernmental forums does not
necessarily result in effective district-local coopera-
tion. Political will is the key driver in facilitating
cooperative and effective district-local, as well as
provincial-local, intergovernmental relations. Of
critical importance in this regard will be better and
continued monitoring of the implementation of the Act
at the district level, both by districts themselves and
the provincial governments responsible for supervis-
ing, monitoring and supporting the DIFs.
If intergovernmental forums are unable to
translate their intentions into developmental
outcomes, an institutionalized response to inter-
governmental relations holds the danger of serving to
embed a narrow, instrumentalist perspective on
intergovernmental relations, which is likely to be
top-down or exclude meaningful engagement from
local communities.
Key points:
Co-operative government between different
spheres and arms of government is central to
the South African polity, with a chapter in the
Constitution dedicated to this principle.
In addition to the Constitution, the Intergovern-
mental Relations Framework Act (IRFA) of 2005
has helped to institutionalise co-operative
relations between spheres of government
At the same time real and unresolved tensions
continue to plague the local sphere, in particular
the relations between district and local
municipalities which are often characterised by a
lack of co-operation, if not conflict. This is
exacerbated by the lack of clarity in the division
of powers and functions between district and
local municipalities.
Political will is the key driver in facilitating cooperative and
effective district-local, as well as provincial-local, intergovern-
mental relations.
3. Equitable Service Delivery and
Poverty Reduction
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Service delivery is one of the
core duties of municipalities.
Local government is the closest
sphere of government to the people,
and is therefore assumed to be
the sphere that can most readily
identify, prioritise, and implement
programmes and projects to address
development needs.
More specifically, the intended outcomes of develop-
mental local government include equitable, sustain-
able and effective development that serves to reduce
poverty and enable people to maintain, if not
improve, their well-being. In terms of the Municipal
Systems Act, local government is expected to involve
communities in their area of jurisdiction in address-
ing people’s needs in a transformational and partici-
patory manner. This section will reflect on progress
and challenges related to equitable service delivery
and poverty reduction. Attention will also be given to
Local Economic Development and the Community
Development Workers Programme, as a government
intervention aimed at improving service delivery and
enhancing the community-state interface.
3.1 Service Delivery
To what extent is poverty being reduced in
South Africa?
How has access to basic services changed in
the past few years?
To what extent are standards in the provision of
services being maintained?
To what extent is the goal of creating sustain-
able human settlements being achieved?
How are municipalities ensuring that the service
needs of indigent households are catered for?
Are provisions for free basic services adequate
for poor households?
What is the extent of debt owed to municipalities
and how are they dealing with this challenge?
What are the different models of service
delivery being used by municipalities?
To what extent is municipal technical and
financial capacity an issue affecting service
delivery and how is this being addressed?
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Progress and challenges
A recent report by the Presidency (2007) noted a
number of positive trends with respect to poverty
reduction. Among these are the rise in income levels
of the poorest 10% and 20% of the population as a
result of strong overall income growth and expansion
of social grants; a significant decline in the number
of people living below a poverty line of R 3 000 per
annum (from 52% to 43% over the past decade), and
a significant improvement in access to services,
particularly those targeting household poverty (e.g.
housing, water, sanitation).
However, as the report also acknowledges, these
positive trends are accompanied by contradictory,
and at times worrying trends. One of the most
striking issues is that poverty remains systemic in
South Africa, with between 14 and 15 million people
living on less than R2 000 a month. It is also widely
acknowledged that inequality has increased, with
South Africa having one of the highest levels of
inequality in the world, and slow but steady eco-
nomic growth in recent years has not translated into
jobs, particularly for those who are unskilled, low-
skilled or semi-skilled. Another worrying trend is the
decline in life expectancy, which is chiefly caused by
the HIV/AIDS epidemic.
HIV/AIDS undermines development progress and
prospects in other ways as well. For one, it adds to
the burden of already vulnerable groups and house-
holds in poor communities, undermines fragile
coping capacities and is giving rise to an alarming
incidence of orphaned and vulnerable children and
child-headed households. It also adds to the demand
for services, both in a quantitative and qualitative
sense, which complicates public service provision.
HIV/AIDS is also frequently quoted as a contributing factor when
service delivery fails or does not meet expected standards, due
to chronic staff illness, vacancies and skills shortages arising
from deaths in the workforce.
HIV/AIDS is also frequently quoted as a contributing
factor when service delivery fails or does not meet
expected standards, due to chronic staff illness,
vacancies and skills shortages arising from deaths in
the workforce. Government has not been well-placed
to deal with the multiple impacts of HIV/AIDS, and
has to date concentrated on health and behaviour
change, without taking account of the many environ-
mental and developmental factors that compound
susceptibility to the virus among the poorest and
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most vulnerable members of our society. This has
been recognized by the DPLG in its “Framework for
an Integrated Local government Response to HIV and
AIDS” published in April 2007.
Another trend that affects efforts towards
poverty reduction and service delivery relates to the
issue of household formation, and particularly the
recently observed trend of household splitting. As a
result, backlogs in household services, such as water,
sanitation and housing, are particularly stubborn.
While addressing service delivery backlogs and
effectively responding to demographic trends such as
household splitting are important, it is equally
important not to lose sight of two other issues,
namely maintenance of infrastructure and the quality
of services. Regarding infrastructure maintenance
and, with new development, expansion, municipalities
are often faced with a tension between the need to
maintain ageing infrastructure, such water mains,
electrical distribution plant and drainage systems in
the older urban and peri-urban settlements, and the
need to invest in new development projects. This
tension and trade-off is particularly severe when it
requires major repair and replacement rather than
routine maintenance.
Regarding quality of services, there is little if any
oversight or monitoring in terms of national stand-
ards of the quality of service that needs to be
provided. The national housing subsidy scheme,
which adopted minimum norms and standards for
low-income housing in 1999, is an exception. Even
basic services such as refuse collection in formal
areas, which is a weekly planned maintenance
service, are frequently compromised by a lack of
personnel and shortages of, or poorly maintained,
equipment and vehicles. This in turn contributes to
an increased incidence of illegal dumping and
uncollected refuse attracting dogs and rats, which are
a further health hazard.
Government programmes aimed at addressing
household poverty have further had the perverse
effect of entrenching exclusion, marginalisation and
inequality. There is much evidence from researchers
and housing experts that the housing subsidy
scheme entrenches poverty and compromises
livelihood security as households battle to accommo-
date large, extended family units in “RDP box
housing” and lack the resources to pay for services
over the free basic allowances and ongoing mainte-
nance. Furthermore, they find themselves spatially
marginalised. Currently, most of the new low income
housing projects are located on the periphery of
municipal boundaries, where land is more affordable.
This has negative implications for new tenants, who
find themselves far removed from economic and
social opportunities and resources. While successive
reviews of the scheme have emphasised the need to
develop low-income settlements on well-located
land, providing access to employment opportunities
and social services, the pressure to address backlogs
perpetuates housing delivery on the periphery of
cities and towns. While shelter poverty may be
addressed, economic poverty is exacerbated as
households have to spend a larger portion of their
income on commuting to places of employment (or
indeed seeking employment), schools, clinics and
hospitals, and so on. This trend is also costly from
the perspective of infrastructure development and,
most especially, transport.
Ultimately, it is not only the well-being and quality of
life of current inhabitants of low income settlements,
it is not only the well-being and quality of life of current
inhabitants of low income settlements, but the long-
term financial and environmental sustainability of
service delivery and local development that is at stake .
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groups and communities themselves to organise,
advocate and negotiate to secure their effective
participation in the progressive realisation of socio-
economic rights. The achievement of national16 and
international targets17 for poverty reduction and
sustainable development, are inextricably linked to the
extent to which people in poor communities are able
to build their capacity to participate in governance and
decision making about the allocation and use of
resources for development. Delivery programmes that
do not build this capacity will not have the sustainable
long-term impacts that are necessary to challenge
poverty and discrimination effectively. Civil society
groupings remain isolated and disempowered, and
unable to hold government structures and elected
officials accountable. The consequences of disaffec-
tion with poor service delivery, without adequate
means of addressing such disaffection constructively
and in a participatory manner, are declining levels of
voting, increasing numbers of councillors removed
and replaced in the local elections held in March 2006,
and highly visible service delivery protests both
before the local elections and still to date.
Settlement patterns and
service delivery
Settlement patterns have a direct bearing on service
delivery. Few municipalities have the capacity to
monitor and manage urban influx and urban-rural
cross-migration effectively.18 Municipal IDPs typically
do not address service delivery issues on private land
or in rural areas. There are also issues of logistics and
economy of scale in reaching scattered rural house-
holds. In some settlements, particularly in commu-
nally owned or traditional authority areas, members of
the public share water with animals. These conditions
result in increased susceptibility to illnesses.
Due to the national housing subsidy scheme
being the principal mechanism for providing basic
An unacceptably large proportion of the urban popula-
tion of South Africa still lives in poor living conditions,
without adequate housing or access to basic services
but the long-term financial and environmental
sustainability of service delivery and local develop-
ment that is at stake as it is difficult to undo the
spatial implications of current service delivery
programmes.
Civil society groupings remain isolated and
disempowered, and unable to hold government
structures and elected officials accountable.
many poor communities’ expectations of access to
socio-economic development and of participation
in local development processes have been frustrated
or disappointed.
Also, notwithstanding progress made with regard to
accelerated, improved service delivery and poverty
reduction, many poor communities’ expectations of
access to socio-economic development and of
participation in local development processes have
been frustrated or disappointed.
An unacceptably large proportion of the urban
population of South Africa still lives in poor living
conditions, without adequate housing or access to
basic services, and disconnections for non-payment
of services (in excess of the free basic allowances)
have increased.
Moreover, many of the projects under govern-
ment programmes aimed at poverty reduction and
equitable service delivery have not demonstrated
much success in building the capacity of target
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creating conditions for “downward raiding” of
rental stock.
The responsibilities for maintenance and repairs
associated with being a homeowner.
RDP housing that was not designed with im-
provement or extension in mind, with the inability
to extend contributing to overcrowding (or a
shack in the backyard), while adding internal
partition walls to create privacy can interfere with
design ventilation.
Lack of access to services and facilities, due in
turn to poor co-ordination, or inadequate capital
budgets, in provincial and national service
departments for investment in new schools,
health facilities, and police stations.
Inability to manage consumption of water and
electricity within the free allowances prescribed
in terms of indigent support policies.
Indigent support policy
The indigent support policy is one instrument
available to municipalities to provide support to poor
households. Richards et al (2003) contend with
respect to indigent policy and the application of free
basic services policy (water and electricity), that four
broad policy options are available to municipalities in
the delivery of basic services to the poor:
1. A targeted approach aimed specifically at the
poor, requiring households to apply for a free or
subsidised service and pass a means test with
monthly household income being one of the
measures of indigency. This approach is not
particularly practical and is costly. For this
approach to run effectively, a municipality needs
to establish an administrative and monitoring
structure whereby social workers would be
required to visit households repeatedly over time
to ensure that their economic circumstances have
not changed.
services in urban and peri-urban areas, and the
increasing backlog in housing delivery, water and
sanitation is a daily challenge for poor households
living in informal settlements, where up to 500
households may share one communal standpipe.
Refuse collection is also neglected due to lack of
road access to informal and rural settlements.
Reliance on the national housing subsidy
scheme as a conduit for service delivery impedes
delivery in rural areas, specifically within KwaZulu-
Natal and the Eastern Cape. A key component of the
housing subsidy scheme is the provision of security
of tenure. This is principally in the form of freehold
title, which is seen as a foreign concept and in
conflict with the traditional powers of traditional
leaders to grant functional tenure. There has been
further suspicion that development will bring with it
the liability to pay municipal rates and services.
A related issue is the sustainability of many low-
income housing projects, developed under the
banner of “building sustainable human settlements”.
This theme has featured prominently through several
revisions of policy implementation, the most recent
being the 2004 policy, Breaking New Ground.
However, the ability to translate this into real
improvements in the living conditions of the poor is
compromised by a multiplicity of factors:
Poorly located housing being sold or used for
rental income, while the original beneficiaries
return to better located informal settlements.
Concomitantly, the high cost of acquiring and
developing housing stock on well-located land,
which is not affordable (the N2 Gateway flagship
project in Cape Town being an example) and
ill-advised spending priorities, as a result of limited community
participation and consultation  by municipalities, has been
impacting negatively on service delivery.
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2. The blanket or universal approach in which all
households receive a free portion of water and
electricity (Buffalo City Municipality19 and the City
of Cape Town municipality use this approach) and
a step-tariff structure applies thereafter to
subsidise the free portion of the service.
3. A self-targeted approach, which entails a
municipality supplying access to free basic
services (water and electricity), providing
households fall within a specified property-value
range and consume less than a specified limit of
the free basic or subsidised service. eThekwini
and Mangaung municipalities use this approach.
Municipalities (for example eThekwini) using this
model penalise households who have applied for
the special indigent tariff but who consume more
than the allotted amount of water or electricity
which is subsidised. eThekwini indigent house-
holds who consume more than the limit for the
subsidised amount actually start paying a step-
tariff rate, which is higher than regular users who
have not applied under the indigent policy. No
means testing is necessary under this model. The
advantage of this model is that it does not
involve a costly administrative structure to
undertake repeated means testing to check
whether a household’s circumstances have
changed.
4. The ring fencing of poorer communities to
receive free provision of services is also used.
Municipalities using this approach have to trade-
off and balance the cost to the local government
and to households of unfairly benefiting some
proportion of households who live in the town-
ship versus unfairly disadvantaging households
who live outside the township. This method is
simple and cheap to administer and may repre-
sent recognition of a de facto situation. However
there are likely to be residents in a ring-fenced
area which are not poor.
In general, municipalities use cross-subsidisation via
a step-tariff system to provide basic services to poor
households. The larger municipalities (eThekwini and
the City of Cape Town) contend that poor households
are provided with a number of consumption options
in respect of basic household services. This enables
them to reduce their municipal accounts to very low
and affordable levels.
There appears to be a shift amongst municipali-
ties towards a self-targeted approach in the adminis-
tration of indigent policies. For example, Buffalo City
Municipality, which currently uses a targeted or
blanket approach, is reviewing this and may shift to a
self-targeted policy in the future. The self-selection
nature of the self-targeted approach means that
municipalities do not have to establish costly
monitoring departments to ensure that households
qualify and continue to qualify for indigent benefits.
Whilst the self-targeted approach may offer advan-
tages to municipalities, it remains to be seen whether
the approach directly benefits the majority of
indigent households, and the extent to which this
policy reaches those households most in need
(Richards et al, 2003). A key question to be asked is
whether it is or can be manipulated politically as an
instrument of patronage.
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While the provision of free basic services can
provide an important lifeline to poor households,
there are a number of concerns with respect to the
indigent policy.
the free allowances prescribed in terms of indigent
support policies. It is virtually impossible for a
household to survive on 200 litres of water a day (6
kilolitres per household per month) if the house is
connected to waterborne sewerage, without having
some means of supplementing the supply (through
purchasing more at tariff or continuing to draw water
from natural – and usually polluted – sources) or
compromising the family’s health, e.g. through not
flushing routinely or not washing hands afterwards.
Water consumption increases dramatically if there
are any infectious diseases present in the household,
simply for bathing and providing changes of bedding
and towels. Free basic electricity is only intended for
lighting, consequently many households continue to
use wood, which is unsustainable or paraffin (which
is expensive, dangerous, and can cause respiratory
complaints) for cooking and heating water.
Also, the provision of free basic water does not
take into cognisance issues of seasonal changes in
water consumption, nor the size of families. Al-
though the Water Services Act (108 of 1997) gives
discretion to municipalities to provide free basic
water according to the needs and the municipality’s
financial capability, very few councillors understand
these provisions, and it is not in the interests of
officials, who are more focused on balancing budgets
than human rights issues, to do more than is neces-
sary to meet minimum service delivery expectations.
This explains the mixed response with respect to
the effectiveness of municipal indigent policies. For
example, more than half (55%) of respondents in
Nkangala District Good Governance Survey indicated
that the indigent policy is effective in serving the
First, poor households are not always aware that
such policy exists, let alone how to take advantage of
its provisions. Similarly, councillors are not always
knowledgeable of indigent support policies. A study
completed by BESG in the Msunduzi Local Munici-
pality on the Indigent Support Policy in August 2007
revealed that 88% of community members in
targeted low-income areas were not aware of such a
policy – even though 80% of those interviewed were
direct beneficiaries. There were neither brochures
nor pamphlets that explain this policy in a commu-
nity friendly manner in council buildings or council-
lors’ offices. Similarly, while survey findings sug-
gested that all local municipalities in Nkangala
District have an indigent policy, 37% of respondents
in Emalahleni Local Municipality reported that there
was no such policy in their municipality.
One of the more progressive aspects of
Msunduzi Municipality’s application of the indigent
support policy is the provision for people to apply for
increased allowances at a subsidised rate. Unfortu-
nately, in practice, there is a very low take-up of the
rebate option due to poor dissemination of the policy
and poor understanding of the policy by councillors,
and the need to apply and be subject to a means test
on an annual basis.
Secondly, the amount of free basic services
provided for in the indigent support policy is
insufficient and poor households are unable to
manage consumption of water and electricity within
poor households are not always aware that such policy exists,
let alone how to take advantage of its provisions.
It is virtually impossible for a household to survive on
200 litres of water a day (6 kilolitres per household per
month) if the house is connected to waterborne sewerage
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needs of the poor, an exception being the 65% in
Steve Tshwete Local Municipality who reported that
the indigent policy is not effective.
The issue of the indigent support policy ties in
with the issue of cost-recovery.
Cost recovery for
subsidised services
A major challenge to municipalities is the recovery of
costs incurred in the delivery of services. In 2002,
municipalities were owed R22 billion for rates and
service charges (Idasa Budget Watch, January 2003).
Almost two-thirds (63%) of consumer debt was
owed to the six metropolitan municipalities. Category
B, or local, municipalities also had significant
consumer debt; however the wealthier Gauteng and
Western Cape municipalities had the largest debts
(Richards et al, 2003). Msunduzi Municipality, a large
category B municipality with a budget in 2002/03 of
R1,176 billion making it South Africa’s ninth wealthi-
est municipality saw municipal debt increase
between 1997 and 2002 municipal debt by 20% per
annum. For the year ended 30 June 2001, the city
was owed an amount of R243 million in service
charges. This affected the municipality’s ability to
fund capital expenditure from internal funds resulting
in the need to acquire external loans.
Reasons for rising consumer debt for services
are many and complex, including:
Interest payments on long outstanding debts for
services, increasing the total amount owed to
municipalities.
Unreliable and corrupt consumer data, attribut-
able to poor billing, metering and revenue
administration processes.
Poverty, resulting in an inability to pay for
services.
Inadequate policies and procedures to collect
consumer debt.
A lack of political will to support debt collection
actions.
A culture of non-payment and belief that there
are no follow-up procedures.
Dissatisfaction with the level of service and
perceptions that accounts are wrong.
Problems to be resolved in respect of the
implementation of Free Basic Services.
Unreliable postal service resulting in the non-
delivery of bills.
Inaccessible payment points.
Lack of clarity around responsibility for revenue
administration (Richards et al, 2003).
In eThekwini Municipality, solid waste removal costs
are covered through property rates. Solid waste
removal expenditure is offset by the municipality’s
commercial solid waste removal arm. With respect to
private household waste removal, a step-tariff
structure applies. Cape Town also adopts a cross-
subsidy approach. Households with a property value
of less than R50 000 receive a 100% subsidy. There
are two components to solid waste removal: a
private/household component, which is subsidised
for properties valued less than R125 000 and a
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public component for the removal of solid waste in
the public domain, and as part of general environ-
mental protection. This would include, for example,
solid waste recycling. A universal levy is applied to
finance this component. This levy is also structured
by way of a step-tariff, based on household property
value. Buffalo City Municipality does not have a
universal tariff policy for solid waste removal. In
general terms though, solid waste removal for the
poor is subsidised, particularly for households with a
monthly income of less than R1 500.
eThekwini Municipality and the City of Cape
Town do not appear to run specific incentive
schemes to encourage payment for municipal
arrears. Both of these municipalities appear to
provide a “package of costs” to the poor which is
affordable and therefore payment for municipal
services is encouraged in this way. The threat of
black-listing with credit bureaus and evictions
provide “negative incentives” to encourage payment,
especially if the poor perceive that their rates bills
are relatively affordable. In Cape Town, a new
scheme for the poor, which has yet to be approved,
will offer consumers a reduction on their arrears on
service payments providing they can prove they are
poor and have installed water restrictors in their
systems.
Mangaung Municipality offers special arrange-
ments for the poor who are in arrears over service
payments whereas richer communities, able to afford
service charges, are reportedly shown zero tolerance
if they fall into arrears. With respect to poor house-
holds in Buffalo City Municipality in arrears, special
arrangements were also made for households who
signed up under this scheme. Those households
which qualified under this benefit had their arrears
“parked” and payment on “new” arrears after July
2001 extended to February 2002. This scheme has
reportedly done little to reduce service arrears.
With respect to incentives to encourage citizens
to pay for services, there are a number of options
available. Akharwaray and Atkinson (2002) argue that
municipalities should have a “menu of approaches”
which would limit the coercive or punitive approach
to those residents who are the worst offenders in
respect of non-payment for services. Two possible
options are suggested, which are in keeping with the
spirit of developmental local government.
The first option is called the incentive approach.
Some municipalities have experimented with this and
have used lucky draw systems, whereby households
who pay their bills qualify for a monthly prize draw.
Akharwaray and Atkinson (2002) cite several
advantages to this approach: the fondness South
Africans have for lotteries and the fact that the
chances of winning a municipal draw are much
greater than winning the national lottery; the lucky
draw approach can be accompanied by a public
relations drive including regular meetings, media
announcements and report-backs to the community
on progress with arrears payments. Separate draws
could also be held for current accounts and accounts
in arrears which may encourage significant payments
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on arrears and finally, the draw may encourage
residents who are officially classified as indigents to
register as municipal payers.
The second broad approach suggested by
Akharwaray and Atkinson (2002) is the community
responsiveness model in which payments for
services are directly linked to municipal performance
so that residents know how their money is being
spent. This approach requires a communication
strategy using newsletters and monthly fliers
informing residents of the accomplishments of the
municipality.
Models of service delivery
Municipalities have a range of options of service
delivery models at their disposal, including direct
service delivery by municipalities, the establishment
of municipal entities, privatisation and partnership
arrangements with external agencies. The Municipal
Systems Act, for example, recognises the need to
enhance government capacity to deliver services
through public-private partnerships. This is quite
distinct from conventional competitive tendering.
While the White Paper on Municipal Service Partner-
ships (2000) makes provision for a municipal service
partnership to be established with a CBO or NGO, the
provisions of the Municipal Finance Management Act
make it near impossible for civil society organisa-
tions to qualify for such an arrangement.
The Community Based Maintenance and Environ-
mental Management Programme (CBM) serves to
illustrate this point. The programme was conceived by
BESG, a GGLN member organisation, as a result of the
local municipality failing to provide adequate refuse
collection, grass cutting, and roads and stormwater
management services in newly established townships.
BESG developed a “municipal-community” partnership
model whereby officials from the respective line
departments, ward councillors, and representatives
from local CBOs formed a joint steering committee
that managed the annual budget provided by the line
departments, dealt with performance matters, and
would ultimately be formed as a separate entity with
community-based labour transferring from BESG to
the new entity. At its peak, the project employed 44
workers servicing 4 500 households in three less
formal townships.
Aside from the benefits of public participation
and accountability for performance, the project:
Proved to be highly efficient and responsive, as
workers were not “siloed” as municipal workers
operate within the rigidities of line departments.
If there was an emergency, such as a flood after
heavy rains, as many workers as necessary could
be diverted from less urgent tasks to provide a
rapid response and avert a crisis. If routine tasks
were not done as scheduled, residents could directly
approach a community-based works supervisor.
Proved to be very cost-efficient20, as it was run on
a not-for-profit basis and expenditure was reported
monthly to the joint steering committee on an
“open book” basis.
Acted as a job creation and empowerment vehicle,
with 70% of the workforce being single
unemployed women heads of household.
Regrettably, officials in the lead waste management
department were determined to extend and privatize the
Thus, the notion of municipal-community partner-
ships is not very well developed or, in instances
where the approach has been piloted, not particularly
well received by municipalities.
the notion of municipal-community partnerships is
not very well developed or, in instances where the
approach has been piloted, not particularly well
received by municipalities.
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work undertaken by CBM, and obtained a ruling from
the municipality’s legal adviser that the project was in
breach of the MFMA. This apparent clash between
two pieces of primary legislation (the Municipal
Systems Act and MFMA) is a matter of interpretation
that has not been tested with National Treasury, in
spite of the DPLG having supported the project as a
model for good practice.
Another, more positive, example of a municipal
community partnership can be found in the Western
Cape, where the Foundation for Contemporary
Research (FCR) has facilitated the establishment of
the Masikhule mini-tunnel farming project. This
project began in 2003 in the Theewaterskloof Munici-
pality (TWKM) as a partnership between the Botrivier
Farmers’ Association, Masikhule (a local CBO), the
TWKM and FCR, with funding from the Department of
Social Development and the National Development
Agency (NDA). The intention was to address poverty
in the area using the sustainable livelihoods approach
to construct mini-tunnels for vegetable farming and
food processing. The resultant products are spinach,
spring onions, beetroot and lettuce and selected
community members have received on-site training.
Other objectives are job creation, food security,
training, capacity building, good governance, partner-
ship, local ownership and social solidarity. A survey
of the partners shows most to be of the view that the
objectives have been achieved. The major area of
concern is around “ownership” of the project. This is
being addressed through the appointment of a project
co-ordinator to establish a memorandum of under-
standing between partners, a lease agreement, a
social and management accord and various training
and capacity building interventions. Although initially
sceptical, the TWKM now perceives the municipality-
community partnership (MCP) model to be sufficiently
successful to be used as a “blue print in their approach
and in participation in other development initiatives”
(Fourie, 2006:46). The challenge remains for such
positive examples to be replicated within and across
municipalities, so that it becomes an embedded
institutional arrangement for equitable service delivery,
poverty reduction and community empowerment.
Alternative service delivery
options
Given some of the challenges related to municipal
capacity for equitable service delivery, the cost of
infrastructure investment and maintenance,
particularly in the context of high levels of poverty,
and questions of sustainable resource use, it is
important that municipalities are encouraged to
pursue alternative service delivery options. Statutes
such as the Water Services Act should be
encouraging municipalities, particularly those who do
not have financial capacity, to innovate in order to
provide or supplement service delivery. For example,
rainwater harvesting in the rainy season is not only
logical but is an imperative in a drought-prone
country; yet most RDP housing is neither built nor
designed to incorporate gutters and down pipes in
order to trap rainwater. On-site service provision has
been successfully utilised by Eskom in areas with no
local mains distribution, through the provision of




The problem of poor service delivery is particularly
chronic in smaller municipalities. The ability of a
municipality to provide services is limited by a
combination of its equitable share, its ability to raise
revenue through rates and service charges, its ability
to spend income (such as the Municipal Infrastructure
Grant) and a lack of technical capacity. Most rural
municipalities do not have a revenue base thus making
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it difficult to provide services. This in turn limits their
human resource capacity. Some have to use the
services of neighbouring municipalities with capacity
and skills. While towns based in largely rural areas
can only provide minimal services, they continue to
act as magnets for people seeking employment
opportunities, placing further strain on their opera-
tional and financial capacity. A thorough review of the
intergovernmental relations framework and co-
operative government framework is needed to address
these issues in a broader governance context.
Housing, through Municipal Housing Support Units,
in project procurement and management.
Another government initiative to bridge the gap
in public perceptions of poor service delivery was
the introduction of Community Development
Workers.
What has been lacking in these various ad hoc
responses is a systematic evaluation of the capacity
of local government to fulfil its mandates in
comprehensive, equitable service delivery and
poverty reduction. This requires an in depth,
longitudinal study of development demands against
the technical, financial, intellectual and strategic
resources available to municipalities. It is necessary
that local government be enabled to transform from
a regulatory to a developmental function, but this has
required major structural adjustment in a relatively
short period of time.
One of the key issues is the persistent failure on the part
of municipalities to spend their Municipal Infrastructure
Grant allocations from central government
One of the key issues is the persistent failure on the
part of municipalities to spend their Municipal Infra-
structure Grant allocations from central government.
While the shortage of technical skills is
particularly severe in smaller and rural municipalities,
it is a persistent national problem. The South African
government has employed a number of measures to
support municipalities who are falling short in meeting
service delivery objectives. Project Consolidate was
conceived by the DPLG as a means of supporting
poorly resourced municipalities in fulfilling their
developmental mandate. Smaller municipalities are
routinely assisted by the Provincial Departments of
Key points:
While there has been some progress in poverty
reduction, particularly through the provision of
social grants impacting on the poorest 10 to
20% of South Africans, income poverty remains
widespread. An unacceptably large proportion
of the urban population of South Africa still
lives in poor living conditions, without adequate
housing or access to basic services.
Settlement patterns in particular have a direct
bearing on service delivery and pose real
challenges. In addition to the legacy of racially
segregated settlements, few municipalities have
the capacity to monitor and manage urban
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How is Local Economic Development (LED)
defined and understood in the South African
context?
How have approaches to LED changed in recent
years?
What are the roles of municipalities in the
promotion of LED?
What are the challenges faced by municipalities
and other role players in stimulating LED?
LED has become a central part of the South African
development question. National government policy
debates on LED have been ongoing especially within
the DPLG and the Department of Trade and Industry
(DTI). In August 2006 the DPLG released its national
framework for LED in South Africa 2006-2011, titled
“Stimulating and Developing Sustainable Local
Economies.” The DTI in turn provides leadership in
business-focused areas such as small and medium
enterprise (SME) development and Broad Based
Black Economic Empowerment. The role of these two
government departments in developing policy
frameworks and guidelines on specific aspects
pertaining to LED in South Africa has been crucial.
Understanding local
economic development
Before delving into the complexities of current LED
practices in South Africa, it is important to develop
some understanding of the meaning of LED. Defini-
tions of local economic development put forward by
government as well as local and international
scholars, refer to issues of partnership, ownership,
empowerment, and participation. The World Bank,
for example, defines LED as “…a process by which
public, business and non-governmental sector
partners work collectively to create better conditions
for economic growth and employment generation
(Swinburn et al, 2006). Furthermore, UN-Habitat
(2003) describes LED as a process based on four
critical premises:
Premise 1: LED is a locally driven process
designed to identify, harness and utilise re-
sources to stimulate the economy and create new
job opportunities. LED is not one specific action
or programme, rather it is the sum total of the
individual contributions of a broad spectrum of
influx and urban-rural cross-migration effectively.
Issues of logistics and economy of scale in
reaching scattered rural households are also a
challenge as is the dynamic nature of big urban
settlements.
Another problem is the nature of the subsidy
system which has perpetuated the location of
low-income housing in areas which are peripheral
to social goods and economic opportunities.
Support for indigent households has been an
important way in which municipalities can impact
on poverty with different models successfully
implemented. An ongoing challenge is communi-
cating with the poor about this form of assistance,
with models that favour self-targeting making it
incumbent on the poor themselves to come
forward in order to benefit from indigent assist-
ance. In this regard there need to be better,
proactive communication by municipalities
targeted at possible beneficiaries.
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the community. LED occurs when local authori-
ties, business, labour, NGOs and, most impor-
tantly, individuals strive to improve their eco-
nomic status by combining skills, resources and
ideas.
Premise 2: LED is a participatory process where
local people from all sectors work together to
stimulate local commercial activity, resulting in a
resilient and sustainable economy. It is a tool to
help create decent jobs and improve the quality
of life for everyone, including the poor and
marginalised. LED exists only when it encourages
the public, private and civil society sectors to
establish partnerships and collaboratively find
local solutions to common economic challenges.
Premise 3: The LED process seeks to empower
local participants in order to effectively utilise
business enterprise, labour, capital and other
local resources to achieve local priorities (e.g.
promote quality jobs, reduce poverty, stabilise
the local economy and generate municipal taxes
to provide better services).
Premise 4: Creating a LED strategy is an inte-
grated, process-oriented and non-prescriptive
endeavour. It embraces local values (poverty
reduction, increased self-reliance, satisfying
basic human needs, mutual commitment,
integrated social and environmental objectives),
utilises economic drivers (growth in jobs,
income, business activity) and considers
development (the role of structural change and
quality of development). This suggests that LED
is not about quick fixes or generating “wish
lists”. In fact, best practice suggests rather than
trying to determine what to do as the first step, is
to do LED backwards. A practical understanding
of the marketplace and a clear set of objectives
are needed before projects are chosen, policy is
generated, or strategies created.
Current realities of LED at
local level
From the above, it is evident that a central aspect of
LED is the partnerships that have to be forged
between local government, business, NGO’s and
communities. The DPLG National Framework for LED
(2006) refers to this in detail. The framework reflects
a shift in approach from the rigid planning ap-
proaches which have dominated LED practices from
1996 to 2006, to a more creative and flexible
approach which defines the primary role of munici-
palities in the promotion of LED as:
the provision of infrastructure and quality and
reliable services
managing spatial policies
land-use regulation and development applications
managing service tariff policies
managing a progressive tax system
marketing the territory.
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If one considers this to be an underpinning ethos of
the 2006 LED Framework, it signals a significant and
positive shift in response to many of the challenges
of earlier LED efforts in the country. Notwithstanding
this, a number of challenges with regard to LED
planning and implementation still prevail. These
challenges include:
The challenge of effective planning methodolo-
gies: When LED came to the fore, municipalities
were expecting “guide packs” similar to the IDP
Guide Packs for this mandate. In the absence of
this kind of meticulous step-by-step orientated
guidance, municipalities felt that they were left in
the cold. In the absence of LED guidelines, the
methodology used by officials in many munici-
palities for LED planning resembled the method-
ology of the IDP so closely, that communities
often became confused between the two proc-
esses. In fact, many councillors today still
grapple with the distinctions.
The challenge of managing participation at the
local level: The emphasis on participation in LED
is correctly focused on getting representatives
from the four social partners on board i.e.
government, private sector, organised labour and
civic organisations. This perspective is quite
accurate within the context of both national and
provincial government. At these levels, the scale,
in terms of numbers and levels of organisation,
warrants that the four social partners participate
in summits and negotiations of an economic
nature. It is also where the leadership within
well-organised and structured entities in fact,
does actively participate, are mandated and can
constructively contribute to the negotiations.
However, at a local level, one would rarely find
that the four social partners are organised at the
levels found at the national and provincial levels.
Government, in the form of local government,
would most probably be the only clearly organ-
ised/structured stakeholder at local level. The
private sector is often organised in two or more
business chambers – one catering for the
traditionally white-based chambers of commerce
and the others for new associations of black-
based businesses. Civil society is made up of a
loose association, if any, of NGOs and community
organisations and generally does not speak with
a single voice. Labour, as with civil society at a
local level, is often not coherently organised.
Hence, it is not feasible to expect the four social
partners to sit around a table representing with a
single voice the aspirations of their respective
constituencies. The reality is that at a local level
there is a largely unorganised collection of
individuals who need to be mobilised to partici-
pate in, strategise and negotiate matters of LED.
The challenge of local government capacity: A
cadre of trained LED experts at the local level is
lacking. Although the larger centres can draw on
the skills of their planners, accountants, etc.
smaller centres have no such staff pools. There is
an urgent need to train LED officials and to
expose councillors to the concept.
The challenge of scale: One of the pertinent
questions relates to the most effective scale for
supporting and coordinating economic develop-
ment. Experiences with LED to date suggest that
the majority of municipalities pursue LED
through projects, rather than having a more
strategic and programmatic approach. This has
brought home the realisation that the local
municipal level may not be the most appropriate
geographical focus for economic development.
Within the national space economy, metropolitan
areas and districts have been identified as the
ideal zones for the coordination of intergovern-
mental action and service delivery (see NSDP). It
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is also at this scale that LED is potentially best
facilitated and pursued.
The challenge of addressing poverty through
LED: It needs to be borne in mind that LED is
often catalysed by local-level economic crises.
The crises in present-day South Africa are rooted
in excessive unemployment, deep levels of
poverty, a widening gap between rich and poor
and the related consequences which arise out of
socio-economic inequalities.
A debate, which has been raging between leaders at
local levels regards pro-poor strategies versus pro-
growth strategies. It is plausible to understand why
this has been occurring. Different stakeholders have
different perceptions of what LED is. For example,
some equate it with the expansion of business and
commercial activities while matters of community
development and poverty alleviation take precedence
with a different stakeholder group. Instead LED should
be about both pro-growth and pro-poor strategies.
Field-based evidence clearly shows that the
success rate of LED in reducing poverty has been
fairly limited. An evaluation by Nel et al (2003)
revealed that the most successful LED projects were
those driven by business and local communities; that
managing LED through local authorities created
various managerial and financial problems; that
partnership formation was limited; that the most
successful projects were tourism-related and linked
to international markets; that very few of the small-
scale and community-based employment creation
projects have resulted in financially viable projects
which assist in job creation beyond a specific grant
period. The main reasons for this include the lack of
markets and the inherent limitations of local initia-
tives and low levels of skills within local municipali-
ties. Further constraints to the successful implemen-
tation of LED include:
Limited incentive schemes are available for
private sector investments;
In some cases LED strategies form a sub-section
of the IDPs, while in other instances separate
LED strategies exist;
No specific attention is paid to enterprise
development;
The absence of a watchdog role by the council
and LED forums where they exist;
LED functions are split between different
departments;
There is little or no contact between the local
business community and local authorities;
Local authorities do not foster the development
of business organisations;
Initiatives to organise the informal business
sector are nearly non-existent;
The involvement of business in the development
of IDPs and LED strategies is minimal.
Practical interventions to
improve LED
To develop robust and inclusive local economies
one needs high levels of intergovernmental co-
ordination, not only between national government
departments, but through all spheres of govern-
ment. Although national government departments
have strategies and resources for schemes to
enhance and stimulate local economies, there is an
urgent need to invest in infrastructure and systems
to address communication failures reflected in the
fact that those targeted by these programmes are
usually not aware of the opportunities that exist.
This should be done in a  co-ordinated manner.
Every effort should be made at national level to
ensure that access to finances exists, be it in the
form of loans or loans mixed with grants to enable
small producers to commence with their activities
or expand existing activities. However, the tools and
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instruments provided by national government must
be used in an optimal manner to support the growth
and development of local economies.
As part of inter-governmental relations, the
provincial sphere of government should draw up
their PGDSs in line with the NSDP and IDPs of the
district and local authorities within the particular
province. The provinces should also play a role in
facilitating finance and provide an office to promote
and co-ordinate practices for developing and
stimulating the local economy.
Within the local government sphere,
councillors and officials must be aware of
stipulations in the IDPs, PGDSs and the NSDP to
ensure that a concerted effort is made to align goals
and that resources are effectively utilised, thus
necessitating clear communication regarding the
availability of these resources. This requires that
local role-players be innovative and find ways to deal
with development challenges and not solely be
dependent on external investment and assistance.
To conclude, the content of the DPLG 2006 LED
Policy Framework signals a positive move towards a
new paradigm which challenges municipalities to:
value and utilise local, indigenous economic
knowledge and participatory planning capacities;
and
engage with the national macro-economic strategy
emanating from ASGI-SA (Accelerated and Shared
Growth Initiative for South Africa) and the micro-
economic strategy of the DTI.
A further positive step is DPLG’s plan to ensure that
district and metropolitan municipalities will become
the primary level of LED planning and implementation.
These positive steps are overdue and critical in the
fight against poverty and reducing the risk of financial
crisis at the local level.
Key points:
The Constitution mandates municipalities to
play an important role in the local economic
development of their municipal area, necessitat-
ing the development of a new skills base within
municipalities.
LED successes have been limited and where inter-
ventions have worked they tend to be tourism-
linked or linked to international markets.
It is important to distinguish between LED that
privileges growth and LED that aims to be pro-
poor. International experience shows that the two
approaches are quite different, with pro-poor
LED requiring the development of specific
approaches.
High levels of intergovernmental co-ordination,
between national government departments, and
through all spheres of government are needed
to stimulate LED and to align goals, resources
and communication. In particular there needs to
be greater alignment of the different planning
instruments including the IDP, Provincial
Growth and Development Strategies and the
National Spatial Development Perspective.
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To what extent does the Community Develop-
ment Workers (CDW) programme constitute an
effective supplementary programme to the
functions of the three spheres of government?
If, as policy suggests, CDWs are mainly
intended to support local government:
Where should they ideally be based (local or
district municipalities)?
Who should they primarily report to?
Where should overall financial and institu-
tional responsibility for CDWs rest?
How effectively has the programme been
integrated into government functions?
Has the notion that CDWs can improve the
integration and coordination of government
services proven to be realistic?
Are the reporting and accountability arrange-
ments for CDWs properly structured to ensure
an effective and relevant service?
Does the CDW programme contribute towards
the existence of a vibrant sector of civil society
capable of engaging the state in mutually
beneficial ways?
What impact does the CDW programme have on
established systems for participatory govern-
ance such as ward committees?
To what extent does the CDW programme
constitute a sustainable and effective solution
to shortfalls in the civil service?
To what extent has the CDW programme
contributed to the improved deployment of
development resources at community level?
Policy and legislative
framework
Virtually all literature on the CDW programme alludes
to the 2003 State of the Nation address by President
Thabo Mbeki where he motivated for an “…echelon
of multi-skilled community development workers
who will maintain direct contact with the people
where these masses live.” Official documentation on
the programme also suggests that its basic princi-
ples are drawn from the White Paper on Transform-
ing Public Service Delivery (Batho Pele White Paper).
Furthermore, links are also drawn with local govern-
ment legislation such as the Municipal Systems Act
and the Municipal Structures Act. As such CDW
“policy” appears to be based on a framework of
principles that is derived from many different Acts.
The common thread however is improved public
service, citizen’s participation and linking communi-
ties more closely with state functions.
The policy documents that emanate from the
programme itself are mostly informal. The handbook,
“National Policy Framework for Community Develop-
ment Workers in South Africa” (DPLG, undated)
deals with key aspects of the CDW programme,
including its rationale and theory, how CDWs should
be trained for their responsibilities, how the pro-
gramme will be supported and finally how it is to be
monitored and evaluated.
There are strong similarities between the
programme principles and a 2003 article by Doreen
Atkinson, “The Role of Municipal Development
Officers: Towards a Practical Framework” that
advocated a new stratum of municipal development
officers. None of the official literature however
makes any reference to Atkinson’s article. The
common vision nonetheless is of a dedicated
contingent of development managers concerned with
integrating and coordinating different government
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departments (both horizontally and vertically) and
forming closer links to communities. There is (in
policy terms) an unusual emphasis on “a special
calibre of development worker” who is rooted in local
communities and has the skills and motivation to
unravel bureaucratic obstacles. The CDW policy
combines an unusual mix of service and administra-
tive principles with imperatives that seem political.
This (the CDW programme) will require every-
one to embrace a new patriotism and a value system
that places collective advancement above individual
narrow selfish interests (DPLG, undated).
Key issues
The official policy prescribes a CDW programme
coordinated by all three spheres of government
(national, provincial and local). The DPLG facilitates
the relationships between the three spheres with
respect to CDWs while the Department of Public
Service and Administration (DPSA) coordinates the
overall programme. Provincial administrations are
the employers of the CDWs but municipalities,
among other things, provide the workplace for the
CDWs and, through the offices of the Speakers,
create the necessary environment for them to
perform their duties. In a 2007 survey of the
programme commissioned by GTZ and the DPLG,
this system of multiple ownership and oversight and
the actual level of integration, particularly with
respect to district municipalities, was found to be
wanting. The survey report noted “the field survey
found that the coordinating and oversight systems
are mired in ambiguity and confusion.” (GTZ/DPLG,
2007:iv). The survey also found that there was a
complete spectrum of views regarding who actually
managed the programme and who CDWs ultimately
answered to.
In general however the programme had positive
features in terms of “helping people access social
services” and functioning as a communication link
between government and the community. The sectors
in which the most positive views of impact pertained
were social development/welfare followed by health,
child security and youth programmes. Stakeholders
also see CDWs as having helped mobilise communi-
ties to secure their rights (GTZ/DPLG, 2007:iv).
Fundamentally, nearly 90% of respondents in the
survey believed that CDWs had a positive impact on
the lives of ordinary citizens (GTZ/DPLG, 2007:viii).
Relations with
stakeholders
In the GTZ/DPLG 2007 survey, tensions between
CDWs and ward committees and ward councillors
were acknowledged and ascribed to confusion
around roles and responsibilities. The fact that the
roles and responsibilities of CDWs, ward committees
and ward councillors are clearly outlined in the CDW
Handbook has not resolved this problem. The survey
report offers certain explanations for this state of
affairs, which include the political insecurity of ward
councillors but also the possibility that CDWs have
exceeded their mandate in certain instances. The
aspect of material benefit however cannot be ignored
- a number of respondents suggested that ward
committees should simply be paid a stipend and that
this would alleviate some of the tension with regard
to CDWs. As a strategy for harmonising relations,
“buying off” ward committees, clearly has its
problems. The survey findings suggest that at this
stage CDWs enjoy considerably better relations with
civil society organisations, local development forums
nearly 90% of respondents in the survey believed that
CDWs had a positive impact on the lives of ordinary
citizens.
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and community policing forums than they do with
ward councillors and ward committees. This may be
partly explained by the fact that CDWs have had




The CDW programme faces three key policy/institu-
tional challenges: Firstly, to tighten up and formalise
its policy framework, secondly to harmonise the role
of the two national ministries responsible for its roll-
out and thirdly to properly locate the deployment of
CDWs within the three spheres of government. This
last exercise must establish proper accountability
and reporting mechanisms for CDWs and clarify the
issue of political versus administrative oversight.
Dedicated legislation for CDWs may be required.
These policy revisions should be implemented in
consultation with all government and civil society
stakeholders. The CDW programme in conjunction
with NGO and CBO community programmes has the
potential to act as an early warning system when, for
example, services begin to fail or are otherwise
threatened. However CDW information gathering and
referral services must supplement rather than
duplicate or compete with established civil society
programmes. Effective referral must also be matched
by government capacity to respond. CDWs must
support the ward committee systems rather than
work around them. The programme itself should bear
in mind the necessary balance between participatory
procedures and the formal political procedures of
municipal councils. The use of the term
“voluntarism” as an inherent principle of the pro-
gramme and as a form of ethical benchmarking must
be approached with caution and the conceptual
blurring with community activism should be avoided.
As the survey report suggests, standard CDW modus
operandi should include a scan of all related NGO
programmes prior to CDW deployment in a specific
locality. Thereafter the aim should be to reinforce and
supplement such programmes and not to duplicate
or compete.
Key points:
Envisaged as a mechanism to assist poor and
marginalized citizens and communities to
access public services, the CDW programme
has shown mixed results.
While there have been successes there is no
clear set of policy guidelines for the CDW
programme and the involvement of all spheres
of government and two national departments
blurs lines of accountability and governance.
There are then three key policy/institutional
challenges facing the CDW programme: firstly,
to tighten up and formalise its policy frame
work, secondly to harmonise the role of the two
national ministries responsible for its roll-out
and thirdly to properly locate the deployment of
CDWs within the three spheres of government.
CDWs enjoy considerably better relations with civil
society organisations, local development forums and
community policing forums than they do with ward
councillors and ward committees.
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explore and resolve competing demands and trade-
offs within communities, especially between commu-
nities with different needs. Political dialogue,
contestation and compromise are essential to resolve
the irritations of the privileged Johannesburg
homeowner whose local street lighting or rubbish
removal is not of as high a standard as previously,
versus the desperate needs of the Diepsloot shack
dweller, for whom piped water and grid electricity
might only be a recent reality.
Better comprehension of the blurred political-
technical interface in municipal management is
necessary to ensure progress in achieving develop-
mental local government. Both technical complexity
and political power are involved in the functioning of
every aspect of local governance. The dynamics of
service delivery can therefore not be construed
narrowly as complex technical problems, when they
are equally the sites of shifting political contestation.
The core policy ambition of developmental local
government is the achievement of holistic and
integrated development outcomes that are consistent
with the progressive realisation of socio-economic
rights (Pieterse & van Donk, 2008). Developmental
local government comprises a dual agenda:
a content-driven agenda that prioritises sustain-
able human settlements, robust local economies,
free basic services to the indigent and participa-
tory local democracy; and
an institutional reform agenda focused on
financial management, intergovernmental co-
ordination and performance management. The
latter is seen as a precondition to the former but
both tracks must be pursued in tandem.
Additionally, several tensions run through the
government’s agenda for local government, namely:
(i) between top-down directives and bottom-up
initiatives;
The effective delivery of basic
municipal services (water,
electricity, sanitation, refuse
removal, roads) is one of
government’s critical ongoing
challenges.
These services are close to the heart of every citizen
and failure to meet needs of this nature cannot be
contemplated even in the medium term. Civil society,
especially as represented by groupings such as the
Good Governance Learning Network, has an impor-
tant role to play in ensuring that local governance is
empowered to achieve its mandate.
Although the modernisation of South African
local government is proceeding apace, there is still
much to be accomplished. Given the legacies, the
capacity and fiscal constraints and the contested
place of the local in the intergovernmental system,
finishing the task will require political determination
and policy innovation (Pieterse et al, 2008). The
major thrust of national government intervention has
thus far been of a technical nature, arguably at the
expense of much meaningful engagement by the
average citizen.
Public participation is a key aspect of the
envisioned developmental form of local government.
This should be occurring much more systematically
in the setting of municipal priorities by means of
integrated development planning, the review of local
government performance and the delivery of serv-
ices. In practice, participation has largely been
restricted to the input gathering exercises of IDP
processes. The public cannot be compelled to
Conclusion
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(ii) between technical and political accountability;
(iii) between prescription and experimentalism, a
prerequisite for innovation; and
(iv) between horizontal and vertical integration of
development plans and institutional priorities.
It is important that these issues should receive
explicit attention in public and academic discourses
in order for there to be effective management of the
power relations that circumscribe the everyday
operations of developmental local government. The
GGLN has a crucial role to play in this process of
information dissemination by means of ongoing
research, capacity building, training and user-friendly
publications.
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1 The review process commenced in mid-2007.
2 Three regional workshops took place in Johannesburg, Cape
Town and Durban during April 2007, and a joint workshop
involving all members was held in Cape Town in June 2007.
3 In 2005 a re-demarcation took place, which included the
disestablishment of provincial Cross Border Municipalities.
The original 284 became 283 municipalities (IDASA, 2006).
4 http://www.unhchr.ch/development/governance
5 Information accessed at http://portal.unesco.org/ci/en/ev.php-
URL_ID=5205&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html
6 Hicks draws on the work of Gaventa, 2004; Luckham et al,
2000; Carothers, 2005; and Skocpol, 2003.
7 The good governance survey was conducted by Afesis-
Corplan in partnership with Planact and the German Agency
for Technical Co-operation (GTZ)/Strengthening Local
Governance Programme (SLGP), in Nkangala District
Municipality’s six local municipalities, namely: Delmas, Dr
J.S. Moroka, Emalahleni, Emakhazeni, Steve Tshwete and
Thembisile.
8 The main sectors represented by the surveyed ward
committee members were health & welfare (81%); education
(81%); sports & culture (80%); women (78%); youth (78%);
religious groups (76%); business (72%); CBOs & NGOs
(69%); civic & ratepayers associations (58%); labour
(39%);and senior citizens (10%).
9 The 2006 turnout ranged from only 42,5% in Gauteng (the
wealthiest province) to 56,1% in the Eastern Cape (the
poorest province).
10 Unpublished research on the Executive Mayor System
conducted in 2005 by Afesis-corplan and Foundation for
Contemporary Research
11 Parliamentary Media Briefing: Deputy Chairperson of the
Public Service Commission, Mr J. Ernstzen, 8 February 2006.
12 www.theDPLG.gov.za accessed 23 October 2007
13 See for example Markinor Omnibus Survey 2001
14 See for example Special Investigating Unit Annual Report
2004 2005
15 Commitments in the South African Constitution and Bill of
Rights as well as specific delivery targets set by government
ministries such as housing, local government, social
development, trade and industry, public works.
16 For example the Millennium Development Goals and Make
Poverty History Campaign
17 Urban-rural cross-migration has become noticeable in the
context of the HIV/AIDS AIDS pandemic as family members
in urban areas become economically inactive and chronically
sick and are sent home to rural areas to be cared for – in
spite of the lower levels of primary and secondary health care
available in most rural areas and travel distance to the
nearest towns.
18 Although in Buffalo City Municipality this applies to metered
water users only and households using communal stand
pipes.
19 This was supported by an external cost benefit study
commissioned in 2004.
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MDB CODE MUNICIPALITY HOUSEHOLDS WATER SANITATION REFUSE ELECTRICITY
DC15O R Tambo DM 343 963 220 500 229 714 240 957 194 460
DC12 Amathole DM 424 795 150 742 187 898 186 358 148 162
DC47 Greater Sekhukhune DM 204 791 97 769 134 909 138 684 56 140
DC32 Ehlanzeni DM 351 835 95 642 176 192 179 040 80 243
ETH eThekwini Mun 824 371 88 366 149 471 69 244 115 697
DC35 Capricorn DM 285 220 82 443 151 166 154 415 82 224
DC34 Vhembe DM 274 095 82 143 161 017 166 120 77 631
DC13 Chris Hani DM 189 729 79 199 100 775 104 582 72 740
DC33 Mopani DM 261 697 77 042 146 747 151 945 60 351
DC21 Ugu DM 158 444 74 758 76 389 87 535 61 045
DC26 Zululand DM 147 273 67 838 79 147 83 618 66 940
DC28 uThungulu DM 189 785 64 608 76 320 87 918 58 430
DC37 Bojanala Platinum DM 334 497 62 445 132 059 130 908 48 350
DC27 uMkhanyakude DM 105 730 57 071 60 345 68 379 61 411
DC44 Alfred Nzo DM 93 533 55 041 64 133 67 570 58 640
DC23 uThukela DM 138 841 54 138 72 758 73 604 45 885
DC29 Ilembe DM 130 015 52 793 57 039 64 532 46 736
DC24 uMzinyathi DM 98 741 52 524 56 490 61 271 57 704
DC38 Central DM 184 772 49 985 86 475 94 293 40 063
DC43 Sisonke DM 107 299 49 820 62 494 67 172 56 241
JHB City of Johannesburg 1 050 229 47 164 55 429 45 121 91 110
MP325 Bushbuckridge Mun 109 322 46 531 7 4 859 76 910 19 128
EC157 King Sabata Dalindyebo Mun 90 627 44 412 46 597 48 791 38 565
EKU Ekurhuleni Metro Mun 776 470 42 399 70 691 52 182 113 731
LM343 Thulamela LM 128 447 41 157 77 886 79 940 38 765
DC22 uMgungundlovu DM 234 781 40 968 70 968 77 566 40 566
EC122 Mnquma LM 67 568 40 100 44 823 43 052 36 323
DC14 Ukhahlamba DM 86 144 39 806 49 235 50 582 39 193
DC30 Gert Sibande DM 222 274 39 150 62 105 67 472 63 410
EC121 Mbhashe Mun 53 550 39 087 38 969 40 614 35 975
EC155 Nyandeni LM 55 095 38 324 39 928 41 348  29 208
TSH City of Tshwane Metro Mun 597 520 36 384 77 371 59 901 60 715
EC153 Qaukeni LM 51 063 35 218 36 810 38 865 35 193
EC151 Mbizana LM 46 411 34 282 34 115 36 627 29 051
DC36 Waterberg DM 168 233 34 225 65 656 70 377 37 056
DC31 Nkangala DM 256 877 33 450 83 239 88 882 32 049
CPT City of Cape Town 778 237 33 386 33 480 22 050 52 708
Appendix: Service backlogs
1 From left to right, the figures refer to the total number of households in the municipality and the number of households without each of the four
specified municipal services. The municipalities are arranged in descending order of the number of households without water services.
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LM333 Greater Tzaneen Mun 97 425 32 226 53 239 54 842 20 511
LM344 Makhado Mun 113 222 32 039 67 038 69 188 27 305
LM473 Makhuduthamaga LM 54 033 30 871 38 945 40 604 16 216
EC125 Buffalo City Mun 194 478 30 642 42 966 38 134 52 170
DC39 Bophirima DM 104 895 29 840 52 296 54 467 32 604
LM354 Polokwane Mun 135 638 29 724 55 240 55 369 31 569
EC442 Umzimvubu Mun 46 093 28 588 32 313 33 181 27 363
DC19 Thabo Mofutsanyana DM 186 394 28 032 68 522 77 966 52 669
LM475 Greater Tubatse Mun 56 234 27 934 37 227 37 936 22 528
EC156 Mhlontlo Mun 44 204 27 574 30 337 31 790 24 175
DC25 Amajuba DM 98 219 26 725 34 652 30 929 20 751
EC441 Matatiele LM 47 439 26 453 31 820 34 389 31 277
KZ213 Umzumbe Mun 38 889 26 450 24 384 28 694 21 811
EC135 Intsika Yethu Mun 40 884 25 742 30 283 31 074 21 889
KZ244 Msinga Mun 32 908 23 852 23 780 24 959 23 735
DC17 Motheo DM 210 643 23 294 46 364 54 573 24 624
MP322 Mbombela LM 122 504 23 155 47 622 47 663 22 737
DC18 Lejweleputswa DM 196 775 22 809 30 370 39 245 41 723
LM367 Mogalakwena Mun 70 134 22 655 37 604 39 809 15 114
EC141 Elundini LM 33 753 21 782 23 040 23 954 23 999
EC137 Engcobo LM 31 434 21 532 22 549 23 394 19 635
MP324 Nkomazi LM 75 584 21 508 44 828 46 146 30 690
KZ435 Umzimkhulu LM 36 677 21 444 26 243 27 461 20 316
FS172 Mangaung LM 188 876 21 209 41 712 48 457 20 369
KZ272 Jozini Mun 34 739 20 992 22 761 25 240 24 593
KZ265 Nongoma LM 32 473 20 803 20 267 22 756 18 442
EC154 Port St Johns Mun 29 502 20 763 21 409 22 123 19 297
LM472 Elias Motsoaledi LM 19 022 20 671 30 559 31 167 5 325
LM355 Lepelle-Nkumpi LM 52 928 20 543 30 878 31 206 15 036
KZ284 uMlalazi Mun 44 634 20 006 20 617 23 025 16 849
EC152 Ntabankulu LM 27 060 19 927 20 519 21 414 18 972
NMA Nelson Mandela Bay Mun 265 375 19 124 12 343 22 838 47 477
NW383 Mafikeng LM 67 579 19 037 29 388 30 835 13 703
DC40 Southern DM 274 576 18 327 28 501 29 136 40 399
KZ266 Ulundi LM 34 957 17 919 19 020 21 036 16 271
LM331 Greater Giyani Mun 53 292 17 680 33 012 34 994 13 700
EC126 Ngqushwa Mun 21 894 10 134 15 673 16 527 5 438
MP303 Mkhondo Mun 28 918 10 121 12 589 13 123 12 795
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KZ242 Nquthu LM 29 698 17 647 20 907 22 590 20 639
KZ271 uMhlabuyalingana Mun 26 678 17 457 17 883 19 672 19 291
NW372 Madibeng LM 100 457 17 282 38 771 37 763 17 765
KZ225 Msunduzi Mun 135 329 17 247 33 710 33 913 13 988
KZ216 Hibiscus Coast Mun 55 274 16 877 19 401  21 196 9 617
FS184 Matjhabeng LM 128 716 16 760 18 487 19 336 28 026
KZ293 Ndwedwe LM 30 645 16 480 16 153 20 034 16 661
NW394 Greater Taung LM 42 018 16 477 28 048 28 709 16 520
LM332 Greater Letaba Mun 53 747 16 362 35 169 36 169 13 883
KZ294 Maphumulo Mun 22 429 16 313 15 576 16 777 14 408
EC142 Senqu Mun 34 285 15 779 21 397 22 808 10 501
FS194 Maluti-a-Phofung Mun 92 159 15 437 48 877 51 186 30 563
DC45 Kgalagadi DM 47 259 15 358 25 093 25 690 14 298
KZ235 Okhahlamba LM 27 978 15 198 18 391 19 302 13 193
NW375 Moses Kotane LM 62 940 15 124 33 798 35 470 4 076
NW373 Rustenburg LM 116 665 15 047 30 769 28 014 15 279
EC136 Emalahleni Mun 28 304 14 521 18 687 19 089 12 262
EC124 Amahlathi Mun 34 720 14 448 20 441 21 093 8 615
KZ286 Nkandla Mun 24 910 14 343 16 010 17 292 17 428
KZ236 Imbabazane LM 23 283 14 050 17 157 17 712 6 814
MP316 Dr J. S. Moroka Mun 54 339 13 939 31 774 32 044 3 497
KZ274 Hlabisa Mun 27 279 13 916 13 995 16 298 12 257
KZ434 Ubuhlebezwe Mun 23 107 13 711 13 873 15 063 12 630
NW371 Moretele LM 43 938 13 652 25 974 26 327 8 615
KZ263 AbaQulusi Mun 37 064 13 343 15 728 17 170 15 552
KZ252 Newcastle Mun 71 999 13 291 19 245 14 402 8 981
LM351 Blouberg Mun 35 176 13 205 24 716 25 754 15 686
KZ232 Emnambithi / Ladysmith LM 51 903 12 331 17 398 16 625 12 037
MP301 Albert Luthuli LM 41 234 11 719 23 464 25 621 15 539
NW381 Ratlou LM 25 641 11 681 16 828 17 112 4 363
EC127 Nkonkobe Mun 34 434 11 464 17 654 18 428 6 183
KZ431 Ingwe LM 21 954 11 462 14 710 16 555 12 814
KZ214 Umuziwabantu Mun 19 524 10 848 12 133 13 135 11 200
KZ254 Dannhauser Mun 19 481 10 743 12 138 13 027 8 463
KZ291 éNdondakusuka Mun 31 014 10 540 11 658 14 528 8 294
LM352 Aganang Mun 32 533 10 271 22 850 23 404 14 440
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KZ211 Vulamehlo Mun 16 805 10 025 9 009 11 287 9 588
KZ245 Umvoti Mun 23 002 9 813 10 184 11 335 10 225
KZ262 uPhongolo LM 26 954 9 647 14 748 14 558 8 816
KZ282 City of uMhlathuze 73 301 9 629 19 183 23 270 6 664
LM474 Fetakgomo LM 48 951 9 576 13 193 13 463 8 722
NW391 Kagisano LM 21 496 9 562 14 945 15 296 5 568
NC451 Moshaweng LM 20 281 9 472 14 822 14 959 10 195
KZ292 KwaDukuza Mun 45 928 9 460 13 652 13 193 7 373
KZ281 Mbonambi LM 20 438 9 175 8 518 10 826 6 210
KZ233 Indaka LM 21 475 9 006 14 918 15 678 9 903
DC48 West Rand DM 183 669 8 918 20 378 19 021 26 703
DC10 Cacadu DM 103 001 8 890 18 726 13 987 17 417
DC42 Sedibeng DM 230 786 8 832 21 329 66 954 22 660
LM471 Greater Marble Hall Mun 26 551 8 717 14 985 15 513 3 350
LM353 Molemole Mun 28 944 8 700 17 482 18 682 5 493
KZ221 uMshwathi Mun 27 324 7 717 12 714 14 573 8 013
MP315 Thembisile LM 58 235 7 709 33 206 34 331 4 662
EC134 Lukhanji Mun 44 973 7 683 14 907 15 740 9 595
NW385 Ramotshere Moiloa LM 22 719 7 333 17 817 18 756 7 312
MP312 Emalahleni LM 82 298 7 227 11 746 15 165 13 861
LM342 Mutale LM 18 447 7 142 11 534 12 010 7 743
NW384 Ditsobotla LM 36 431 6 736 10 608 14 010 8 595
KZ283 Ntambanana Mun 13 844 6 692 6 499 7 722 5 800
NW403 City of Matlosana 112 119 6 521 5 397 8 415 13 380
KZ215 Ezinqoleni Mun 11 443 6 460 6 938 7 585 5 056
DC20 Fezile Dabi DM 124 985 6 416 17 489 28 267 17 946
KZ261 éDumbe Mun 15 824 6 126 9 383 8 098 7 859
DC9 Frances Baard DM 85 558 6 111 11 367 14 730 13 163
FS191 Setsoto LM 33 623 6 104 6 466 11 991 7 661
EC138 Sakhisizwe Mun 14 609 5 782 7 589 7 742 5 148
KZ227 Richmond Mun 16 021 5 755 6 954 7 664 4 388
DC4 Eden DM 121 156 5 702 8 739 7 332 8 809
NC452 Ga-Segonyana Mun 17 799 5 667 8 954 9 535 3 363
LM335 Maruleng Mun 23 050 5 640 13 517 14 400 6 707
GT421 Emfuleni LM 190 237 5 558 15 693 58 571 14 009
MP307 Govan Mbeki Mun 67 629 5 489 8 190 6 729 11 937
FS201 Moqhaka LM 43 902 2 063 5 174 7 914 5 419
KZ433 Greater Kokstad Mun 20 566 2 057 5 223 5 549 8 203
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DC2 Cape Winelands DM 160 100 5 234 7 570 10 699 9 664
NW382 Tswaing Mun 32 401 5 198 11 833 13 581 6 089
LM334 Ba-Phalaborwa Mun 33 571 5 128 11 811 11 525 5 544
NW405 Merafong City LM 99 701 4 940 9 396 6 803 13 925
KZ285 Mthonjaneni LM 12 657 4 762 5 493 5 783 5 479
KZ226 Mkhambathini LM 15 417 4 437 6 150 8 024 5 256
MP302 Msukaligwa Mun 30 302 4 275 5 442 6 958 9 529
KZ212 Umdoni Mun 16 508 4 097 4 524 5 639 3 773
MP304 Pixley Ka Seme LM 18 412 4 081 6 204 6 763 4 795
GT483 Westonaria LM 51 521 4 061 8 562 3 710 11 170
LM362 Lephalale Mun 28 359 3 823 11 848 13 314 6 078
DC46 Metsweding DM 51 002 3 800 8 929 10 493 7 992
EC123 Great Kei Mun 11 513 3 646 5 922 6 358 2 347
KZ234 Umtshezi Mun 13 978 3 545 4 885 4 278 3 932
FS192 Dihlabeng LM 33 476 3 517 6 394 8 202 8 456
DC8 Siyanda DM 54 299 3 275 7 115 9 681 8 382
DC16 Xhariep DM 39 315 3 274 8 577 9 850 7 864
GT481 Mogale City LM 89 687 3 169 8 193 10 252 9 908
LM361 Thabazimbi Mun 25 037 3 165 6 155 6 801 5 875
LM365 Modimolle LM 20 964 3 065 6 347 6 364 5 831
KZ273 Big 5 False Bay Mun 7 117 2 973 3 107 3 458 3 445
NW404 Maquassi Hills LM 17 302 2 856 4 243 5 097 4 890
KZ253 Utrecht Mun 6 739 2 690 3 270 3 499 3 307
DC7 Pixley Ka Seme DM 41 916 2 686 5 952 6 563 6 936
GT462 Kungwini LM 34 169 2 630 6 232 6 976 4 936
EC132 Tsolwana Mun 7 935 2 563 3 957 4 100 815
MP305 Lekwa Mun 26 198 2 539 4 694 6 176 6 568
MP313 Steve Tshwete LM 37 115 2 473 3 317 2 893 5 465
MP323 Umjindi Mun 15 910 2 409 3 743 2 841 4 220
FS185 Nala LM 26 014 2 338 3 667 4 431 4 362
NW402 Potchefstroom City Council 34 028 2 325 4 987 4 090 4 852
NC091 Sol Plaatje Mun 51 104 2 308 2 022 2 658 6 069
WC044 George Mun 36 191 2 245 2 798 2 208 2 804
DC3 Overberg DM 58 738 2 13 1 3 936 3 400 5 749
EC105 Ndlambe Mun 15 734 2 125 4 757 2 109 3 582
KZ224 Impendle LM 7463 2 075 5 172 5 637 2 292
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KZ223 Mpofana Mun 10 516 2 039 2 804 3 289 3 342
NC094 Phokwane Mun 17 092 2 021 5 643 6 264 3 147
MP321 Thaba Chweu Mun 26 818 2 000 5 091 5 281 3 382
FS203 Ngwathe Mun 32 540 1 816 5 751 9 553 4 319
LM341 Musina LM 13 978 1 805 4 559 4 982 3 818
GT423 Lesedi LM 19 709 1 769 1 975 3 941 3 830
FS204 Metsimaholo LM 33 733 1 747 5 248 7 993 4 935
WC023 Drakenstein Mun 46 266 1 734 1 898 2 457 3 209
FS195 Phumelela LM 12 043 1 701 3 351 2 946 3 125
KZ222 uMngeni LM 22 701 1 698 3 463 4 465 3 286
NW401 Ventersdorp LM 11 426 1 686 4 477 4 732 3 353
EC143 Maletswai Mun 9 818 1 635 2 988 2 135 3 056
FS183 Tswelopele Mun 12 554 1 602 2 831 6 225 3 396
GT482 Randfontein LM 40 446 1 581 3 352 4 547 5 367
EC104 Makana Mun 18 453 1 567 3 592 1 159 3 250
DC1 West Coast DM 77 947 1 563 3 179 6 267 4 155
WC031 Theewaterskloof Mun 24 363 1 522 2 248 1 611 3 094
GT422 Midvaal LM 20 840 1 505 3 661 4 443 4 821
NW393 Mamusa LM 10 751 1 483 2 996 2 526 2 414
EC106 Sundays River Valley Mun 10 007 1 472 2 951 2 853 1 718
WC048 Knysna Mun 14 972 1 378 1 821 338 1 469
FS181 Masilonyana Mun 20 515 1 368 2 968 6 055 3 952
NW374 Kgetlengrivier LM 10 497 1 340 2 748 3 334 2 615
FS173 Mantsopa LM 14 082 1 307 3 008 3 812 2 867
FS193 Nketoana LM 15 039 1 273 3 434 3 636 2 865
MP311 Delmas Municipal Council 13 954 1 269 1 785 2 625 2 968
EC108 Kouga Mun 19 549 1 266 2 046 1 493 2 366
FS161 Letsemeng Council 12 098 1 242 2 999 3 072 2 837
EC128 Nxuba Mun 6 638 1 221 1 450 2 152 1 110
KZ241 Endumeni Mun 13 133 1 212 1 620 2 387 3 105
FS162 Kopanong Mun 17 636 1 195 3 001 3 865 2 800
NC083 //Khara Hais Mun 17 651 1 187 1 631 1 428 2 660
GT461 Nokeng Tsa Taemane LM 16 833 1 170 2 697 3 517 3 057
WC025 Breede Valley Mun 35 096 1 162 1 984 3 334 2 272
EC133 Inkwanca LM 5 490 332 1 007 1 067 1 140
NC085 Tsantsabane Mun 5 840 326 567 711 698
NC064 Kamiesberg Mun 3 239 292 561 389 791
NC071 Ubuntu Mun 4 267 290 537 741 664
MDB CODE MUNICIPALITY HOUSEHOLDS WATER SANITATION REFUSE ELECTRICITY
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EC102 Blue Crane Route Mun 9 580 1 135 1 725 1 892 2 310
KZ432 Kwa Sani Mun 4 660 1 125 2 384 2 440 2 218
DC6 Namakwa DM 30 601 1 119 2 973 3 235 3 637
NC092 Dikgatlong Mun 9 735 1 095 2 055 2 498 2 488
KZ275 Mtubatuba Mun 8 286 1 088 1 867 2 919 1 183
EC131 Inxuba Yethemba Mun 16 075 1 046 1 797 2 374 2 255
WC024 Stellenbosch Mun 35 124 1 043 1 113 994 1 157
NW396 Lekwa-Teemane LM 11 578 964 1 062 1 787 2 398
MP306 Dipaleseng Mun 9 581 926 1 522 2 101 2 246
NC082 Kai !Garib Mun 18 050 880 2 412 4 144 2 277
FS163 Mohokare LM 9 580 837 2 577 2 913 2 227
MP314 Emakhazeni LM 10 937 833 1 411 1 824 1 596
LM364 Mookgophong Mun 9 569 792 1 690 1 805 1 709
FS205 Mafube LM 14 811 790 1 316 2 807 3 274
FS171 Naledi LM 7 686 779 1 644 2 304 1 388
FS182 Tokologo Mun 8 976 741 2 417 3 197 1 987
NC078 Siyancuma Mun 9 229 739 1 971 2 187 1 960
NW392 Naledi LM (NW) 15 254 735 3 341 3 576 4 022
LM366 Bela-Bela LM 14 170 725 2 011 2 285 2 449
WC026 Breede River / Winelands Mun 21 215 679 1 198 1 663 1 188
KZDMA27 St Lucia Park 1 631 645 732 792 642
NW395 Molopo LM 3 799 617 1 904 2 572 1 683
EC144 Gariep Mun 8 288 610 1 809 1 684 1 637
WC047 Bitou LM 8 944 597 497 267 771
WC022 Witzenberg Mun 20 459 594 1 207 1 945 1 626
EC109 Kou-Kamma Mun 9 979 582 1 230 1 567 1 198
NC093 Magareng Mun 5 811 579 970 2 508 922
WC045 Greater Oudtshoorn Mun 18 413 526 1 112 1 206 1 351
NC072 Umsobomvu Mun 5 909 475 742 809 843
WC011 Matzikama Mun 14 497 467 1 234 1 991 1 193
NC084 !Kheis Mun 3 997 388 1 189 1 080 975
ECDMA10 Aberdeen Plain 2 544 388 965 1 080 947
WC015 Swartland Mun 18 758 367 479 1 157 714
NC076 Thembelihle Mun 3 490 361 731 662 687
NC062 Nama Khoi Mun 12 094 358 722 700 950
WC032 Overstrand Mun 19 020 353 782 840 1 876
WC043 Mossel Bay Mun 20 258 346 517 575 859
NC073 Emthanjeni Mun 8 835 340 497 554 1 010
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WC014 Saldanha Bay Mun 18 923 290 198 174 758
WC041 Kannaland Mun 6 156 271 780 909 586
DC5 Central Karoo DM 15 236 227 859 1 259 1 188
NCDMA08 Siyanda DMA 3 253 221 877 1 267 908
WC042 Hessequa Mun 12 664 206 681 969 723
WC034 Swellendam Mun 7 619 202 499 581 431
WC013 Bergrivier Mun 13 362 190 435 1 045 463
NC065 Hantam Mun 5 521 172 571 765 639
NC081 Mier Mun 1 596 165 276 751 446
EC101 Camdeboo Mun 10 496 163 639 621 955
NC067 Khâi-Ma Mun 3 363 159 358 487 438
NCDMA07 Pixley Ka Seme DMA 1 102 152 492 566 390
NC075 Renosterberg Mun 2 473 148 327 394 556
WC012 Cederberg LM 11 220 145 694 1 596 755
WCDMA04 Eden DMA 3 558 134 533 861 246
WC053 Beaufort West Mun 9 103 131 346 520 618
EC107 Baviaans LM 3 904 128 438 762 558
NC453 Gamagara Mun 6 683 127 722 473 324
NC086 Kgatelopele Mun 3 911 108 163 300 418
NCDMA09 Diamondfields 1 817 108 676 802 538
GTDMA48 Sterkfontein 2 015 108 271 512 258
NC077 SiyaThemba Mun 4 182 107 236 319 431
WCDMA01 West Coast DMA 1 188 105 138 305 273
NCDMA45 Kgalagadi DMA 2 497 92 595 724 415
NC066 Karoo Hoogland Mun 3 168 75 439 543 577
NC074 Kareeberg Mun 2 430 74 419 332 395
EC103 Ikwezi Mun 2 756 66 384 450 532
WC033 Cape Agulhas Mun 7 653 54 407 368 348
WC052 Prince Albert Mun 2 614 48 170 264 205
MPDMA32 Kruger Park 1 695 39 50 200 87
NCDMA06 Namaqualand DMA 342 32 84 146 137
NC061 Richtersveld Mun 2 874 31 237 206 106
WC051 Laingsburg Mun 1 945 27 199 286 220
WCDMA05 Central Karoo DMA 1 574 22 144 189 145
WCDMA02 Cape Winelands DMA 1 939 22 170 307 212
KZDMA43 Mkhomazi Wilderness Area 335 20 61 103 59
KZDMA23 Giants Castle Game Res 223 8 9 9 7
MDB CODE MUNICIPALITY HOUSEHOLDS WATER SANITATION REFUSE ELECTRICITY
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MDB CODE MUNICIPALITY HOUSEHOLDS WATER SANITATION REFUSE ELECTRICITY
NPDMA33 Kruger Park 611 6 0 14 6
KZDMA22 Highmoor/ Kamberg Park 10 0 0 1 1
ECDMA13 Mount Zebra National Park 23 0 0 0 0
ECDMA14 Oviston Nature Res  0  0  0  0
FSDMA19 Golden Gate Highlands NP 54 0 0 5 0
NPDMA47 Schuinsdraai Nature Res 0 0  0  0
MPDMA31 Mdala Nature Reserve 0 0 0 0
NWDMA37 Pilanesberg National Park 0 0 0 0
WCDMA03 Overberg DMA 83 0 0 0 0
Source: Gaffneys (2007) derived from Census 2001.
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